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The Trikāya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Yogācāra, but regarded as typical of the Mahāyāna in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad ''dharma-kāya'', ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' (or ''saṃbhogika-kāya'') and ''nirmāṇa-kāya'' (or ''nairmāṇika-kāya''). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the ''nirmāṇa-kāya'', usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The ''saṃbhoga-kāya'' ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of form, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabilities. By contrast, the ''dharma-kāya'' ("''Dharma''-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the ''dharma-kāya'' is often linked with various terms for reality, such as ''dharmatā'', ''dharma-dhātu'', and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062F8-QINU`"' In this light the ''dharma-kāya'' is understood as the primal "source" or "ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062F9-QINU`"' While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract terms, others impute personal characteristics to it;'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FA-QINU`"' and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FB-QINU`"'<br> As a summary of the Trikāya doctrine this is, of course, oversimplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which underwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continued down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship
between them.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FC-QINU`"' It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the course of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments advanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (''Buddha-kāya'')," first published in English in 1973.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FD-QINU`"' Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogācāras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., ''rūpa-kāya'' and ''dharma-kāya'') "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sūtras,'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FE-QINU`"' and in early Mahāyāna sūtras, the ''Prajñāpāramitā'', the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīka'', and so forth. The rūpa-kāya is the Buddha seen in a human body, while the dharma-kāya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106–7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the time of Nāgārjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the ''saṃbhoga-kāya'', were also to hand before the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the ''bodhisattva''-conccpt and the idea that a ''bodhisattva'''s performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogācāras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51–53), and distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream'"`UNIQ--ref-000062FF-QINU`"' (in this case, Sarvāstivādin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject'"`UNIQ--ref-00006300-QINU`"' there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-body/three-body progression, in terms of which a single personality is divided into a physical and a "spiritual" body, and then the physical body is further split in two, yielding the final complement of three. Some writers, however, point to the existence of three bodies even in the Pali sources, what one scholar has called the "primitive triad," i.e., ''pūti-'' or ''cātur-mahābhūtika-kāya'', ''mano-maya-kāya'', and ''dhamma-kāya''.'"`UNIQ--ref-00006301-QINU`"' The first is the corruptible physical body formed out of the four elements, while the second is the mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial realms (believed by some to be a forerunner of the ''saṃbhoga-kāya''); the third is the so-called "''Dhamma-body''." Now, although both these ways of approaching the subject—the assumption of a linear process, and the belief that the Pāli Canon contains an embryonic Trikāya schema—raise certain difficulties, I do not propose in this paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikāya theory in its entirety, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development of the idea of ''dharma-kāya'', in the hope that clarifying this will open the way to a better understanding of Mahāyāna buddhology as a whole. (Harrison, introduction, 44–46)<br><br>[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8792/2699 Read more here . . .]
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Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030)'"`UNIQ--ref-000066C2-QINU`"' contributed significantly not only to developing Nirākārajñānavāda theories but also to the resurrection of the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' (abbr. RGV) in early-11th-century India. The ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' was very likely composed sometime around the 4th or 5th century in India. The work fell into obscurity towards the late 6th century, only to slowly regain recognition starting from the early 11th century (see Appendix A).<br> The earliest masters of this period who quote or refer to the RGV are Maitrīpa (1007/1010-?), Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030), and Ratnākaraśānti (late 10th to early 11th century).'"`UNIQ--ref-000066C3-QINU`"' Maitrīpa was the common disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti, and, according to a story in Tibetan documents, rediscovered a Sanskrit manuscript of the RGV in a stūpa in Magadha.<br> If this rediscovery story is a historical event, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnākaraśānti would have received the teaching of the RGV from their common disciple Maitrīpa; but we have no concrete witness to corroborate it.<br> Maitrīpa’s knowledge of the RGV is attested by a quotation of RGV II. 61b in his ''Pañcatathāgatamudrāvivaraṇa''; he introduces a Nirākāravijñānavādin’s propounding the arising of the Dharmakāya from the Saṃbhogakāya and Nirmāṇakāya, but does not discuss Buddha-nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-000066C4-QINU`"' In contrast to Maitrīpa, who does not discuss Buddha-nature, we find extensive discussions of the topic in compositions of Jñānaśrīmitra and
