Books
This excellent work, throwing a new light on the contacts between Indian and Chinese philosophers and theologians at the court of the Tibetan king, at the peak of his power in the middle of the eighth century, contains the following chapters: l) Translation of the Chinese record of the debate between the representative of the Chinese Buddhist philosophers, a Chinese Ch'an (Zen) master having the pretentious name Ta-ch'êng (Mahāyāna, Great Vehicle), and the representative of the Indian Buddhist philosophers, Śāntarakṣita's disciple Kamalaśīla, who was hostile to Ch'an doctrines and charged the Chinese Ch'an monks with neglect of morality and with graded spiritual exercises and gradual progress on the path to Sainthood (ārya-mārga); 2) Translations of memorials, records, letters, prayers and poems, written by Chinese officials and Buddhist monks in Tibetan-occupied West China during the eighth century; 3) Translations of the first and third chapters of Kamalaśīla's work entitled Bhāvanā-krama ("The Stages and Grades in the Spiritual Exercises," extant in Sanskrit (manuscript discovered by the late E. Obermiller in 1935, Journal of the Greater India Society, II, 1-11), the Tibetan Tanjur, and the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Taishā Daizōkyō, No. 1664). Almost half of Demiéville's book consists of copious notes with references to Chinese and Tibetan historical documents, annals and records, and Tun-huang manuscripts (Pelliot Collection, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris), filling many gaps left by the printed Chinese Buddhist texts. The Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot Coll., No. 4646) translated in the first chapter of the book under review has been reproduced in facsimile (32 plates) and bears the title Judgment on the True Principles of the Great Vehicle of Sudden Enlightenment. The doctrines of the Chinese opponent of Indian gradualism in this court symposium led by the Tibetan king are largely identical with those of the Chinese Ch'an masters Hui-nêng and his disciple Shên-hui (praised as a "political genius" and the Seventh Patriarch by Hu Shih in Philosophy East and West, III, 6-13), whose Discourses have been translated by J. Gernet (Publications de l'ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, Vol. 31, Hanoi, 1949) and whose more important Sermon delivered on a Platform (T'an-yü)has just been translated by the expert in the history of the Ch'an school, W. Liebenthal (Asia Major, III (1953), 132-155). Demiéville's book is indispensable for those who want to compare Indian and Chinese national traits and attitudes. His documents show a contrast between the Chinese ideal of the conquest of time (totum simul), expressed in the proverb, "He lays down the butcher's cleaver, and immediately becomes a Buddha" (quoted by Hu Shih op. cit., p. 11), and the Indian patient, disciplinarian, and pedestrian stress on training, gradual cultivation, nurture, and educational processes. -Johannes Rahder, Yale University.
(Chinese characters in original unavailable)In a careful analysis of the historical and rhetorical basis of the literature, Steven Heine demonstrates that the Mu version of the case, preferred by advocates of the key-phrase approach, does not by any means constitute the final word concerning the meaning and significance of the Mu Koan. He shows that another canonical version, which gives both "Yes" and "No" responses, must be taken into account. Like Cats and Dogs offers critical insight and a new theoretical perspective on "the koan of koans." (Source: Oxford University Press)
Pérez-Remón's book is analytical in nature, and its immediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anattā doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self" (attā) and "non-self" (anattā) are of course central to this study. In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he introduces some important distinctions which appear for the most part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification; and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qualified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anattā doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. Perez-Remon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking on the nature and existence of the self.
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In this chapter I examine some medieval Buddhist doctrines that, at least on the surface, seem similarly strange and implausible. Indeed, some of the Buddhist notions to be examined below were perplexing to audiences in their own day, much as discussions of brain transplants are perplexing to us today. On the Indian side, I will begin with the notion of nirodha-samāpatti, a meditative state akin to a vegetative coma in which all consciousness has ceased. I will then turn to a class of beings known as “beings without conception” (asaṃjñika-sattvāḥ), denizens of a celestial realm who are devoid of sentience, thought, and consciousness. In both cases, an insentient state seems to be followed by (or gives rise to) a sentient state, which poses serious challenges to the classical Buddhist understanding of karma. On the Chinese side, we will consider the debate over the buddha-nature of insentient objects—can an insentient thing such as a wall or roof tile attain buddhahood and preach the dharma? This doctrine too could be (and was) seen as a threat to the coherence of Buddhist teachings.
Modern scholars tend to approach such doctrines as the products of intelligent but misguided scholastics struggling to make sense of the universe, all the while hobbled by the dictates of tradition, scripture, and a prescientific understanding of the cosmos. They are the proverbial schoolmen calculating how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But I would suggest another perspective. Such theories, I argue, serve as frames of reference for pondering issues of personal identity, ethical responsibility, sentience, and death. Given that we ourselves are still far from clarity on these issues, and given that we too devise fanciful thought experiments to help gain a conceptual toehold, perhaps it is time to look afresh at what the Buddhists might have been up to.[11] (Sharf, preamble, 144–45)
Notes
11. For an articulate defense of Buddhist scholasticism, along different lines, see Paul John Griffiths, “Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice,” in Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 201–35.Source Texts
Interviews
Multimedia
Conversations on Buddha-Nature with Lopen Dr. Karma Phuntsho. Produced by the Tsadra Foundation Research Department, March 28, 2022. Video, 6:49. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a9L-KcGTJQs.;Potprecha Cholvijarn: On the Background to the Nibbāna as Self or Not-Self Debate;ātman;anātman;Buddha-nature as Self - Atman;The doctrine of buddha-nature in Theravadin Buddhism;Debate(s);Potprecha Cholvijarn: On the Background to the Nibbāna as Self or Not-Self Debate