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Luminous Heart

Translation of The Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart

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This superb collection of writings on buddha nature by the Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339) focuses on the transition from ordinary deluded consciousness to enlightened wisdom, the characteristics of buddhahood, and a buddha’s enlightened activity. Most of these materials have never been translated comprehensively. The Third Karmapa’s unique and well-balanced view synthesizes Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the classical teachings on buddha nature. Rangjung Dorje not only shows that these teachings do not contradict each other but also that they supplement each other and share the same essential points in terms of the ultimate nature of mind and all phenomena. His fusion is remarkable because it clearly builds on Indian predecessors and precedes the later often highly charged debates in Tibet about the views of Rangtong ("self-empty") and Shentong ("other-empty"). Although Rangjung Dorje is widely regarded as one of the major proponents of the Tibetan Shentong tradition (some even consider him its founder), this book shows how his views differ from the Shentong tradition as understood by Dölpopa, Tāranātha, and the First Jamgön Kongtrul. The Third Karmapa’s view is more accurately described as one in which the two categories of rangtong and shentong are not regarded as mutually exclusive but are combined in a creative synthesis. For those practicing the sūtrayāna and the vajrayāna in the Kagyü tradition, what these texts describe can be transformed into living experience. (Source: Shambhala Publications)

Citation	Brunnhölzl, Karl, trans. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature. Nitartha Institute Series. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2009.

Table of Contents About the Book Texts Translated Quotes

• An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje8
• Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje10
• Preface12
• Introduction15
• The Indian Yogācāra Background15
• The Tibetan Tradition on the Five Maitreya Texts119
• The Third Karmapa's View126
• Translations180
  • The Autocommmentary on The Profound Inner Reality181
  • The Ornament That Explains the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga241
  • Four Poems by the Third Karmapa271
  • Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on The Treatise on Pointing
    Out the Tathāgata Heart288
  • Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Commentary on The Treatise on the
    Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom366
  • Karma Trinlépa's Explanation of the Sugata Heart447
• Appendix I: Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's Presentation of Kāyas, Wisdoms, and
  Enlightened Activity463
• Appendix II: The Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart505
• Appendix III: The Treatise on the Distinction between Consciousness and
  Wisdom517
• Appendix IV: Outline of NTC527
• Appendix V: Outline of NYC531
• Appendix VI: The Change of State of the Eight Consciousnesses into the Four
  (Five) Wisdoms and the Three (Four) Kāyas534
• Glossary: English–Sanskrit–Tibetan536
• Glossary: Tibetan–Sanskrit–English542
• Bibliography548
• Endnotes589

The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje (1284–1339), propounded a unique synthesis of Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the classical teachings on buddha-nature. His work occupies an important position between its Indian predecessors and the later, often highly charged debates in Tibet about "rangtong" (self-emptiness) and "zhentong" (other-emptiness). The Third Karmapa is widely renowned as one of the major proponents of the Tibetan zhentong tradition. This book contains a collection of some of his main writings on buddha-nature and the transition of ordinary deluded consciousness to enlightened wisdom.

An Aspiration by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje

You realize that whatever appears dawns within the play of the mind
And that mind itself is the dharmakāya free of clinging.
Through the power of that, you, the supreme siddhas, master apparent existence.
Precious ones of the Kagyü lineage, please bestow excellent virtue.

Through the heart of a perfect Buddha awakening in you,
You possess the blossoming glorious qualities of supreme insight.
You genuine holder of the teachings by the name Dzogchen Ponlop,
Through your merit, the activity of virtue,

You publish the hundreds of flawless dharma paintings
That come from the protectors of beings, the Takpo Kagyü,
As a display of books that always appears
As a feast for the eye of intelligence of those without bias.

While the stream of the Narmadā river of virtue
Washes away the stains of the mind,
With the waves of the virtues of the two accumulations rolling high,
May it merge with the ocean of the qualities of the victorious ones.

This was composed by Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje as an auspicious aspiration for the publication of the precious teachings called The Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra by the supreme Dzogchen Ponlop Karma Sungrap Ngedön Tenpe Gyaltsen on April 18, 2004 (Buddhist Era 2548). May it be auspicious.

Foreword by H.H. the Seventeenth Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje

In Tibet, all the ravishing and beautiful features of a self-arisen realm—being encircled by ranges of snow mountains adorned by superb white snowflakes and being filled with Sal trees, abundant herbs, and cool clear rivers―are wonderfully assembled in a single place. These wonders make our land endowed with the dharma the sole pure realm of human beings in this world. In it, all aspects of the teachings of the mighty sage, the greatly compassionate teacher skilled in means, are perfectly complete―the greater and lesser yānas as well as the mantrayāna. They are as pure and unblemished as the most refined pure gold; they accord with reasoning through the power of things; they dispel the darkness of the minds of all beings; and they are a great treasury bestowing all benefit and happiness one could wish for, just as desired. Not having vanished, these teachings still exist as the great treasure of the Kangyur, the Tengyur, and the sciences as well as the excellent teachings of the Tibetan scholars and siddhas who have appeared over time. Their sum equals the size of the mighty king of mountains, and their words and meanings are like a sip of the nectar of immortality. Headed by Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche with his utterly virtuous and pure intention to solely cherish the welfare of the teachings and beings, many dedicated workers of Nitartha international, striving with devotion, diligence, and prajñā, undertook hardships and made efforts over many years to preserve these teachings and further their transmission, and restore them. In particular, they worked toward the special purpose of propagating the excellent stream of teachings and practices of the unequaled Marpa Kagyü lineage, the great family of siddhas, in all directions and times, like the flow of a river in summertime. Through these efforts, the Eight Great Texts of Sūtra and Tantra publication series, inclusive of all the essential meanings of the perfectly complete teachings of the victor is magically manifesting as a great harvest for the teachings and beings. Bearing this in mind, I rejoice in this activity from the bottom of my heart and toss flowers of praise into the sky. Through this excellent activity, may the intentions of our noble forefathers be fulfilled in the expanse of peace.

Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Dorje
Gyütö Ramoche Temple
July 19, 2002 (Buddhist Era 2547)

Preface

In an ongoing effort to create a body of English translations of essential works by the Karmapas and other major lineage figures of the Tibetan Karma Kagyü School, I present here a volume with some of the main writings of the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje. (1284–1339), on buddha nature, the origin and permutations of ordinary deluded consciousness, its transition to nonconceptual nondual wisdom, and the characteristics and functions of buddhahood together with its enlightened activity. These materials primarily include:

• Chapter 1 and excerpts from chapters 6 and 9 of The Profound Inner Reality with its autocommentary
• Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart
• The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom
• Excerpts from The Ornament That Explains the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga'

In addition, this volume contains four shorter poems by the Third Karmapa:

• The Wisdom Lamp That Illuminates the Basic Nature
• Proclaiming Mind's Way of Being Mistaken
• Stanzas That Express Realization
• A Song on the Ālaya

These texts by the Third Karmapa are supplemented by:

• Two commentaries on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart and The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé (1813–1899)
• Excerpts from a commentary by the First Karma Trinlépa, Choglé Namgyal (1456–1539) on the first chapter of the autocommentary on The Profound Inner Reality
• Excerpts from Pawo Tsugla Trengwa's (1504–1566) presentation of buddhahood, kāyas, wisdoms, and enlightened activity in his commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra.

As for the view of Karmapa Rangjung Dorje, this book may be regarded as a continuation of, and elaboration on, the remarks thereon in In Praise of Dharmadhātu (which also contains the Third Karmapa's commentary on this text), providing translations of more of the still-extant materials that describe his unique approach to both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. In the Kagyü tradition, it is generally said that its distinct outlook on Madhyamaka was primarily presented by the Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje (1507–1554), while its position on buddha nature (and the tantras) was mainly put forth by the Third Karmapa. As the following will show, the Yogācāra tradition of Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu may well be included in the scope of the Third Karmapa's explanations, which generally present a creative synthesis of Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and the teachings on buddha nature. In addition, all of the above materials are not only scholarly documents, but bear great significance for practicing the Buddhist path and making what is described in them a living experience.

My wish to publish these texts in English dates far back, and the work on them has been in progress for about fifteen years, but had to be postponed many times due to other responsibilities, so I am truly delighted that this project finally comes to fruition. It would not have been possible without all the Tibetan masters from whom I received oral explanations on most of the above texts over the last two decades. In this regard, my heartfelt gratitude goes to Khenchen Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche, Tenga Rinpoche, Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, Sangyé Nyenpa Rinpoche, Ringu Tulku, and the late Khenpo Lama Thubten. I am also very grateful to all the Western scholars, particularly Professor Lambert Schmithausen and Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes, who opened many doors to the Indian sources of the Yogācāra tradition.