Ratnākaraśānti.'"`UNIQ--ref-000066C5-QINU`"' In the present paper, I shall focus on quotations from the RGV in Jñānaśrīmitra’s ''Sākārasiddhiśāstra'' and ''Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra'', and on his understanding of the RGV, so as to shed light on the reception of the RGV in the early 11th century. (Kano, introductory remarks, 7–8)
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Articles/Kaḥ thog Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's Doxographical Position: The Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness (gzhan stong dbu ma chen po) +
This paper cxplores the doctrinal position of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita ’Gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D70-QINU`"' (1761-1829) namely, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (''gzhan stong dbu ma chen po''). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita was the first of the Dge rtse reincarnation lineage, and served as an abbot of the Kah thog monastery of the Rnying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism in Khams, in eastem Tibet.'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D71-QINU`"' Apart from the fact that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita edited the Sde dge edition of the ''Rnying ma rgyud ’bum'','"`UNIQ--ref-00005D72-QINU`"' little is known of him or his own works.'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D73-QINU`"'<br> This paper will examine Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s doxography, considering the way in which he attempts to demonstrate that the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is ultimate within the Buddhist doctrinal history originating from India. According to Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita, the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness is said to have been the intent of the Last Tuming of the Wheel of the Dharma which is of definitive meaning, teaches the Buddha-nature (''tathāgatagarbha''), and, as pointed out by Duckworth, "accords with the Great Perfection"'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D74-QINU`"' (''rdzogs chen''). Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s ''gzhang stong'' view is explicitly taught in the following doxographical texts: the ''Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan'', the ''Grub mtha'i rnam gzhag nges don dgongs gsal'', the ''Rton pa bzhi ldan gyi gtam'', the first chapter of the ''Rnying ma rgyud 'bum dkar chag lha'i rnga bo che'','"`UNIQ--ref-00005D75-QINU`"' and the ''Sangs rgyas gnyis pa'i dgongs pa'i rgyan'','"`UNIQ--ref-00005D76-QINU`"' which is Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita's commentary on the ''Gsang sngags lam gyi rim pa sal ba'i sgron me'', a ''gter ma'' of Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer (1124/1136-1192/1204).<br> This paper will also suggest that Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita should be recognized as a forerunner of the ''ris med'' movement in Khams, as supported by the following facts: his view on the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness embraces the major practice lineages (''sgrub brgyud'')—Jo nang pa, Bka' brgyud pa, Sa skya pa, early Dge lugs pa, Rnying ma pa, and Zhi byed—within a single overriding intent of the Buddha’s teachings;'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D77-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita as the teacher of Zhe chen dbon sprul ’Gyur med mthu stobs rnam rgyal, also known as Zhe chen Mahāpaṇḍita (b. 1787), who was a ''gzhan stong pa'','"`UNIQ--ref-00005D78-QINU`"' and who in tum was the teacher of the three masters Kong sprul (1813-99), Mkhyen brtse'i dbang po (1820–2), and Dpal sprul (1808-87).'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D79-QINU`"' Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita’s ''Legs bshad gser gyi thur ma'', which is his response to the ''Lta ba'i gsung mgur'' by Lcang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86),'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D7A-QINU`"' would hint at the seeds of the ''ris med'' movement which grew up among the three schools, the Sa skya, Bka' brgyud, and Rnying ma.'"`UNIQ--ref-00005D7B-QINU`"' With this paper, then, I hope to add to our understanding of the practice lineages of Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka. (Makidono, introduction, 77–80)
Khenpo Dawa Paljor's Teaching on Buddha-Nature following Mipham Rinpoche's Word-by-Word Commentary on the Uttaratantra Shastra. Recorded in Tibetan with English Translation. +
