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Ngog Loden Sherab's Analytical Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga

Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Ngog Loden Sherab's Analytical Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga." In A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Go Lotsāwa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga, 25–34. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2008.

Ngog Loden Sherab's Analytical Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga

Loden Sherab (1059-1109) played a crucial role in the transmission of the Ratnagotravibhāga in Tibet. Not only were his translations of the Ratnagotravibhāga and its vyākhyā the ones included in the Tengyur, but he also composed a "summarized meaning" or commentary of the Ratnagotravibhāga, in which he tries to bring the teaching of buddha nature into line with his Madhyamaka position. The latter is usually identified as being Svātantrika. Since this summary, which is of great significance for the understanding of Zhönu Pal's mahāmudrā interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga, has received little attention by Western scholars up till now, the main points of Loden Sherab's strategy will be presented in this section.

      Some ten years ago, the text of the summarized meaning was reproduced from blockprints of the edition by Geshé Sherab Gyatso (Dge bshes Shes rab rgya mtsho) (1884-1968) and published with an extensive introduction by David Jackson (1993). Seyfort Ruegg, who must have had access to the blockprint in the possession of Dagpo Rinpoché (Dvags po Rin po che) in Paris, only briefly refers to Loden Sherab's commentary when discussing the ineffable and inconceivable nature of ultimate truth. Contrary to the Gelug position, Loden Sherab radically rejects the possibility that the ultimate can be grasped by conceptual thought:

This is because the ultimate [truth] is not an object amenable to speech; for the ultimate [truth] is not an object of thought, since conceptual thought is apparent [truth]. The intended meaning of not being able to be expressed by speech is here [because the ultimate is] not a basis for any verbal or conceptual ascertainment. This does not [mean] that [the ultimate] merely does not appear directly to the verbal consciousness. For if it were so, then it would follow that [objects] of apparent [truth], such as a vase, would also be such (i.e., not a basis for verbal ascertainment).

      This position is in accordance with the interpretations of Sakya Paṇḍita (Sa skya Paṇḍita) (1182-1251) but greatly at variance with the position maintained by Chapa Chökyi Sengé (Phya pa Chos kyi Seng ge) (1109—69) and many later Gelug scholars. Loden Sherab differs from Sakya Paṇḍita, however, in taking the Ratnagotravibhāga to be a commentary on the discourses with definitive meaning:

When the illustrious Maitreya clarified in an unmistaken way the intention of the discourses of the Sugata, he presented reality, which is the true meaning of Mahāyāna, by composing the treatise of the Mahāyānottaratantra [Rātnagotravibhāga], which teaches the precious sūtras of definitive meaning, [namely] the irreversible dharmacakra, the dharmadhātu as a single path; and which precisely teaches the meaning of all the very pure and certain discourses.

It should be noted, however, that the remaining four Maitreya works, namely die Abhisamayālaṁkāra and the three Yogācāra works, are taken to be commentaries on sūtras with provisional meaning.

      Zhönu Pal informs us in his Blue Annals that Loden Sherab equated buddha nature with the inconceivable ultimate, whereas Chapa took the latter (and thus buddha nature) to be a nonaffirming negation, bringing it within reach of logical analysis:

The great translator (i.e., Loden Sherab) and Master Tsangnagpa (Gtsang nag pa) take the so-called buddha nature to be the ultimate truth, but say, on the other hand: "Do not regard the ultimate truth as being an actual object corresponding to words and thoughts." They say that it is by no means a conceptualized object. Master Chapa for his part maintains that nonaffirming negation (which means that entities are empty of a true being)
is the ultimate truth, and that it is a conceptualized object corresponding to words and thoughts.

      The way in which Loden Sherab equates buddha nature with the ultimate becomes clear in his commentary on the third vajra point of the Noble Saṅgha, where he explains the awareness of how reality is (yathāvadbhāvikatā) and the awareness of its extent (yāvadbhāvikatā) in the following way:

Awareness of the extent refers to the "vision that a perfect buddha is present in all [sentient beings]." The awareness that the common defining characteristics—the very selflessness of phenomena and persons—are the nature of a tathāgata, [namely] buddha nature, and that [this reality] completely pervades [its] support, [i.e.,] the entire element of sentient beings, is the [awareness of] the extent. Furthermore, the unmistaken awareness of mere selflessness, which exists in all sentient beings, is the awareness of how [reality] is. The apprehension that every support is pervaded by it is the awareness of its extent. Both are supramundane types of insight, [and so] ultimate objects, not a perceiving subject bound to the apparent [truth].