Sincere thanks go to Sidney Piburn and Jeff Cox from Snow Lion Publications for their continuous support and readiness to publish this work, and to Michael Wakoff for being a meticulous and caring editor. I am also very grateful to Stephanie Johnston, who read through the entire manuscript, offered many helpful suggestions, and produced both the layout and the index. As for Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom, its first-draft translation was prepared together with Anna Johnson, Christine McKenna, Gelong Karma Jinpa, and Karma Chögyal during a three-month Tibetan Intensive at Gampo Abbey, Canada.

May this book be a contributing cause for the buddha heart of H.H. the Seventeenth Gyalwang Karmapa Ogyen Trinley Drodul Dorje swiftly embracing all sentient beings in whatever ways suitable. May it in particular contribute to planting and sustaining both the great scholarly and meditative traditions of the Karma Kagyü lineage in the English-speaking world, since they were founded and fostered by all the Karmapas as a means to introduce all beings into their true nature.

Fremont, Seattle, September 11, 2007

Introduction

The Indian Yogācāra background

In certain parts of the Eastern as well as the Western academic traditions, the Yogācāra School has often been neglected or misrepresented, usually in favor of assigning the "pole position" among Buddhist schools to Madhyamaka (in particular, to its Prāsaṅgika brand). There are many reasons for this, but two of the main ones are (1) making superficial and out-of-context judgments based on a unidimensional understanding and discussion of what seem to be stereotypical "buzz words" (such as cittamātra) and (2) not treating the concepts and explanations of Yogācāra in their own terms, but looking at them through the lenses of other philosophical systems. As Nguyen says:

It is a truism in modern studies of systems of meaning (such as cultures, languages, religions, mythology) that it is necessary first to see such a system of meaning from within, in terms of its own categories and concepts, and its own inherent logic. If on the contrary, we set out by attempting to view a system of meaning in terms of categories fundamentally alien to it, we are in danger of misconstruing the system and constructing a distorted interpretation of it that overlooks its basic meanings and inherent structure. This mistake has often been made in the past in studies of Yogācāra philosophy. . . .

In Buddhist literature itself, texts like the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Madhyāntavibhāga, and Mahāyānasaṃgraha are always careful to consider all particular concepts in their integral relationship to the thought-system as a whole. Each of these texts deserves careful study.

Hall adds:

The argument over whether Vijñānavāda is idealistic or realistic bears a marked resemblance to the controversy as to whether Madhyamaka is nihilism or transcendental absolutism.

Mistaking taxonomy for understanding is a fault not limited to modern writers on Buddhism. A similar excessive concern for and trust in doctrinal labels can be seen in ancient Indian philosophers and Tibetan scholastics, and even in the Abhidharma itself. The identification of one school with another (such as that of Vijñānavāda with some Western form of idealism) is not only likely to be misleading; it is only all too often the point at which the argument stops. A more fruitful approach to comparative philosophy would begin by tentatively accepting several comparable philosophies as coherent systems in their own terms, and would proceed to apply their several viewpoints to specific problems of philosophy.

As should be evidenced by many of the following quotes from Yogācāra texts, this school was definitely not advocating some kind of naïve idealism or psychologism, nor an ultimately and truly existing consciousness. King says:

It should be made clear from the outset then that the Yogācāra school is far more complex in its understanding of the nature of experience than is usually acknowledged.

Lusthaus elaborates:

Buddhism is not a psychologism. Even Yogācāra, which does propose to reduce karma and the entirety of the triple world to cognitive factors, is not a psychologism. This is because the point of Buddhist analysis is not the reification of a mental structure or theory of mind, but its erasure. Vasubandhu highlights the closure of cognitive horizons not because such a closure is either desirable or unalterable, but because the closure can only be opened once its all-encompassing complexity and ubiquity is understood and recognized. Yogācāra uses psychological arguments to overcome psychological closure, not to enhance it.

The Yogācāras were also not immune or oblivious to notions such as "emptiness," "lack of nature," and "identitylessness" (which are often wrongly considered to belong solely and uniquely to Madhyamaka), but included and greatly used them as parts of their own explanations too. Specifically, hermeneutic frameworks such as the three natures, the threefold lack of nature, and the three emptinesses (see below) are not at all presented in order to contradict the prajñāpāramitā sūtras or Nāgārjuna, but equally serve to explain emptiness, just within a further developed hermeneutical system. As King says:

As a Mahāyāna school, the Yogācāra developed as a response to the insights of those same [prajñāpāramitā] sūtras. Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult indeed to have ignored the centrality of the notion of śūnyatā to these texts. In fact, the idea that the early classical Yogācāra of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu found any difficulty whatsoever in embracing the basic insights of the Madhyamaka school disregards both the historical and textual evidence, which, on the contrary, displays a spirit of underlying continuity and acceptance.

However, in contrast to the Mādhyamikas' reluctance to speak about the specifics of seeming reality and the Buddhist path of purifying the deluded mind (or mind at all), the Yogācāra system, besides presenting sophisticated analyses of ultimate reality, also elaborates on how the deluded mind operates, how it can make the transition to the unmistaken wisdom that sees this mind's own ultimate nature, and what the characteristics and the fruition of this wisdom are. Thus, Yogācāra not only investigates the definitive meaning of the scriptures in a nonreifying manner, but also what happens experientially in the minds of those who study and practice this meaning. At the same time, it provides broader contextualizing comments on the sūtras and addresses typical misconceptions about emptiness and Madhyamaka, such as it being pure nihilism (which was a very common concern even among Buddhists since the time of Nāgārjuna). Consequently, one could even argue that the Yogācāra system is not only not inferior to the Madhyamaka approach, but exhibits a much more encompassing outlook on human experience and the soteriologicalD D issues of the Buddhist path than the almost exclusively one-way deconstructive approach of the Mādhyamikas. This seems to have occurred already to some people in India, as the following verse attributed to the audience of the seven-year debate between Candragomī and Candrakīrti illustrates.

Ah, the treatises of noble Nāgārjuna
Are medicine for some and poison for others.
The treatises of Ajita and noble Asaṅga
Are nectar for all people.

King elaborates:

Thus, we find in the Yogācāra, as in the Madhyamaka school, a pointed refusal to become involved in an ontological debate. It is interesting that this type of analysis is something of a bridge-building exercise between what might be seen as an undue emphasis upon negative language (via negativa) in the exposition of emptiness by (some?) Mādhyamikas on the one hand, and the overarching realism (via positiva) of the Abhidharma schools on the other hand. As such, the Yogācāra movement can be seen as a "re-forming" of the Middle Path. This is not to say that such a reformation is necessarily out of step with the understanding of śūnyatā as systematized in the śāstras of Nāgārjuna (who is clearly neither a nihilist nor a realist in the accepted senses of the terms), but merely that, in its emphasis upon the "given" of meditative and so-called "normative" perception, the Yogācāra aim is to establish the appropriate parameters of linguistic usage and a rigorous logic for the establishment of the Mahāyāna position on experientially verifiable grounds.

In addition, quite a number of Tibetan masters emphasize that Yogācāra (whether it is called that way or shentong) is more in harmony with the vajrayāna. For example, Śākya Chogden (1428–1507) says:

As for the reasonings that ascertain all phenomena as lacking a nature, the other one [that is, Niḥsvabhāvavāda] is vaster, while the [description of] the definitive meaning of what is to be experienced through meditation is more profound in this system. Because its explanation of nothing but nondual wisdom as what is to be experienced as a result of meditation very greatly accords with the vajrayāna [systems], this [latter] system is more profound.

and

In the uncommon texts of mantra,
There is no explanation whatsoever
About what is to be experienced through the view
That is not in accord with the texts of Maitreya.
. . .
The Maitreya dharmas accord with the mantra[yāna],
Because they assert solely nondual wisdom
As what is to be realized after [all] phenomena
In terms of apprehender and apprehended have been realized to be empty.

For all these reasons, let alone the Buddhist perspective proper, Yogācāra presentations of mental processes also have great potential to significantly contribute to the modern cognitive sciences. Nguyen suggests:

In modern studies of comparative philosophy and religion, Yogācāra thought, once adequately understood, should provoke major interest, given its startling parallels with the most modern developments in Western thought about cognition and epistemology. Just as the modern researchers now acknowledge that the modern world has much to learn from the medical lore of traditional cultures, the same could be said of classical Buddhist philosophical pyschology.