This article examines an exposition of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness by 'Jam mgon Kong sprul Bio gros mtha' yas (1813-99)'"`UNIQ--ref-00000428-QINU`"' of the Bka' brgyud school of Tibetan Buddhism, in his ''Stainless Ray of Light of the Adamantine Moon: An Instruction on the View of the Great Madhyamaka of Other-Emptiness'' (''Gzhan stong dbu ma chen po'i Ita khrid rdo rje zla ba dri ma med pa'i 'od zer zhes bya ba'', henceforth ''Instruction on the View''). In it, Kong sprul sets forth the theory and practice of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness, centered upon the doctrine of Buddha-nature. The ''Instruction on the View'' largely consists of three main outlines: (1) the origin of the doctrine of the Great Madhyamaka of other-emptiness (''gang nas byung ba'i khung''); (2) the main part of the Instruction on the View (''Jta khrid dngos''); and (3) an explanation of the benefits (''phan yon bshad pa''). In this article, I will first summarize the contents of the ''Instruction on the View'', according to its topical outlines,'"`UNIQ--ref-00000429-QINU`"' and then discuss a hermeneutical issue related to textual interpretations of authoritative scriptures, comparing Kong sprul's approach with that of Dge rtse Mahāpaṇḍita (1761-1829) and Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912). (Makidono, introduction, 151–52) +
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Among the numerous texts discovered at Drepung monastery’s library through the efforts of [[Alak Zenkar Rinpoche]] and his team is a hitherto unknown commentary by one [[Lhodrak Dharma Senge]]. Although the manuscript is incomplete and missing the final pages which may have contained the colophon, the title on the first page and a note at the start of the commentary explicitly mention Lhodrakpa Dharma Senge as the author. Yet, apart from the obvious association of the author with the southern Lhodrak region of Central Tibet, we have no information on when and where he lived. +
Roger R. Jackson, in his essay "Luminous Mind Among the Logicians", treats the Indo-Tibetan commentarial discussions of the affirmation of the mind's natural luminosity (''prabhāsvaratā'') found in ''Pramāṇavārttika'' II.208. Such an affIrmation, as he shows, has deep roots in the Buddhist tradition, and is usually connected with ''tathāgatagarbha'' thought. That it is also affirmed by Dharmakīrti and discussed extensively by his commentators in India and Tibet shows that it is not without significance for the logicoepistemological tradition represented by Dignāga and his successors. The idea that the mind is naturally luminous or radiant and that
its defIlements have only an adventitious status is of obvious relevance to Buddhist soteriology; it affirms that, in some important sense, the goal of Buddhist religious practice has already been attained or is already present. The importance of Jackson's study is that it shows the same idea to be relevant also to Buddhist epistemological theory: it is precisely the mind's natural radiance that makes apprehension of things as they really are a possibility. It is this metaphysical and epistemological fact which leads Jackson to categorize Dharmakīrti and his school as epistemological optimists. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 5) +
Articles/Lying to Tell the Truth-Upaya in Mahayana Buddhism and Oikonomia in Alexandrian Christianity +
Roger Gregory-Tashi Corless, in his essay "Lying to Tell the Truth", explores the use of intentional vagueness and obscurity in the texts of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and relates this to the intentional use of falsehood (or, perhaps better, nontruth) in the ''Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra''. Both in second century Alexandria and in third century India, he suggests, one fmds a self-conscious use
of graded, hierarchically ordered sets of "false truths" as pedagogical devices. For the ''Lotus'', Corless suggests, the "true truth" is that all living beings are in fact possessors of Buddha Nature; it is this toward which the pedagogically useful though partial truths (''upāya'') found in other assertions point. This position is illustrated with extensive quotations from [[Kūkai]], and is compared with positions taken by a series of Christian thinkers from Nicholas of Cusa to John Henry Newman. (Griffiths and Keenan, introduction to ''Buddha Nature'', 3–4) +
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A simple three-word koan. Or just a one-word koan: buddhanature. So deceptively simple, so easy to leave in the realm of concept, yet it penetrates to the very heart of the matter. Here’s Geoffery Shugen Arnold, Sensei, on Case 30 of the Gateless Gate, “Mazu’s ‘Mind is buddha.'” +
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The study of the ''Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra'''"`UNIQ--ref-000000EB-QINU`"') has a long history. French, Chinese and Japanese scholars have participated in the discussion, some of them great authorities in the field of Sino-Indian Studies, as P. Demieville, Ui Hakuju, Tokiwa Daijō, and Mochizuki Shinkō'"`UNIQ--ref-000000EC-QINU`"') . That I dare to add my grain to the store of knowledge already collected, though not even fully acquainted with the earlier efforts , demands an explanation. When studying Chinese Buddhism and slowly progressing through the centuries I came before the stumbling block of this text and found that without more definite knowledge about the ''Mahāyāna-śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' a clear picture of Medieval Buddhism could not be attained. As no answer has yet been given to this problem acceptable to all the debaters I had to look into it myself. Unfortunately, the Indian libraries in my reach are very incomplete with respect to Japanese and Chinese books and periodicals. So I was confronted with a dilemma which worries many scholars to-day, namely, whether I should continue my studies in spite of this handicap or stop altogether. Finally I decided that I would try to get a result by using what was available to me and adding material which I collected myself. This led to what I consider as a result worth while to be submitted as a basis of discussion. The professors Matsunami Seiren and Hayashi Kemmyō kindly sent me reprints of their papers.<br> The present state of the discussion may in short be characterized as follows. The traditional view that (1) the ''Śāstra'' is a translation of a Sanskrit original and (2) that the translator is Paramārtha, is now generally abandoned'"`UNIQ--ref-000000ED-QINU`"'). It is also known that the ''lntroduction'' is forged.'"`UNIQ--ref-000000EE-QINU`"') It is further known that the Sanskrit text translated by Śikṣānanda was itself a translation from the extant Chinese version'"`UNIQ--ref-000000EF-QINU`"'). If so much is accepted, early doubts of Chinese Buddhists concerning the ''Śāstra'' gain weight'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F0-QINU`"').<br> Hui-chün, an early seventh century witness, in the passage quoted above p. 156 note 4, speaks of "former" Dāśabhūmikas who forged the ''Śraddhotpāda''. Chi-tsang (549-623) blames Dāśabhūmikas "of a former generation"