This passage not only shows that awareness of emptiness is an ultimate object, but also that buddha nature is taken as the mere lack of a self in sentient beings. How buddha nature is defined becomes clearer in the commentary on the first and third reasons for the presence of a buddha nature in sentient beings, in RGV I.28:

Pure suchness is the kāya of the perfect buddha. [Its] radiation (spharaṇa) means being pervaded by it (the kāya)—pervaded inasmuch as all sentient beings are fit to attain it (i.e., a kāya of their own). In this respect, the tathāgata [in the compound tathāgata-nature] is the real one, while sentient beings' possession of his [i.e., the tathāgatas] nature is nominal, because "being pervaded by it" has been metaphorically applied to the opportunity to attain it (i.e., such a kāya) With regard to the [reason] "because of the existence of a potential," tathāgata is nominal, because the [tathāgata-nature] is the cause for attaining suchness in the [resultant] state of purity—[is, in other words,] the seeds of knowledge and compassion, the mental imprints of virtue, and [thus only] the cause of a tathāgata. The only real [in tathāgata-nature here] is the "nature" of sentient beings (and not that the latter consists of an actual tathāgata).

      Buddha nature is thus not only taken as emptiness (namely the lack of self in sentient beings) but also as the seed or cause of buddhahood. We wonder, then, how Loden Sherab explains similes such as the huge silk cloth from the Avataṁsakasūtra, which illustrates the presence of immeasurable buddha qualities in sentient beings. Against the purport of the sūtra, according to which each sentient being has its own buddha wisdom, Loden Sherab claims that this buddha wisdom is the one of the illustrious one himself:

As the picture on a silk cloth exists in an atom, just so the wisdom of the Buddha exists in the [mind] stream of sentient beings. If you ask what [this wisdom] is, [the answer is] the dharmadhātu. If you ask how this [can] be wisdom, [the answer is:] Since the illustrious one came to know that all phenomena lack defining characteristics thanks to the insight that encompasses [everything] in a single moment, this insight is inseparable from its objects. Therefore the ultimate, the very dharmadhātu itself, is [in this respect also] the wisdom that is aware of this [dharmadhātu]. Since [the dharmadhātu] abides in all sentient beings without exception, the example and the illustrated meaning are fully acceptable.

      The question arises whether this contradicts Loden Sherab's presentation of the first reason for sentient beings having buddha nature in RGV I.28. In his explanation of the nine examples from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Loden Sherab specifies exactly how sentient beings are pervaded by the dharmakāya:

As to the phrase "[the dharmakāya that] pervades the entire sphere of sentient beings": The Dharma of realization of previous tathāgatas was accomplished on the basis of immeasurable accumulation [of merit and wisdom]. [The resulting dharmakāya, i.e.,] the very pure suchness and the wisdom apprehending it, namely that which by nature is separate [from sentient beings], pervades all sentient beings, for this dharmakāya is emptiness, and it is emptiness, too, that exists in sentient beings.

      In other words, even though the buddha nature of sentient beings is different from the wisdom of the buddhas, the former is still pervaded by the latter since the buddha wisdom realizes the emptiness of sentient beings' minds. The space-like buddha qualities of RGV II.29-37, which Loden Sherab, in accordance with the vyākhyā, also subsumes under the ultimate truth, must be taken in the same way. They pertain to the ordinary mind only insofar as it, too, is emptiness. Equally inconceivable as the ultimate is natural luminosity, as this must be actualized through wisdom without any objective support, so that luminosity is actually taken to be wisdom. To review, the emptiness of the ultimate cannot become the object of ordinary perception. But being the object of a buddha, it is pervaded by the wisdom or luminosity of the Buddha, this insight being no different from its object.

      The buddha nature or element, which is repeatedly said to be the emptiness of each mindstream, can become the objective support of inferential cognitions that negate without affirming anything. As such it becomes the substantial cause for the attainment of buddha qualities:

As to the [buddha] element that has become the conventional object of a nonaffirming negation, it is called the substantial cause that has become the conventional object of a nonaffirming negation; but something that amounts to human effort [as a substantial cause of buddhahood] does not actually exist. As to the conventional object, it has the meaning of a nonaffirming negation—namely that anything that is established as an own-being does not exist in reality.