In sum, the Yogācāra tradition considered itself as a continuation of all the preceding developments in Buddhism and not as a radical departure from them or even as a distinct new school per se. To retain what was regarded as useful in other schools of Buddhism did not mean to be ignorant of the pervasive Madhyamaka cautions against reifications of any kind. Thus, the vast range of Yogācāra writings represents a digest of virtually everything that previous Buddhist masters had developed, including intricate abhidharma analyses, charting the grounds of the many levels of the paths in the three yānas, subtle descriptions of meditative processes, presentations of epistemology and reasoning, explorations of mind and its functions in both its ignorant and enlightened modes, and commentaries on major mahāyāna sūtras. Thus, any linear or one-dimensional presentation of this Buddhist school seems not only misguided, but highly inconsiderate, due to the rich variety of this school’s sources and explanatory models (in itself, this variety and its development are nice examples of key Yogācāra notions, which usually describe processes rather than states or things). Nevertheless, a brief overview, in the Yogācāra School's own terms, of the main topics addressed in the following texts by the Third Karmapa is indispensable to demonstrate how firmly he is steeped in the view and explanations of this school.

The major Yogācāra masters and their works

Let's begin with the Indian masters (in roughly chronological order) and their major texts that are at the core of the Yogācāra tradition. First and foremost, we have Maitreya and his five seminal works, which are the foundations for all subsequent Yogācāra scriptures:

• Abhisamayālaṃkāra
• Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
• Madhyāntavibhāga
• Dharmadharmatāvibhāga
• Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra)

Nāgamitra (third/fourth century?) composed a Kāyatrayāvatāramukha, which discusses dharmakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya in terms of the three natures.

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both fourth century CE) were the two earliest commentators on the five texts by Maitreya and also composed many texts of their own. The following main Yogācāra texts are attributed to Asaṅga:

• Saṃdhinirmocanasūtravyākhyāna (commentary)
• Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (commentary)
• Yogācārabhūmi (consisting of the Bahubhūmivastu, Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, Vivaraṇasaṃgrahaṇī, Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī, and Vastusaṃgrahaṇī)
• Abhidharmasamucchaya
• Mahāyānasaṃgraha

Vasubandhu's main Yogācara works consist of:

• Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya
• Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya
• Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti
• Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya
• Viṃśatikākārikā
• Triṃśikākārikā
• Trisvabhāvanirdeśa
• Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa
• Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa
• Vyākhyāyukti

Guṇabhadra (394–468) was greatly active in translating and teaching mahāyāna sūtras as well as Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha materials in China. He is credited with the first translation of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.

Dignāga (c. 480–540) is said to have taught at the Indian Buddhist University of Nālandā and is mainly famous for his logico-epistemological texts. However, as many studies have shown, these works (such as the Pramāṇasamucchaya) are generally grounded in the Yogācāra system. In addition, he also wrote a few more explicitly Yogācāra texts, such as the Ālambanaparīkṣā with its autocommentary.D

Ratnamati (fifth–sixth century) was another Indian active in China, who greatly emphasized the tathāgatagarbha teachings. He translated the Uttaratantra, Vasubandhu's commentary on the Daśabhūmikasūtra, and many other such texts.

Bodhiruci's collaboration with Ratnamati (and Buddhasānta) in translating Vasubandhu's above commentary came to an end over their disagreement as to whether tathāgatagarbha represents classical Yogācāra thought or not. Bodhiruci translated thirty-nine texts into Chinese, among them the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra, and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Kambala (also fifth–sixth century) wrote a brilliant poetic treatise, called Ālokamālāprakaraṇanāma, which represents an unusually early and unique approach of synthesizing Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Combining the framework of the three natures with that of the two realities, Kambala clearly assimilates Madhyamaka to Yogācāra and not vice versa (as, for example, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did much later). Also the autocommentary on his Bhagavatīprajñāpāramitānavaślokapiṇḍārtha (better known as Navaślokī) exhibits typical Yogācāra features.

Guṇamati (sixth century) wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti and is renowned as Sthiramati's main teacher. Both were active at the Buddhist University of Valabhi (in present-day Gujarat).

Sthiramati (c. 510–570) is often unduly ignored, but he not only composed important commentaries on several of the above texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, but also systematized and elaborated many classical Yogācāra themes. Especially his large commentaries on Maitreya's Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Madhyāntavibhāga as well as his shorter one on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā can be considered as landmarks in Yogācāra writing in their own right. His Yogācāra works include:

• Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya
• Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā
• Viṃśatikābhāṣya
• Triṃśikābhāṣya
• Abhidharmasamucchayavyākhyā
• Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāsa

Paramārtha (499–569) traveled to China in 546 and remained there until the end of his life, being the first one to widely teach and translate Yogācāra (and tathāgatagarbha) materials there. The Chinese canon contains thirty-two texts attributed to him, either works authored by him or translations (partially with significant embedded comments). The latter include several sūtras, Asaṅga's Viniṣcayasaṃgrahaṇī and Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Vasubandhu's Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya and Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (Paramārtha's most complex and significant work), and Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā. He also translated, if not authored, the famous Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna. In addition, he is considered as the author (or at least the commentator and redactor) of the Buddhagotraśāstra (Fo Xing Lun), which is one of the rare texts that synthesizes explicitly and in detail many classical Yogācāra materials, such as the three natures, with the notion of tathāgatagarbha. Among Paramārtha's novel interpretations of Yogācāra concepts, the best known is his theory of a ninth consciousness, called amalavijñāna (see below). This is primarily found in his commentary on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā, called Evolution of Consciousness (Chuan Shi Lun), and the comments embedded in his translations of the Viniṣcayasaṃgrahaṇī, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and its Bhāṣya. Together with Kumārajīva (344–413) and Hsüan-tsang (602–664), he is considered to be one of the greatest translators of Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

Dharmapāla (530–561) was an abbot of Nālandā University. His works are only extant in Chinese, and Hsüan-tsang, who was instrumental in bringing Yogācāra teachings to China, greatly relies on Dharmapāla's views (primarily in his Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, which compiles the commentaries by ten Indian Yogācāras on Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā). Dharmapāla also composed a commentary on Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and had a famous written debate with Bhāvaviveka, which is found in the former's commentaries on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka and Śataśāstra from a Yogācāra point of view.

Another sixth-century Yogācāra is Asvabhāva, who often closely follows Sthiramati and wrote the following commentaries on texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Kambala:

• Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā
• Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana
• Ālokamālāṭīkāhṛdānandajananī

Śīlabhadra (529–645) followed Dharmapāla as the abbot of Nālandā and taught Hsüan-tsang for fifteen months during the latter's stay there. He is the author of the Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, one of two extant commentaries on the Buddhabhūmisūtra (the other one being the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa). His text greatly relies on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its Bhāṣya, as well as on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.'

Guṇaprabha (sixth century) is of course most famous for his Vinayasūtra, but he also wrote a commentary on the Bodhisattvabhūmi, a Bodhisattvabhūmiśīlaparivartabhāṣya, and a commentary on Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa.

Jinaputra (second half of sixth century) wrote a commentary on the Abhidharmasamucchaya and a short part of the Yogācārabhūmi, called Bodhisattvabhūmiśīlaparivartaṭīkā.

Prasenajit (sixth/seventh century) is reported to have studied with Sthiramati, Śīlabhadra, and many other masters, being highly erudite in all Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist fields of knowledge. However, he preferred to live as a hermit outside of the Buddhist institutional mainstream and repeatedly refused to become the personal teacher of the then king of Magadha, instead dwelling with many hundreds of students on a mountainside. Though he is not known to have composed any texts of his own, he was highly influential in teaching Hsüan-tsang a great number of both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra texts, particularly providing the final clarifications on the Yogācārabhūmi, for two years after the latter had been taught by Śīlabhadra. When Hsüan-tsang returned to Nālan'thereafter, he debated some Mādhyamikas and finally even composed a (lost) Sanskrit treatise in three thousand stanzas on Yogācāra and Madhyamaka not being mutually exclusive, but in harmony.

Candragomī (sixth/seventh century) was a disciple of Sthiramati. In his early adulthood, he had been married to a princess, but left her to spend the rest of his life keeping the five Buddhist precepts of a layman. He was very erudite in all Buddhist and non-Buddhist fields of learning and also a great poet. After being invited to Nālandā by Candrakīrti, he had an ongoing debate with the latter for seven years, defending the Yogācāra view. His teachings are reported to have been focused mainly on the Daśabhūmikasūtra, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Samādhirājasūtra, the Gaṇḍālaṃkāradhāraṇī, and the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, of which he also composed synopses. Among his works, the most famous are the Candravyākaraṇa (a work on Sanskrit grammar), the Śiṣyalekha, and the Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃsaka (a mnemonic summary of the Ethics chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi). Many other texts by him (such as a *Pradīpamālā on the stages of the bodhisattva path) are mentioned in various sources, with some of them being more specifically Yogācāra, but none of them have survived.

Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660), like Dignāga, is best known for his contributions to epistemology and logic through his seven texts on valid cognition (such as the Pramāṇavārttika), but these texts also clearly exhibit many Yogācara traits.

Vinītadeva (c. 645–715) composed commentaries on Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśika and Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkśā (as well as on several of Dharmakīrti's treatises on valid cognition).

Pṛthivībandhu (seventh century?) wrote a detailed commentary on Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa.

Jñānacandra (eighth century) composed a brief meditation manual, called Yogacaryābhāvanātātparyārthanirdeśa, and a commentary on Nāgamitra's Kāyatrayāvatāramukha.

Sāgaramegha (eighth century) wrote a massive commentary on the Bodhisattvabhūmi, called Yogācārabhūmaubodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā.

Sumatiśīla (late eighth century) authored a detailed commentary on Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa.

Late Yogācāras (all tenth–eleventh century) include Dharmakīrti of SumatraD D (one of the main teachers of Atiśa); Jñānaśrīmitra (Sākarasiddhi, Sākarasaṃgraha, and Sarvajñāsiddhi); Ratnakīrti (Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī and Sarvajñāsiddhi); and Jñānaśrībhadra (commentary on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, summary of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, and commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika). Ratnākāraśānti is variously considered a Yogācāra or Mādhyamika. In any case, most of his works (such as Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Triyānavyavasthāna, Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-Madhyamapratipadāsiddhi, Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, and Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa) exhibit a synthesis of both these systems, often referred to as "Vijñapti-Madhyamaka."

Several other Indian Mādhyamikas, such as Śrīgupta (seventh century?), Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Haribhadra (all eighth century), Viydākaraprabha (eighth/ninth century), Jetāri (tenth/eleventh century), and Nandaśrī, indeed used a lot of Yogācāra materials, but clearly upheld the Madhyamaka view as their final position.

In brief, the main classical Indian exponents of Yogācāra are no doubt Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati. As will be seen in the following, it is also primarily their works that provide the roadmap for the discussions of the eight consciousnesses, the four wisdoms, the three kāyas, and buddha nature in the Third Karmapa's texts translated below.

In terms of its contents, it should be noted that the Yogācāra system is by no means some kind of speculative philosophy that starts from a priori axioms and then constructs a magnificent edifice of abstract concepts in order to define what is true. On the contrary, the Yogācāra School proceeds from observing and analyzing a wide range of meditative experiences (hence its name), which reveal both the deluded and nondeluded processes of the mind. Through exploring and outlining the perceptual and conceptual structures of such processes, the Yogācāra system works out primarily their epistemological and soteriological implications (and only secondarily their ontological ones). As common in the Buddhist tradition (and many Indian spiritual traditions in general), Yogācāra treats epistemological analysis (a purely philosophical discipline for Western minds) as inseparable from, and being most relevant for, soteriological concerns (a religious matter for Western minds). In other words, the delusion about a truly existent self and phenomena and its resultant suffering are basically taken to be a cognitive error, while liberation or buddhahood is nothing but the removal of this error. As Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra VI.2 says:

In itself, the view about a self lacks the characteristic of a self,
As do its deformities―their characteristics differ [from a self].
Nor is there another [self] apart from these two, so it arises as a mere error.
Therefore, liberation is the termination of this mere error.

Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya and Sthiramati comment that neither "the view about a self" (the mind that entertains the various beliefs related to "me" and "mine") nor its "deformities" (the five skandhas produced by afflictions and impregnations of negative tendencies) have the characteristics of a self, since their characteristics differ from those of a self, which on their view is purely imaginary (both the grasping at a self and the skandhas are multiple, conditioned, impermanent, not all-pervading, and so on, while the self is said to have the opposite characteristics). Nor is there a self outside of this grasping and the skandhas. Therefore, such grasping is nothing but an error, just as is mistaking a rope for a snake. And since there is no self that is in bondage, liberation is simply the termination of this error—there isn't anybody or anything that is liberated. Madhyāntavibhāga I.4 agrees, saying that liberation is nothing but the extinction of the false imagination that does not exist as it appears, yet seemingly exists and operates within a mind that is ignorant about its own true nature, in the form of projecting the fundamentally delusive duality of subject and object, upon which we then act.

The following is a brief outline of some of the main Yogācāra notions and pedagogic templates that are employed toward the end of terminating mind's self-delusion and revealing its natural state.

Continued here

The world is merely mind's own play

One of the most inclusive notions in Buddhism in general and Yogācāra in particular is vikalpa (Tib. rnam rtog), with the related kalpanā (Tib. rtog pa), parikalpa (Tib. kun rtog), and their cognates. All of them have the basic sense of "constructing," "forming," "manufacturing," or "inventing." Thus, in terms of mind, they mean "creating in the mind," "forming in the imagination," and even "assuming to be real," "feigning," and "fiction." This shows that their usual translation as "thought" or "concept" is not wrong, but―particularly in a Yogācāra context―far too narrow. Fundamentally—and this is to be kept in mind throughout Buddhist texts—these terms refer to the continuous, constructive yet deluded activity of the mind that never tires of producing all kinds of dualistic appearances and experiences, thus literally building its own world. Obviously, what is usually understood by "conception" or "conceptual thinking" is just a small part of this dynamic, since, from a Buddhist point of view, vikalpa also includes nonconceptual imagination and even what appears as outer objects and sense consciousnesses—literally everything that goes on in a dualistic mind, be it an object or a subject, conscious or not. Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā 20–21ab says:

Whichever entity is imagined
By whichever imagination
Is the imaginary nature,
Which is unfindable.

But the other-dependent nature
Is the imagination that arises from conditions.

The meaning of "imagination" as an essentially deluded, dualistic, and illusory mental activity is particularly highlighted by the classical Yogācāra terms abhūtaparikalpa ("false imagination," lit. "imagination of what is unreal") and parikalpita ("the imaginary," one of the three natures), with the latter being everything that appears as the division into subject and object that is produced by false imagination. The following passages serve to identify what false imagination is and its extent. For example, Madhyāntavibhāga I.8ab says:

False imagination [consists of]
The minds and mental factors of the three realms.

Vasubandhu's Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya on I.1 states:

Here, false imagination is the imagination of apprehender and apprehended.

Sthiramati's Ṭīkā elaborates on this:

False imagination means that duality is unreal (or false) in it, or that [duality] is imagined by it. The word "false" indicates that it does not exist as it imagines [itself] in the form of being apprehender and apprehended. The word "imagination" indicates that referents are not found as they are imagined. Thus, being free from apprehender and apprehended is explained to be the characteristic of this [false imagination]. So, what is this [false imagination]? Without further differentiation, false imagination consists of the minds and mental factors of past, present, and future, which serve as causes and results, comprise the three realms, are beginningless, terminated by nirvāṇa, and conform with saṃsāra. But when differentiated, it is the imagination of the apprehender and the apprehended. Here, the imagination of the apprehended is consciousness appearing as [outer] referents and sentient beings. The imagination of the apprehender is consciousness appearing as a self and cognition. "Duality" refers to apprehender and apprehended, with the apprehended being forms and so on, and the apprehender being the eye consciousness and so on.

Rongtön Shéja Künrig's (1367–1449) commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra explains:

All the many kinds of conceptions that are mentioned in the scriptures are included in false imagination, because they have the aspects of the three realms appearing as the duality of apprehender and apprehended under the sway of latent tendencies. False imagination is threefold―the conceptions that are the mere appearance as the duality of apprehender and apprehended; those that have the aspect of coarse states of mind; and those that have the aspect of the appearance of terms and their referents. The first consists of the mere appearance, under the sway of latent tendencies, of apprehender and apprehended being different. The second is what the abhidharma explains as the confused mental chatter that is included in the portions of [the mental factors of] intention and prajñā. The third is the clinging to referents through following names.

In sum, this means that "imagination" includes all eight consciousnesses with their accompanying mental factors as well as their respective objects. As for all of this appearing, but actually being unreal, the mind's own confused play, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.15 states:

False imagination is explained
To be just like an illusion.
Just as the aspect in which an illusion [appears],
It is explained as the mistakenness of duality.

The Bhāṣya adds that false imagination should be known to be the other-dependent nature, which is also stated in XI.40cd. Furthermore, verses 4–5 of the Triṃśikā declare:

What appears here? The imagination of what is nonexistent.
How does it appear? By way of having the character of duality.
What is its nonexistence with that [duality]?
The very nature of nonduality in it.

What is the imagination of the nonexistent here?
It is the mind that imagines in certain ways what [does not exist],
[But its] referents, which it imagines like that,
Are absolutely never found in these ways.