that they mistook the eighth ''vijñāna'' for Buddha-nature (T. vol. 34 380 b 20 f.). In another place he speaks of "old" Dāśabhūmikas (T. vol. 42 104 c 7). This implies that we have to distinguish between late Dāśabhūmikas (after the arrival of the ''Mahāyāna-saṁgraha'') and early ones (the first and second generations after the translators of the ''Daśabhūmika Śāstra'')'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F1-QINU`"') . Among them, those who belonged to the early generation are said to have forged the ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'''"`UNIQ--ref-000000F2-QINU`"').<br> Tokiwa believes in a Chinese author who mainly relied on the ''Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra'' both translations of which (Sung and Wei) he amalgamated. This may be correct though I could not find allusions peculiar to Guṇabhadra's (Sung) translation.<br> Mochizuki has proved that the Chinese author was acquainted not only with the ''Laṅkāvatāra'' but with several other texts. He proposes as author T'an-tsun, a disciple of Fa-shang who dictated the ''Śāstra'' to his disciple T'an -ch'ien. See below p. 160.<br> Hayashi Kemmyō, has traced material in Liang Wu-ti's writings and the ''Pao-tsang lun''. Liang Wu-ti believed in immortal souls'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F3-QINU`"'). The ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' contains nothing of that sort. Though influence from that side cannot be excluded, I do not feel this material to be significant enough to permit us to place the author in the South.<br> Matsunami Seiren believes in Aśvaghoṣa if not as author yet as the spiritual father of the ''Śraddhotpāda''. I have compared his quotations from the ''Sauṇdarānanda Kāvya'' etc . which are interesting. But I think we might consider as established that the author of the ''Śraddhotpāda Śāstra'' was a Chinese and work upon that assumption'"`UNIQ--ref-000000F4-QINU`"'). Besides, the main tenets of the ''Śāstra'' have not been found in the ''Kāvya''.<br> I pass by other theories of which I have only heard . Scholars are searching in all directions and undoubtedly will find material unknown to me which will throw even more light on the intricate problem of our text. Meanwhile I shall consider as established that the ''Śāstra'' was composed by an early Dāśabhūmika and limit my investigation to the question who this person was. (Liebenthal, "New Light on the Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda Śāstra," 155–58)
One of the most interesting notions found in the early ''tathāgatagarbha'' literature is the idea that ''nirvāṇa'' should be understood as nonorigination (''anutpāda''). This idea is explicitly formulated in two texts, the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'', the only ''śāstra'' extant in Sanskrit which is completely devoted to the ''tathāgatagarbha'' and Buddha-nature teachings, and the ''Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra'', the ''sūtra'' upon which the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' bases its exposition of nonorigination. The ''Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra'' itself does not speak of the ''tathāgatagarbha'' or Buddha-nature doctrines, but the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' takes the ''Jñānālokālaṅkārasūtra'' explanation of nonorigination and links it to the view of ''nirvāṇa'' found in two of the important early ''sūtras'' that do speak of the ''tathāgatagarbha'', the ''Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa'' and the ''Śrīmālādevīsūtra''. This interpretation of ''nirvāṇa'' in terms of nonorigination is of considerable importance in understanding the early ''tathāgatagarbha'' teaching, for it clarifies certain notions frequently associated with the ''tathāgatagarbha'' like the "natural purity of mind" (''cittaprakṛtiviśuddhi'')—notions which have been hotly debated ever since the doctrine's inception. It may also tell us something about the conceptual issues which divided the schools of early Buddhism and so hold clues for understanding the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism. (Grosnick, "Nonorigination and ''Nirvāṇa''," 33)<br><br>
[https://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/jiabs/article/view/8547/2454 Read more here . . .] +
Interest in the ''Vajrasamādhi'' has been roused by a paper of Lin Tai-yün published in 1932'"`UNIQ--ref-00000244-QINU`"'. In the ''Vajrasamādhi'' Lin had found a quotation from what is generally supposed to be a Bodhidharma text'"`UNIQ--ref-00000245-QINU`"', and thus the problem was set of the relation between these bits of material and the bearing which an investigation into this matter might have on the riddle of Bodhidharma. Suzuki Daisetsu has dealt with this problem in 1936'"`UNIQ--ref-00000246-QINU`"', Paul Demiéville in 1952'"`UNIQ--ref-00000247-QINU`"' and Dr. Mizuno in I955'"`UNIQ--ref-00000248-QINU`"'. I shall in this note confine myself to the text itself.<br> The texts in question are:<br>