      This leads to the question whether the qualities are for Loden Sherab something newly produced. In his introduction to the second chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga—a commentary on stanza RGV II.3—the notion of nothing being newly produced is brought up in the presentation of the essence of enlightenment (compared to natural luminosity, the sun, and the sky in RGV II.3a). But with the unchangeability of buddha nature restricted to its true nature, the possibility of development with nonconceptual wisdom as a cause remains untouched:

[Verse RGV II.3c:] "Buddhahood is endowed with all stainless buddha qualities; it is permanent, stable, and eternal" expresses wisdom, abandonment, and the qualities based on them. [It further states] that it is not the case that these [qualities] have arisen as something that did not exist before, and that they existed in previous state [s] [still] accompanied by hindrances. In all this the essence [of enlightenment] is taught. As for the cause, here [in this stanza] it is the wisdom of not conceptualizing phenomena, and the distinguishing wisdom attained after that.

In other words, in terms of the essence of enlightenment nothing is newly produced, which means that emptiness is present throughout beginningless time and nothing needs to be added to it (see below).

      Of particular interest is, in this respect, Loden Sherab's commentary on RGV I.51, in which he restricts the statement of being naturally endowed with qualities to the very pure state in which these qualities are not experienced as something disconnected. In the same way as they are experienced as something inseparable from the pure state, their cause, or the dharmadhātu, can be apprehended in impure states:

[The verse RGV I.51b] "being naturally endowed with qualities" shows that the immutability of the properties of qualities (i.e., the buddha qualities) in the very pure state is acceptable. This means that the true nature is not tarnished when qualities suddenly manifest, nor is [this nature] experienced as being separate from any natural [ly endowed] qualities, in the same way as it [cannot] be established as something that possesses a particular qualitative feature that did not exist before in the impure state, for example. For the meaning of naturally established qualities lies in their being naturally established as an objective support without superimposition; or rather as the objective support that is the cause of [these very] qualities. This is because the correct apparent [truth] abides without superimposition, or because the ultimate abides in such a way, respectively. The realization of the ultimate is the cause of all qualities, because all buddha qualities are summoned as if called when you realize the dharmadhātu.

In other words, the naturally established (or endowed) qualities are nothing else than the cause of these qualities, which is mind's emptiness. To put it another way, to perceive your mind as it is, •without superimposing an ultimately existing own-being, is the buddha nature that causes qualities.

      The crucial stanzas RGV I.157-58 (J I.154-55) on emptiness, which state that nothing needs to be added and that buddha nature is not empty of inseparable qualities, are explained in the following way:

Neither superimposing the ultimate existence of an objective support for all defilements nor denying the relative existence of an objective support for the mind and the mental factors of purification, one abides in the two truths as they are. With regard to this it has been said: "The meaning of emptiness is unmistaken." This has been expressed [in the following verses RGV I.157ab (J I.154ab)]: "In it nothing is to be removed [and nothing to be added]." [That is,] in this reality, nothing is to be removed—[namely,] an objective support for all defilements—because [no such thing] has ever been established. [Likewise,] in this reality nothing need to be added—[namely,] characteristic signs of purification, such as the strengths and clairvoyance, because the objective support for [the attainment of the ten] strengths, etc., and purification, which exists on the level of apparent [truth], abides throughout beginningless time....

      The phrase "possessing the defining characteristic of being inseparable" means that the nonapprehended unsurpassable qualities exist on the level of apparent [truth], and since reality and existence on [the level of] apparent [truth] do not contradict each other, they are said to exist as mere nature. If you therefore directly realize illusion-like apparent [truth], you [automatically] establish the qualities, because the nature of qualities is simply such that one has them (i.e., the illusory phenomena of the apparent) as an objective support.

      The quoted passages clearly show that Loden Sherab avoids defining what exactly the qualities of which buddha nature is not empty are, or rather, instead of accepting the literal meaning of RGV I.158 (J I.155) that the buddha element is not empty of unsurpassable properties, Loden Sherab suggests replacing the unsurpassable properties by the conditioned phenomena of apparent truth. In fact, qualities are circumscribed by "having the illusory phenomena of the apparent as an objective support." Such phenomena are conducive to purification, if an ultimate own-being is not wrongly superimposed. As we have seen above, this is the correct apparent truth. What it comes down to is the objective support that is the mere cause of qualities, the dharmadhātu, or rather to the ability to meditate on emptiness by taking buddha nature as the conventional object of a nonaffirming negation. This observation is also shared by Śākya Chogden (Śākya mchog ldan) (1428-1507), who asserts that Loden Sherab sees buddha nature as a "nonaffirming negation that is not qualified by qualities such as the [ten] strengths."

      Finally, it should be noted that Loden Sherab brings the buddha element into relation with the ālayavijñāna when he explains, on the basis of the Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, that the buddha element is the seed of the buddha qualities, and that all sentient beings, too, arise from it. Sentient beings are, however, affected through additional conditions.