Sometimes, the opposite of false imagination―correct imagination―is also presented. The latter refers to the mind being engaged in cultivating the antidotes for false imagination on the Buddhist path. "Correct imagination" refers to increasingly more refined—but still more or less dualistic—mental processes or creations that serve as the remedies for respectively coarser kinds of obscuring mental creations, perceptions, and misconceptions (false imagination). Initially, on the paths of accumulation and preparation, such remedial activities are conceptual in a rather obvious way, such as meditating on the repulsiveness of the body as an antidote against desire, or cultivating bodhicitta through contemplating the kindness of one's parents and so on. More subtle approaches would include familiarizing with momentary impermanence or personal and phenomenal identitylessness. From the path of seeing onward, all coarse conceptions of ordinary sentient beings (even the remedial ones) have ceased. However, during the first seven bhūmis, there are still subtle concepts about true reality, and on the last three bhūmis, about attaining the final fruition of buddhahood. In other words, though phenomena are not taken as real anymore, on the first seven bhūmis, there is still the apprehending of characteristics, and on the last three bhūmis, there is still a subtle tendency of duality. In brief, since the remedial wisdom that consumes what is to be relinquished still depends on what it relinquishes and still entails subtle reference points with regard to the dharmadhātu, it must eventually and naturally subside too, once even its most subtle fuel (the apprehending of characteristics and duality) is burnt up. Using the example of washing a stained shirt, remedial wisdom would correspond to the detergent used to wash away the stains. Obviously, after the detergent performed its function, both it and the stains would need to be removed from the shirt in order for it to be considered clean―from the perspective of the clean shirt itself, both stains and detergent are dirt. Thus, though correct imagination is the remedy for false imagination, both are still "imagination" in the sense that, from the perspective of the sole unmistaken cognition of a buddha, even the realizations on the bhūmis are not final and have to be transcended. As for the "nonconceptual wisdom" of buddhahood, it is the mind's ultimate cognitive capacity that is not impaired by any imaginations or mental fictions―in it, there is no delusional need or impulse to construct anything. Thus, a more literal rendering of the term would be "nonimaginative" or "nonconstructive" wisdom, whose facets or functions are the four wisdoms explained below.

"Mind-only?"

Everything being mind's imagination leads to the most well-known, but also most misunderstood notions of the Yogācāra School―cittamātra or vijñaptimātra. Very often, it is still said that these terms mean that outer objects do not exist and everything is "only mind," with "mind" being the only thing that really or ultimately exists. However, when looking at what the Yogācāra texts themselves say, this is a gross misrepresentation. The beginning of Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikāvṛtti says:

In the mahāyāna, the three realms are presented as being mere cognizance (vijñaptimātra). The sūtras say, "O sons of the Victor, all three realms are mere mind (cittamātra)." . . . Here, the word "mind" has the sense of [mind] being associated with [its mental factors]. "Mere" has the meaning of excluding referents.

All this is mere cognizance

Because of the appearance of nonexistent referents,
Just as the seeing of nonexistent strands of hair

In someone with blurred vision.

Like many other Yogācāra texts, Vasubandu's indeed continues by denying the existence of material outer objects, but the full purpose of teaching cittamātra is much vaster―realizing phenomenal identitylessness. Moreover, in this process, mere mind itself is no exception to being identityless. The Viṃśatikāvṛtti on verse 10 says:

How does the teaching on mere cognizance serve as the entrance to phenomenal identitylessness? It is to be understood that mere cognizance makes the appearances of form and so on arise, but that there is no phenomenon whatsoever that has the characteristic of form and so on. "But if there is no phenomenon in any respect at all, then also mere cognizance does not exist, so how can it be presented as such?" Entering into phenomenal identitylessness does not mean that there is no phenomenon in any respect at all. . . . It refers to the identitylessness in the sense of an imaginary identity, that is, a nature of phenomena as imagined by childish beings, which is the imaginary [nature, consisting of fictional identities] such as apprehender and apprehended. But it is not [meant] in the sense of [the nonexistence of] the inexpressible identity that is the object of the buddhas. Likewise, one enters into the identitylessness of this very mere cognizance as well, in the sense of [it lacking] any identity imagined by yet another cognizance. It is for this reason that, through the presentation of mere cognizance, one enters into the identitylessness of all phenomena, but not through the complete denial of their [relative] existence. Also, otherwise, [mere] cognizance would be the referent of another cognizance, and thus [a state of] mere cognizance would not be established, since it [still] has a referent.

Hall further comments on this as follows:

Vijñapti designates the basic phenomenon of conscious experience, without requiring its separation into object, subject, and act of cognition. . . . To translate vijñapti as "representation" conveys its "public" aspect, but seems to imply representation of something. . . . On the contrary, . . . when vijñapti is qualified as "vijñapti-only," it cannot be meant as a representation of anything else, especially not of an external object. . . . As is so often the case in Buddhist philosophy, Vasubandhu is consciously navigating between two extremes, which in this case may be called realism and idealism.

In negative terms, vijñapti-mātra rules out the realist extreme: substantial external objects of cognition are denied. However, vijñapti-mātra has also a positive connotation, and the fact that Vasubandhu here affirms precisely vijñapti ― rather than vijñāna or citta, which might be more easily misunderstood―seems to indicate an intent to avoid the idealist extreme as well. What is exclusively affirmed is not consciousness as an abiding entity, but the content of momentary acts of consciousness. When this vijñapti is equated with citta, manas, and vijñāna, it follows that mind itself is vijñapti-mātra: it consists of nothing else than the contents of momentary mental acts. The intention here is not to reduce the material to the mental, but to deny the dichotomy, while affirming that the basic reality is more usefully discussed in the terms belonging to a correct understanding of the mental.

. . . Vasubandhu points out that this teaching of dharma-nairātmya works only when vijñapti-mātra itself is understood to be vijñapti-only. Clearly, no reification of consciousness is intended here. . . .

The doctrine of vijñapti-mātra is not the metaphysical assertion of a transcendental reality consisting of "mind-only." It is a practical injunction to suspend judgment: "Stop at the bare percept; no need to posit any entity behind it."

Rather than asserting "mind-only" as the true nature of unconditioned reality, Vasubandhu presents "mind-only" as a description of our delusion: the dreams of this sleep from which the Buddha has awakened. It is, after all, saṃsāra that is declared to be vijñapti-mātra. Yet if "mind-only" is merely skepticism about reified external entities, how does it avoid the opposite extreme of reductionism? The world is neither completely real, nor completely unreal, but like a dream. A dream has its own presence and continuity, but its objects lack the substantiality of external objects. Whether common-sense things or Abhidharmic dharmas, dream-objects are bare percepts. If the dream-world saṃsāra is "mind-only" then freedom and the Buddhist path are possible―we can "change our minds." If the realms of meditation are "mind-only" then one can create a counter-dream within the dream of the world's delusion. Most important, one can awaken from a dream.

Thus, that "mere mind" is being constantly referred to in Yogācāra texts as the delusional perception of what does not exist (these texts moreover abounding with dreams, illusions, and so on as examples for it) hardly suggests that said momentary mental activities exist in a real or ultimate way. In addition, Asvabhāva's Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana explicitly says that "mere mind" refers only to the mistaken minds and mental factors of saṃsāra (the realities of suffering and its origin), but not to the reality of the path:

As for [the statement in the sūtras], "[All three realms are] mere mind," "mind" and "cognizance" are equivalent. The word "only" eliminates [the existence of] referents, and by virtue of [such referents] not existing, [the existence of] an apprehender is eliminated too, because [both] are imaginary. [However,] since this [mind] does not arise without the mental factors, these mental factors are not negated. As it is said, "Without mental factors, mind never arises." . . . "All three realms" refer to cognizance appearing as the three realms. Through saying, "all three realms," it is held that the minds and mental factors that are associated with craving, such as desire, and contained in the three realms are just mere cognizance. However, this does not refer to [the minds and mental factors in meditative equipoise] that constitute the reality of the path (those that focus on suchness and those that focus on the other-dependent [nature]) and those during subsequent attainment. For, they are not made into what is "mine" through the cravings of engaging in the three realms, are remedies, and are unmistaken.

Moreover, many Yogācāra works proceed by explicitly and repeatedly making it clear that "mere mind" does not exist and is to be relinquished in order to attain the full realization of buddhahood. For example, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra VI.7–8 says:

Understanding that referents are mere [mental] chatter,
[Bodhisattvas] dwell in mere mind appearing as these.
Then, they directly perceive the dharmadhātu,
Thus being free from the characteristic of duality.