1. ''Chin-kang san-mei ching'' (''Vajrasamādhi'') T. 273 vol. 9. (Quoted in the following as ''Samādhi''.) It has three commentaries:<br>
a. The ''Chin-kang san-mei ching lun'', T. 1730 vol. 37 composed by Yüan-hsiao, a Korean, in the second half of the seventh century. This is the only commentary which I have used for this paper in order to correct the original. A very good modern edition has been published by Chou Shu-chia in Peking 1936.<br>
b. ''Zokuzōkyō'' A 55/2-3. Ming.<br>
c. ''Zokuzōkyō'' A 55/3. Ch'ing.<br>
2. ''Chin-kang shang-wei t'o-lo-ni ching'', T. 1344 vol. 21. Transl. Buddhaśānta (?). Yüan Wei.<br>
3. ''Chin-kang ch'ang t'o-lo-ni ching'', T. 1345 vol. 21. Transl. Jinagupta (?) (527-604). A second translation of the preceding. These two texts have no relation to the ''Samādhi''.<br>
4. ''Chin-kang san-nei pen-hsing ch'ing-ching pu-huai pu-mieh ching'', T. 644 vol. 15. A probably genuine text, containing 100 ''samādhis'' . . . (Liebenthal, opening remarks, 347–48)<br><br>
[ . . . ]<br><br>
It seems to me established that<br> The ''Samādhi'' is an agglomeration of several texts, of which we have distinguished:<br> 1. A frame (Text A), probably derived from a sūtra translated in the fifth century or earlier in the North, perhaps in Liang-chou. This seems to have been a Hīnayāna text.<br> 2. A text (B), which contains the verses and part of the prose, composed between 565 and 590 by a teacher of the North, Yeh or P'eng-ch'eng. The author might have been Ching-sung.<br> It is difficult to say how Text B originally looked. Was it a pamphlet or a collection of gleanings from other texts? Was it written to counteract the propaganda of Hui-ssu?<br> In order to further clarify these points I propose for study: (1) a careful investigation of the northern tradition from Bodhiruci and Buddhaśānta on to about 590 A.D., (2) searching the Tun-huang fragments for parts of the original Text B, (3) further search for quotations in the texts studied by the teachers of the Northern Ch'i. (Liebenthal, conclusion, 383–86).<br><br>
(*Chinese characters in the original text and notes unavailable)<br><br>
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I refer to the commentary on the ''Dharmadhātustava'' by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (l292-1361) in the last volume of this Journal'"`UNIQ--ref-000067C6-QINU`"' and make it clear that this text is one of the important texts for him to establish the theory of other-emptiness (''gzhan stong'') or the great Madhyamaka (''dbu ma chen po'') in the Jo nang pa'"`UNIQ--ref-000067C7-QINU`"' Though it is not so cited as the five ''Treatises of Maitreya'', he seems to acknowledge the reason why he must depend on it. Though the authorship of Nāgārjuna is doubted on the ground of reference to the tathāgatagarbha idea, this is convenient for Dol po pa who wants to establish the great Madhyamaka mixed the Madhyamaka idea with the Yogācāra idea or the tathāgatagarbha idea. That is to say, he uses it in order to prove that the idea of tathāgatagarbha is also taught in the Mādhyamika literature of Nāgārjuna.<br> Then which text does he depend on to establish his original idea? As the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'' is cited most frequently in his ''bDen gnyis gsal ba'i nyi ma'''"`UNIQ--ref-000067C8-QINU`"', it seems to be the most important text in his great Madhyamaka. I consider his commentary on the ''Ratnagotravibhāga'''"`UNIQ--ref-000067C9-QINU`"' attributed to Maitreya here'"`UNIQ--ref-000067CA-QINU`"'. (Mochizuki, introduction, 111) +
Given that the MPNS is such a complex text, I should like to take up just one theme that runs through much of this sutra—the way the compilers of this sūtra seem to have perceived the causes and the implications of the decline of the Dharma, that is, what one might, as I have done here, term the "eschatology of the MPNS." I believe this may provide an important key to
understanding the entire sūtra, though some of my conclusions are necessarily based on circumstantial evidence. One might also remark here, in passing, that the prominence of the concept in the MPNS that the scriptural Dharma is, as we shall see, decidedly impermanent stands out in stark contrast to the recurrent idea in the sūtra of the permanence of Buddha. (Hodge, introduction, 1) +
L'article traite d'un genre de portraits de moines Zen appelé ''chinzō'', genre qui fleurit sous les Sung et les Yuan, et fut introduit au Japon à l'époque de Kamakura. On connaît au Japon environ soixante-dix ''chinzō'' chinois et japonais datant du treizième au seizième siècle, considérés comme "Trésors nationaux" ou "propriétés culturelles importantes", mais qui ne représentent qu'un dizième du nombre total de portraits connus. Les portraits relevant de ce genre sont assez stéréotypés, et représentent en général un moine assis en sur une chaise haute en position du lotus. Souvent représenté de trois-quarts, mais parfois aussi de face, il est vêtu d'un habit de cérémonie, et tient dans sa main droite un attribut de son autorité, d'ordinaire un bâton, un sceptre ou un chasse-mouches. Certains ''chinzō'' représentent aussi le moine assis ou debout dans un paysage. Enfin, ils comportent généralement un "éloge" en vers et une dédicace.<br>
S'interrogeant sur la fonction religieuse de ces portraits, Griffith Foulk et Robert Sharf sont amenés à remettre en question l'idée que les ''chinzō'' servaient à authentifier la transmission de maître à disciple. Une étude approfondie des sources montre que la définition somme toute moderne des ''chinzō'', visant à définir un genre limité dans le domaine de l'histoire de l'art, a fonctionné dans les faits de façon étroitement normative, alors que le terme désignait à l'origine une catégorie beaucoup plus large de portraits. Conduits de la sorte à étudier la construction moderne du genre des chinzō, les auteurs en arrivent à poser un certain nombre de questions théoriques et méthodologiques qui devraient avoir un certain impact sur l'histoire de l'art asiatique. (Foulk and Sharf, introduction, 149) +