The mind is aware that nothing other than mind exists.
Then, it is realized that mind does not exist either.
The intelligent ones are aware that both do not exist
And abide in the dharmadhātu, in which these are absent.

The Bhāṣya on these verses comments that, once bodhisattvas realize that referents are nothing but mental chatter, they dwell in mere mind appearing as such referents. This represents the four levels of the path of preparation. Subsequently, on the path of seeing, bodhisattvas directly perceive the dharmadhātu free from the characteristic of the duality of apprehender and apprehended. As for directly perceiving the dharmadhātu, having realized that there is no apprehended object that is other than mind, bodhisattvas realize that mere mind does not exist either, because without something apprehended, there is no apprehender. Also Abhisamayālaṃkāra V.7 says on the culmination of the path of seeing:

If apprehended referents do not exist like that,
Can these two be asserted as the apprehenders of anything?
Thus, their characteristic is the emptiness
Of a nature of an apprehender.

The above two verses from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra represent one of the classic descriptions of the "four yogic practices" found in many mahāyāna texts in general and Yogācāra works in particular. These four steps of realization are:

• (1) Outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind (upalambhaprayoga, dmigs pa'i sbyor ba)
• (2) Thus, outer objects are not observed as such (anupalambhaprayoga mi, dmigs pa'i sbyor ba)
• (3) With outer objects being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either (upalambhānupalambhaprayoga, dmigs pa mi dmigs pa'i sbyor ba)
• (4) Not observing both, nonduality is observed (nopalambhopalambhaprayoga, mi dmigs dmigs pa'i sbyor ba).

Thus, stages (1)–(3)―and thus the notion of cittamātra―are progressively dealt with on the bodhisattva path only up through the end of the path of preparation. Stage (4) marks the path of seeing (the first bhūmi), on which bodhisattvas have to let go of the notion of cittamātra as well. This progression is also clearly expressed in Mahāyānasaṃgraha III.11–14, specifically matching these four stages with the four stages of the path of preparation (heat, peak, poised readiness, and the supreme mundane dharma). Here too, the notion of cittamātra is said to be relinquished:

After this [stage of poised readiness], the destruction of the discriminating notion of mere cognizance represents the samādhi that immediately precedes [the path of seeing]. This is to be regarded as the stage of the supreme mundane dharma.

The text also speaks about the ultimate purpose and function of the notion of mere cognizance:

Why do [bodhisattvas] engage in mere cognizance? The cognitions of [nonconceptual and unmistaken] supramundane calm abiding and superior insight focus on [all] the miscellaneous dharmas [of the mahāyāna, whose general characteristic is suchness], and the subsequently attained [nonconceptual] cognition in terms of various kinds of cognizance [realizes all phenomena to be nothing but imaginations of apprehender and apprehended]. Through these [cognitions], they relinquish all seeds in the ālaya-consciousness together with their causes, and thus increase the seeds of making contact with the dharmakāya [―cultivating the latent tendencies for listening of the mahāyāna. Finally,] through undergoing the fundamental change of state, they perfectly accomplish all the buddhadharmas and thus attain omniscient wisdom. This is why they engage [in mere cognizance].

Since the subsequently attained cognition regards everything that arises in the ālaya-consciousness and all characteristics of mere cognizance as being like illusions and such, it arises in a naturally unmistaken way. Therefore, these bodhisattvas are always unmistaken in their teachings on causes and results, just as illusionists are with regard to the phenomena in the illusions they produced.

In other words, like so many other general Buddhist and specific Yogācāra notions, cittamātra (or vijñaptimātra) is no exception to simply being an expedient pedagogic tool to realize a certain level on the path. However, it is neither the final realization, nor to be reified in any way (thus becoming an obstacle to this very realization), but―as in the above example of cleaning a shirt―to be discarded once its intended function has been accomplished. In connection with the four yogic practices, the same crucial point is expressed in many other Yogācāra texts too, such as Madhyāntavibhāga I.6–7:

Based on observation,
Nonobservation arises.
Based on nonobservation,
Observation arises.

Thus, observation is established
As the nature of nonobservation.
Therefore, observation and nonobservation
Are to be understood as equal.

Sthiramati's Ṭīkā comments:

There is no difference between the nonobservation of referents and the observation as mere cognizance in that [both] do not exist. Thus, they are to be understood as equal. . . . [The latter] is just called "observation," since an unreal object appears [for it]. However, since there is no [actual] referent, nothing is observed by this ["observation"]. Therefore, ultimately, its nature is nonobservation. . . . Hence, it is said that it does not exist as the nature of observation. In such observation, neither is the nature of observation to be eliminated, nor is the nature of nonobservation to be established. They are the same in that they are undifferentiable. . . . "So why is [mere] cognition called 'observation' then?" In its nature, it is nonobservation, but [it is designated] in this way, since an unreal object appears [for it], as this is the convention in the world and the treatises.

The Dharmadharmatāvibhāga states:

Through [referents] being observed in this way, they are observed as mere cognizance.
By virtue of observing them as mere cognizance,
Referents are not observed,
And through not observing referents,
Mere cognizance is not observed [either].
Through not observing this [mere cognizance],
One enters into the observation of both being without difference.
This nonobservation of a difference between these two
Is nonconceptual wisdom.
It is without object and without observing,
Since it is characterized
By the nonobservation of all characteristics.

Verses 36–38 of Vasubandhu's Trisvabhāvanirdeśa agree:

Through the observation of it being merely mind,
A knowable object is not observed.
Through not observing a knowable object,
Mind is not observed [either].

Through not observing both,
The dharmadhātu is observed.
Through observing the dharmadhātu,
Mastery is observed.

Having gained mastery,
Through accomplishing the welfare of oneself and others,
The wise attain unsurpassable enlightenment
With its nature of the three kāyas.

Verses 26–30 of his Triṃśikā say:

For as long as consciousness
Does not dwell in mere cognizance,
The aftereffects of dualistic apprehension
Will not come to a halt.

But "all this is mere cognizance"
Refers to this observing too―
Anything that is propped up in front [of one's mind]
Means not dwelling in "merely that [cognizance]."

When consciousness itself
Does not observe any focal object,
It rests in the very being of mere consciousness,
Since there is no apprehender without something apprehended.

Then, it is no-mind and nonreferential―
It is supramundane wisdom.
This is the fundamental change of state
And the relinquishment of the twofold impregnations of negative tendencies.

It is the uncontaminated dhātu
That is inconceivable, virtuous, stable,
And blissful―the vimuktikāya
Called the dharma[kāya] of the great sage.

As in line 28c above, sometimes, Yogācāras differentiate between "mere mind" (cittamātra), "mere consciousness" (vijñānamātra), and "mere cognizance" (vijñaptimātra) on the one hand, and "the very being or nature of mere mind, consciousness, and cognizance" (adding the suffixes –tā or –tva to the former terms), with the latter indicating the actual nature of the former, that is, the nondual dharmadhātu or nonconceptual wisdom. Another way to put this is that cittamātra and so on usually just correspond to false imagination or the other-dependent nature, while cittamātratā and such refer to its true nature―the perfect nature.

Also, as Sthiramati states in his introduction to the Triṃśikābhāṣya, one of the main objectives of the Triṃśikā is to help those who do not correctly understand cittamātra, due to their attachment to the supposed reality of persons and phenomena, to fully realize the actuality of personal and phenomenal identitylessness in order to accomplish the true fruition of the teaching of cittamātra. In general, Sthiramati explains that demonstrating that phenomena do not exist permanently (that is, as having an intrinsic nature of their own) means to avoid the extreme of superimposition, while to say that they are "mere cognizance" serves to avoid the extreme of utter denial. Thus, there is also a difference in Yogācāra texts between mind, consciousness, and cognizance on the one hand, and "mere mind," and so on on the other hand. Mind or consciousness stands for the delusive activity of mental construction itself as well as the fictional reality it constructs, while "mere mind" and so on denote the realization that this supposed reality is not ultimately real, but only the plethora of one's own ongoing mental chatter. Thus, on the path, what appears as one's personal projected universe of the false duality of subject and object is first reduced to seeing the projector of this illusory world―one's very own mind, called "false imagination," "cittamātra," or "the other-dependent nature." Then, once the "bare structure" of the latter without the overlay of delusional fictions (the imaginary nature) is seen, the truth of cittamātra is realized, since to realize the true nature of false imagination or the other-dependent nature as always being free from such overlay is called the attainment of the perfect nature, which is nothing but the nonconceptual wisdom of seeing the ultimate essence of the other-dependent nature. This is also the attainment of suchness, the dharmadhātu, and so on as the final true realization of cittamātra. Hsüan-tsang states in his Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi:

Since citta and caittas depend on other things to arise (paratantra), they are like a magician's trick, not truly substantial (“real”) entities. But so as to oppose false attachments to the view that external to citta and caittas there are perceptual-objects (ching, viśaya) [composed of] real, substantial entities, we say that the only existent is consciousness. But if you become attached to the view that vijñapti-mātra is something truly real and existent, that's the same as being attached to external perceptual-objects, i.e., it becomes just another dharma-attachment [and definitely not liberating].

Paramārtha says the following in his commentary on verses 17–18 of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā:

What does it mean to establish the principle of Consciousness-Only? The meaning, fundamentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense with the mind. Now if the objective world does not exist, Consciousness-Only would also be destroyed. This is what I mean by "the principle of Consciousness-Only is upheld." This is called the pure component [of consciousness] because both defilements and the objective world do not exist [in the system of Consciousness-Only]. . . .
For this reason, outside of consciousness no events can take place. This is why it is called the impure component, for only the prior sense object is dispensed with but not consciousness itself. . . .
Q: If one dispenses with sense objects but retains consciousness, then one can say that there is a principle of Consciousness-Only. But if both the sense object and consciousness are to be dispensed with, how can consciousness [of any kind] be maintained? A: One establishes that Consciousness-Only temporarily dispenses with the sense object but retains the [existence of] mind. In the final analysis, however, one dispenses with sense objects in order to empty the mind. This is the correct meaning. Therefore, [when] both the sense object and consciousness are dissolved, this principle is upheld. [When] both the sense object and consciousness are dissolved, this [state] is identical to the true nature [tattva or tathatā]. The true nature is identical to Pure Consciousness (amala-vijñāna). Additionally, we can say in the final analysis that this is Pure Consciousness.

In his comments on verses 21–22 and 28,D D Paramārtha repeats his stance of cittamātra meaning the nonexistence of both objects and consciousness. On verses 23–25, where the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the perfect natures are described as the threefold lack of nature (see below), he concludes that the principle of cittamātra is explained in order to indicate this threefold lack of nature.

In the light of all this, it seems as (un)justified to call the Yogācāra School "Mind-Only School" or "Mere Mentalism" (sems tsam pa) as it would be to refer to the Madhyamaka School as the "Name-Only School" (ming tsam pa). Just as the notions of cittamātra or vijñaptimātra play a significant role in the Yogācāra School, the notions of nāmamātra (name-only) and prajñaptimātra (imputation-only) play a significant role in Madhyamaka, describing the fact that all phenomena are merely nominal and imputed, but they neither represent the ultimate or most essential feature of Madhyamaka, nor encompass its much larger scope. Rather, all the above notions are explicitly to be transcended in their respective systems and not to be reified, or even to be put forth as ultimate reality. In fact, all four standard Indian Buddhist schools (Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka) were named after their most essential or encompassing features and not after something that they themselves explain to be relinquished.

Mind's play has many faces

In Yogācāra texts, false imas also true for most other notions, such as the skandhas, in Buddhism in general), it cannot be overemphasized that what is described are dynamic processes and not any kinds of static entities or states. Thus, when Yogācāras speak about two, three, or eight consciousnesses (or three natures, five wisdoms, and three kāyas, for that matter), they in no way mean two, three, or eight distinct "minds," or even just static properties of a single mind. Rather, different numbers of consciousness stand for different functions of the mind, all of which operate as momentarily impermanent and changing processes (like constantly moving, changing, and interacting currents in the ocean), none of which is truly existent. Madhyāntavibhāga I.3 speaks of mind displaying as all kinds of seeming expressions in terms of subject and object:

Consciousness arises as the appearance of referents,
Sentient beings, a self, and cognizance,
[But] it does not have an [external] referent.
Since that does not exist, it does not exist either.

Madhyāntavibhāga I.9 specifies the subjective side of this further:

A single one is the conditioning consciousness.
The remaining entail experience.
Experience, delimitation,
And setting in motion are the mental factors.

Thus, there are two main kinds of consciousness―the ālaya-consciousness, as the most basic ground of mind, and the other seven consciousnesses that operate out of this ground and engage their respective objects (which are also nothing but different aspects of this basic ground). According to the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, the ālaya-consciousness is the "conditioning consciousness," because it is the foundation of all other consciousnesses, which entail experiencing their respective objects. Among mental factors, feeling refers to pleasant, unpleasant, and indifferent experiences; discrimination delimits the characteristics of objects; and the other mental factors set consciousness in motion to engage objects.

Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā presents a threefold model of the dynamic evolution or display of saṃsāric mind:

[Mind's] behavior in terms of self and phenomena
Operates in many different ways
In the modulation of consciousness.
This modulation is threefold―

Maturation, what is called "thinking,"
And the cognition of objects.
Here, maturation is the "ālaya-consciousness,"
Which contains all the seeds.
. . .
What operates by resting on the [ālaya-consciousness]
Is the consciousness called "mentation,"
Which has it as its focal object, its nature being self-centeredness.

It is always associated with the four afflictions,
And obscured yet neutral.
. . .
This is the second modulation.
The third is the observation
Of the six kinds of objects . . .

Thus, Vasubandhu's three basic modulations (pariṇāma) of consciousness are the ālaya-consciousness, the afflicted mind, and the remaining six consciousnesses (the five sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness). In Yogācāra texts, these are also referred to as the triad of "mind" (Skt. citta, Tib. sems), "mentation" (Skt. manas, Tib. yid), and "consciousness" (Skt. vijñāna, Tib. rnam shes), respectively. As for the eight consciousnesses, they are described in detail in AC and NYC below, which also provide copious quotations. So, to highlight some of the essential features here, the ālaya-consciousness is nothing but the sum total of the virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral tendencies that make up the mind stream of a sentient being. Thus, it is not like a container separate from its contents, but resembles the constant flow of all the water drops that are labeled "a river." In other words, there is no other underlying, permanent substratum or entity apart from the momentary mental impulses that constitute this ever-changing stream of various latent mental tendencies. Due to certain conditions—mainly the stirring of the afflicted mind (comparable to stirring by a wind or strong current)—various momentary appearances of subject and object manifest. What seem to be external (objects), internal (mind and the sense faculties), or both (the body) are not so, but just different aspects of the ālaya-consciousness appearing as if close or far. Right after each moment of this dualistic interaction of subjects and objects, the imprints created by them merge back into—or are "stored"—in the ālaya, just as waves on the surface of a river emerge from and remerge into it, every time interacting and criss-crossing with other such waves, and thus changing the overall current. In this way, the ālaya-consciousness is both the cause for saṃsāric appearances and their result, that is, their imprints that reemerge later. This does not mean that the ālaya actively creates anything, it is just the dynamic network of various causes and conditions interacting, which is otherwise known as dependent origination. In this way, it is said to be equivalent to fundamental ignorance and the karma accumulated by it, thus serving as the basis for all appearances and experiences in saṃsāra, which at the same time represent the sum of all factors to be relinquished in order to attain nirvāṇa. Thus, the ālaya-consciousness fully ceases to exist only upon the attainment of buddhahood. As the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and others say, because of all of this, it is not to be misconceived as an ātman or a creator.

The afflicted mind is simply another expression for mind not recognizing its own nature. Technically speaking, it is the consciousness that solely focuses inwardly and thus mistakes the empty aspect of the ālaya-consciousness as being a self and its lucid aspect as what is "other." It is said to be so close to the ālaya that it misperceives it in this way, very much like when one cannot see a table clearly or even recognize it as a table, when one presses one's eye against its surface. Usually, we think that not seeing or recognizing something is due to being too far away from it, but, as in this example, the afflicted mind is the most fundamental case of not recognizing something due to being too close to it. This is the starting point of fundamental subject-object duality, which then ramifies into the appearances of the remaining six consciousnesses and their objects, all of them being constantly filtered and afflicted through this basic self-concern. Thus, these consciousnesses are always accompanied by the three primary mental afflictions (desire for what seems pleasurable, aversion toward what seems unpleasurable, and indifference toward what seems to be neither) as well as countless secondary mental disturbances based on these afflictions. Karmic actions (trying to obtain what seems desirable and get rid of what seems not) ensue, inevitably leading to various kinds of suffering sooner or later. Thus, the wheel of saṃsāra spins. Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha describes "mentation" as follows:

Among those [consciousnesses], mentation is twofold. Since it is the support that acts as the immediate condition, the “mentation which is [any] consciousness that has just ceased” is the support for [the arising of] consciousness. The second is the afflicted mind, which is always congruently associatedD D with the four afflictions of the views about a real personality, self-conceit, attachment to the self, and ignorance. This is the support for the afflictedness of consciousness. [Thus,] consciousness is produced by virtue of the first [aspect of mentation] as its support, while the second one makes it afflicted. [Mentation] is a consciousness, because it cognizes objects. Since it is [both] immediately preceding and self-centered, mentation has two aspects.