Articles/On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (sems) Primordial Knowing (ye shes): Clarifications and Transcendental Arguments +
The idea that Buddhist teachings ought to be applied to one's life situation in order to discover their true validity and efficacy has been a salient feature of Buddhism since its inception. It is in light of this normative constraint that Buddhism has traditionally called itself a path (''mārga'')'"`UNIQ--ref-000062A5-QINU`"' or, more accurately, a series of paths formulated to lead individuals of varying needs, abilities, and aspirations toward spiritual awakening (''bodhi''). The complex diversity of views and practices that developed from the time of the historical Buddha were based on two presuppositions: (1) that the Buddha's awakening was of the utmost soteriological significance and therefore to be regarded as the ultimate aim of all religio-philosophical inquiry and activity, and (2) that it was to be seen neither as fortuitous nor inexplicable but as a repeatable soteriological process, one that could be personally realized through particular modes of inquiry and praxis available to most (if not all) humans.<br> From this second assumption stemmed the idea that humans are predisposed to spiritual awakening, that they, in other words, have within them some germinal capacity (''bīja''), spiritual affiliation (''gotra''), element (''dhātu''), or quintessence (''garbha'') that is a condition of possibility of this awakening.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062A6-QINU`"' Alongside these "buddha-nature" concepts developed a family of systematically related gnoseological ideas referring to an abiding, unconditioned (''asaṃskṛta'') mode of consciousness—variously termed the Mind of awakening (''bodhicitta''), naturally luminous Mind (''prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta''), the nature of mind (''citta-dharmatā'')—that was identified with the condition of awakening itself, but also viewed as the tacit background whence dualistic mind, that is, the source of all error and obscuration, emerges. Central to this cluster of related ideas was the view that conditions of awakening and delusion are both located within the complex and heterogeneous structure of lived experience itself. In Indian Buddhism, this paradigm found its most detailed and influential expression in the hybridized Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha works of Maitreya, the Indian Buddhist Siddha literature and the Buddhist tantras.<br> In light of the foregoing considerations, the doctrinal history of Buddhism may be regarded as an ongoing attempt to work out precisely what it was that made its founder a ''buddha'' or "awakened one" so that such knowledge could be systematically pursued by his followers. That this soteriological imperative has been central to Buddhist philosophical and psychological investigations from early on is discernible in the long history of attempts to clarify the defining features of consciousness that can be traced back to the systematic analyses of mind and mental factors (''citta-caitta'') presented in the ''Abhidhammapiṭaka'' of the Pali Canon. For, in investigating the nature and structure of consciousness, Buddhist scholars were above all concerned with articulating the conditions necessary for a sentient being (''sems can'') to become an awakened one, a being in whom (if we follow the Tibetan rendering of "buddha" as ''sangs rgyas'') all cognitive and affective obscurations have dissipated (''sangs'') so that inherent capacities for knowing and caring (''mkhyen brtse nus ldan'') can unfold (''rgyas'').<br> In Tibet, this soteriologically oriented investigation of consciousness was central to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen'"`UNIQ--ref-000062A7-QINU`"' ("Great Perfection") tradition of the rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") school between the eighth and fourteenth centuries. This philosophy developed around a nexus of core soteriological ideas concerning buddha-nature, the nature of reality, and the nature of mind that served to draw attention to a primordial, nondual mode of being and awareness that usually remains hidden behind the mind's own objectifying and subjectivizing reifications.<br> A cornerstone of the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind was a basic distinction between dualistic mind (''sems'') and primordial knowing (''ye shes'')'"`UNIQ--ref-000062A8-QINU`"' that was first systematically presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras (''rgyud bcu bdun'') that make up the Heart Essence (''snying thig'') subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Class (''man ngag sde'') of rDzogs chen teachings and are traditionally associated with Vimalamitra.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062A9-QINU`"' rNying ma historical and biographical works trace this distinction to the teachings of early rDzogs chen masters of the Royal Dynastic Period,'"`UNIQ--ref-000062AA-QINU`"' in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (''bi ma snyan brgyud''), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the many passages on the two distinctions found scattered among rNying ma collections such as the ''Bi ma snying thig'', ''Bai ro rgyud 'bum'', ''rNying ma rgyud 'bum'', and ''dGongs pa zang thal''. These teachings often take the form of personal instructions advising the practitioner to discern within the flux of adventitious thoughts and sensations that characterize dualistic mind (''sems'') an invariant prerepresentational structure of awareness known as primordial knowing (''ye shes''), open awareness (''rig pa''), or the nature of mind (''sems nyid''), from which this turmoil arises. The idea is to directly recognize (''ngo sprod'') and become increasingly familiar with this abiding condition without confusing it with any of its derivative and distortive aspects. In Klong chen pa's view, this distinction provides an indispensable key to understanding the views and practices that are central to the rDzogs chen tradition.<br> Although this tradition has attracted increasing interest in recent decades, both popular and academic, there has been little to date in the way of critical study of its philosophical foundations or key doctrinal developments.'"`UNIQ--ref-000062AB-QINU`"' A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic appraisal of rNying ma ("Ancient Ones") views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamātra, Madhyamaka, Pramāṇvāda, and Vajrayāna views. As a step toward at least defining the parameters of this crucial but neglected field of inquiry, this paper will consider some key arguments in support of the "mind/primordial knowing" (''sems/ye shes'') distinction adumbrated by rNying ma scholars in the classical period. Of particular interest are arguments that were used to justify and defend this distinction by the renowned fourteenth-century rNying ma thinker Klong chen rab 'byams pa in a number of his treatises, commentaries, and poetic works. In a wide range of doctrinal contexts, Klong chen pa will argue that the entire edifice of Buddhist doctrine becomes incoherent in theory and amiss in practice when one fails to recognize the primacy of a primordial mode of awareness and to unequivocally distinguish it from dualistic mind. This paper first examines in detail some of the arguments he employed to convince his audience of the acceptability of such a distinction in light of theoretical and practical drawbacks of not recognizing it. It then focuses on two types of transcendental argument (of the general form "for ''y'' to be possible ''x'' must be the case") that Klong chen pa repeatedly invokes to show that the mind/primordial knowing distinction was not only tacitly presupposed in Indian Buddhist soteriology but was, in fact, indispensable for making sense of the Buddhist path and goal-realization according to Buddhist doxastic norms. (Higgins, "On the rDzogs chen Distinction between Mind (''sems'') and Primordial Knowing (''ye shes''), 23–26)
In this essay I aim to clarify the meaning of other-emptiness in the Jonang (''jo nang'') tradition of Buddhism of Tibet. It focuses on the writings of Dölpopa (''dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan'') (1292–1361), the renowned forefather of this tradition. Dölpopa famously differentiated two types of emptiness, or two ways of being empty—self-emptiness (''rang stong'') and other-emptiness (''gzhan stong'')—and proclaimed the superiority of the latter. (Duckworth, introduction, 485) +
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The early history of Tathagatagarbha thought in India remains obscure. In attempting to elucidate it much depends upon how one chooses to categorize Tathagatagarbha as a system, upon the decisions one makes as to which terms, concepts, argument-patterns and so forth must be present in order for it to be proper to characterize some text or text-fragment as representing that system. These are large questions, much too large to enter upon in this paper; my purpose here is much more limited. I intend to offer a reasonably detailed exposition of a set of sixteen verses from the ninth chapter of the ''Mahāyānasūtrâlaṅkāra'' [MSA] (IX.22-37). These verses deal, or so the ''bhāṣya'' tells us, with the "profundity of the undefiled realm" (''anāsravadhātugāmbhīrya''), and they conclude (37) with the only use of the term ''tathāgatagarbha'' in the entire text There is little doubt that this is one of the few early occurrences of the term in Indian Buddhist texts surviving in Sanskrit; a relatively detailed study of these verses may perhaps shed some light upon the historical and doctrinal questions just mentioned.<br> The systematic question underlying my comments upon these verses throughout will be: what is the relation between the ground of awakening, that which makes it possible, and the fact of awakening, its essential properties?<br>
In what follows I shall provide ftrst a brief introduction to the of the MSA-corpus; I shall then place MSA IX.22-37 in its context within the text as a whole, and shall translate the verses in full and offer expository comments on them, drawing in so doing upon the surviving Indic commentaries. (Griffiths, "Painting Space with Colors", 41–42) +
Is Dōgen a philosopher? Or even an example of what he scolds a "word-counting scholar"?'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014D-QINU`"' Despite the difficulties of classifying Dōgen, many would still agree, at least with regard to his ''magnum opus'', the ''Shōbōgenzō'', that his writings are philosophical.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014E-QINU`"' This, however, requires some clarification, since there is not much left of this work if one were to exclude all the fascicles that are not explicitly cited for philosophical interpretation. The philosophic scope becomes even smaller if one were to consider the respective passages of the few fascicles pertinent for explicit philosophical reading. At the risk of oversimplifying, the philosophical reception of Dōgen's works is almost entirely grounded in the fascicle "Uji",'"`UNIQ--ref-0000014F-QINU`"' which is distinguished for its thought–provoking discourse on time.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000150-QINU`"' Furthermore the philosophical reading of other fascicles, including "Genjōkōan" and "Zenki"'"`UNIQ--ref-00000151-QINU`"' revolves around a related interpretation of "Uji."<br> Nevertheless, we can still ask if there might be yet another accessible vantage point from which one could regard Dōgen's ''Shōbōgenzō'' as philosophical? This paper will argue that the answer is "yes," there is such a vantage point, so long as one distinguishes ''what'' Dōgen writes from ''how'' Dōgen writes. For the claim of the paper is that while it remains ambiguous to maintain that his writings exhibit a philosophical system based on content, their form realizes what philosophy is at its core, i.e. reflexivity or philosophy’s inherent self reference.'"`UNIQ--ref-00000152-QINU`"' (Müller, "Philosophy and the Practice of Reflexivity," 545–46) +
Articles/Prajñāpāramitā and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine +
Prior to the Sui-T'ang period, the concept of Buddha-nature,'"`UNIQ--ref-00006456-QINU`"' the fundamental or universal nature of enlightenment in sentient beings, was already a topic of central importance to Chinese Buddhists. In 418, when Fa-hsien translated the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'' in six fascicles (''Ta-pan niyüan ching''), the debate centering on Buddha-nature, as is well known, concerned Tao-sheng's (?-434) view of the ''icchantika'', a spiritual outcast forever excluded from enlightenment. Tao-sheng's thesis that all sentient beings, including the ''icchantika'', possessed the potentiality for Buddhahood was substantiated when the so-called "Northern edition" of the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'' was translated in 421 by Dharmakṣema (385-433).'"`UNIQ--ref-00006457-QINU`"' While the ''icchantika'' issue would again surface during the T'ang with the popularity of the Fa-hsiang school and its ''triyāna'' doctrine, by the Sui period (589-612) the ''ekayāna'' theme was well established. In the intervening years of the Liang and Ch'en dynasties, Chinese Buddhists in the south had moved on to other aspects of the Buddha-nature theory and were primarily concerned with the composition of exegetical commentaries which speculated on the specific meanings of universal enlightenment. That a variety of commentaries and Buddha-nature theories existed during this period can be seen if one examines the Liang compilation of the ''Collection of Nirvāṇa-sūtra Commentaries'' (''Tapan nieh-p'an'' ''ching chi-chüeh'').'"`UNIQ--ref-00006458-QINU`"' The ''Collection'', however, represents the peak of ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'' study in the south, for following the end of the Liang and Ch'en periods, the study of this text was superseded by the rise of Prajñāpāramitā-based traditions like San-lun and T'ien-t'ai. Exegesis of the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'' and debate on the meaning of Buddha-nature continued within these schools, and while an independent scholastic tradition centering on the sutra had long passed from the Buddhist horizon by Sui times, it was during this period that the discussion of universal enlightenment was taken to a new degree of explicitness.<br>
In the case of the San-lun tradition, the most intriguing discussion on this subject occurred in the writings of its systematizer, Chi-tsang (549-623).'"`UNIQ--ref-00006459-QINU`"' In his Buddha-nature essay, contained in the ''Ta-ch'eng hsüan-lun'' (''A Compendium of Mahāyāna Doctrine''), Chi-tsang sought to integrate the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine of emptiness and the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'' concept of Buddha-nature.'"`UNIQ--ref-0000645A-QINU`"' Assimilating two radically different aspects of Buddhist thought, Chi-tsang was the first individual in the history of East Asian Buddhism to argue that the inanimate world of grasses and trees also had the possibility of achieving Buddhahood. The most obvious peculiarity of this theory was the fact that, prior to Chi-tsang's time it was not a commonly accepted view of universal enlightenment. Indeed, it was a view totally rejected by earlier commentators of the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'', who associated the potentiality for Buddhahood with anthropocentric concepts such as "mind," "luminous spirit," "''ālaya-vijñāna''," and "inherently pure mind." The textual basis for these earlier views was, of course, already established by the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'', which extended the promise of Buddhahood to all sentient existence, that is, to those who possessed the faculty of "mind." Although there was no doctrinal precedent for Chi-tsang's assertion, in his examination of Buddhist texts he found several passages to substantiate his theory of a comprehensive Buddha-nature. As we shall see, Chi-tsang took a highly qualified step in expanding the notion of salvation to include all of the natural, phenomenal world. As a San-lun scholar, however, Chi-tsang was neither interested, in a Taoist sort of way, in elevating nature to a religious dimension, nor simply concerned with the ''Nirvāṇa-sūtra'''s anthropocentrically-limited promise of eventual enlightenment. Rather, Chi-tsang's most significant contribution to the discussion lay in his assertion that the Buddha-nature was a synonym for the middle path doctrine. The route by which he came to his expanded conception of Buddha-nature, then, was based on his primary view of ''prajñā'', and it is this that we wish to investigate in what follows. (Koseki, "Prajñāpāramitā and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World," 16–17)