Thus, the part of mentation that is the afflicted mind constantly entails a set of four subtle afflictions. Just as is the afflicted mind itself, these four are largely instinctive and unconscious, with any conscious thinking such as, "I am so and so" belonging to the conceptual part of the sixth consciousness, which superimposes more conscious and coarse layers of ego-clinging, based on the gut-level sense of "me" that constitutes the afflicted mind. Being a consciousness, it is moreover constantly associated with the five neutral omnipresent mental factors: impulse, feeling, discrimination, contact, and mental engagement (as is the ālaya-consciousness). However, despite being accompanied by these four afflictions, in itself, the afflicted mind is neutral in the sense of being neither virtuous nor nonvirtuous. For example, if we think, "I will help my sick mother," the ensuing action will be virtuous, and if we think, "I will kill someone," the ensuing action will be nonvirtuous. Still, in both cases, the clinging to "I" is the same. Thus, the very fact that the afflicted mind is essentially neutral makes it at all possible to accumulate virtue (at least in its still-contaminated form), despite one's grasping at a self. Finally, however, since the afflicted mind―the grasping at "me" and "mine"―is the root of all other afflictions, such as desire and anger, it must be relinquished. In other words, since this clinging to a self is the opposite of the prajñā that realizes the lack of a self, it obscures liberation from saṃsāra.

As for the term "mentation," despite being primarily used for the afflicted mind in Yogācāra texts, it is also generally used for the mental-sense faculty (equivalent to the immediate condition) as well as the sixth consciousness. Matters are further complicated by texts that provide overlapping descriptions and functions of all these terms. When the Indian Yogācāra texts (as does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha above) speak of the "immediate condition," they discuss it as either being related to the afflicted mind (as above), or in the context of the four conditions (causal, dominant, immediate, and object condition). Thus, the commentaries on the above quote from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that the first kind of mentation corresponds to the "dhātu of mentation" and the "āyatana of mentation" (as in the Abhidharmakośa), there being thus no mentation distinct from the six consciousnesses―any one of these six having just ceased is mentation. The first five consciousnesses have the five physical sense faculties as their supports, but the sixth consciousness does not have such a support. Consequently, in order to attribute a support to this consciousness too, mentation (or the mental-sense faculty) is what serves as its support (which is nothing but a previous moment of any one of the six consciousnesses having ceased and thus triggering the next one). In relation to the mental consciousness which immediately follows one of these consciousnesses that have just passed, they serve as its immediate condition and the support for its arising. It is in this sense that Sthiramati's commentary on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.42 says that the arising of the mental consciousness relies on the afflicted mind, just as the arising of an eye consciousness relies on the eye sense faculty. Also, Sthiramati's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇavaibhāṣya states:

Any one of the six consciousnesses, such as the eye [consciousness], that has ceased is present as the entity which is the support for the arising of the immediately following consciousnesses. Therefore, since they function as the supports for the immediately following minds, they are called "mentation." . . . The immediate condition is consciousness immediately upon its having ceased.

Guṇaprabha's Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa says:

As for [mentation] "functioning as a mental support," this refers to what is present in being the six operating consciousnesses. As [Abhidharmakośa I.17ab] explains:

Mentation is the consciousness
Immediately after [any of] the six [consciousnesses] have passed.

Any of these [six] having ceased is what is called "mentation." For example, a certain son is called the "father" of someone else, and a certain fruition is called the "seed" of something else. Likewise, when the six results that consist of the operating consciousnesses having ceased serve as the support for the arising of other [subsequent] consciousnesses, they are referred to as "functioning as mental supports."

Thus, "mentation" can either designate the mental-sense faculty (which equals the immediate condition), the afflicted mind, or the seventh consciousness as consisting of both the afflicted mind and the immediate condition (or immediate mind). However, in specific Yogācāra terminology, what mentation actually refers to is only the afflicted mind. As Sthiramati comments on Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa:

"In actual fact, mentation is what focuses on the ālaya-consciousness" means that the afflicted mind permanently focuses on the ālaya-consciousness as being a self, because it is congruently associated with focusing on a self in terms of being ignorant about it, [entertaining] views about it, being proud of it, and being attached to it. It always exists by virtue of having the character of self-centeredness. In actual fact, this is what is called "mentation." To refer to [the state of] consciousness immediately upon the six collections of consciousnesses, such as the eye [consciousness], having ceased as "mentation" is in order to establish [this state] as the location of [the arising of] the sixth―the mental―consciousness, but not because it has the aspect of self-centeredness. Therefore, in actual fact, it is not mentation per se.

As the Abhidharmasamucchaya and many other texts explain, the afflicted mind is the ever-present ego-clinging in saṃsāric beings and even in those on the Buddhist path of learning:

Except for when the path [of seeing] has become manifest [in one's mind stream], in the meditative absorption of cessation, and the level of nonlearning, it is always present in virtuous, nonvirtuous, and neutral states.

In terms of the hīnayāna path, this means that the afflicted mind is not present in the meditative equipoises of all noble beings from stream-enterers up through arhats, since the realization of the ultimate is incompatible with views about a self, and since arhats have relinquished all afflicted phenomena of the three realms. In terms of the mahāyāna path, the afflicted mind is out of function during the meditative equipoises of bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi onward, because both personal and phenomenal identitylessness are directly realized. However, by virtue of habitual latent tendencies, it still operates during the subsequent attainment of the first seven bhūmis (therefore, they are called "impure”). On the eighth bhūmi, the afflicted mind is fully relinquished. From a mahāyāna perspective, the afflicted mind is inactive in the meditative equipoise of arhats with remainder, but its latent tendencies still show in their phases of subsequent attainment. In arhats without remainder, these tendencies are not manifest, since such arhats are in constant meditative equipoise. However, together with the remaining cognitive obscurations, they constitute what the mahāyāna calls "the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance."

There is not much to say on the remaining six consciousnesses, except for the sixth one being explained as twofold in the teachings on valid cognition (pramāṇa). These two are the (more commonly known) thinking mind and what is called "mental valid perception." The latter refers to the part of the sixth consciousness that, like the five sense consciousnesses, is able to directly perceive sense objects (such as visible forms) upon being triggered by a preceding moment of sense consciousness (such as a visual consciousness). Together with the five sense consciousnesses, mental perception represents the outwardly oriented consciousnesses, while the thinking mind focuses on (more or less) conceptual mental images, which may or may not be triggered by preceding sense perceptions (such as seeing, reading, or hearing about something, and then thinking about it).

In general, it is said that the sense consciousnesses and the mental consciousness are "unstable" consciousnesses, that is, they do not operate at all times (such as when being fast asleep). The afflicted mind and the ālaya-consciousness are "stable" (they operate even during deep sleep and coma). However, in certain meditative states, even the afflicted mind temporarily sinks back into the ālaya-consciousness, but rearises from it once one rises from such meditations. In a way, the ālaya-consciousness can be understood as referring to nothing but the ever-unimpeded underlying stream of the vivid clarity aspect of mind, otherwise mind would be like a stone, or would have to be switched on again out of nothing upon waking up in the morning, or coming out of a coma or deep meditation.

Several texts by Paramārtha speak about the amalavijñāna ("pure or stainless consciousness") as a ninth kind of consciousness. It refers to the unconditioned, changeless, permanent mind unaffected by any impurities, identical with suchness as the ultimate. This amalavijñāna is said to be the foundation of the Buddhist path, while the ālaya-consciousness is the foundation of all defilements and eventually eliminated. Paramārtha also equates this amalavijñāna with suchness, nonconceptual wisdom, and mind's luminosity. He says that it is unmistaken and free from both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures (which comprise the manifestations of mistaken consciousness), thus being reminiscent of typical shentong positions.

Mind operates on three levels

The three "natures" or "characteristics" are the main Yogācāra pedagogic template to explain mind's operational modes when deluded and undeluded. They are the imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the perfect nature. In Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese texts, one finds a great number of sometimes very different presentations of what these three natures are and how they are interrelated. However, if one keeps in mind that all of these models describe processes rather than three clearly separate and fixed things or realities, their descriptions are not contradictory, but just emphasize different aspects of the same dynamics. For example, it is much easier to describe the features of a book, a CD, or a flower that lie still in front of oneself than the ever-changing and interacting movements of waves on the ocean. The fluid character of all three natures is shown in the following passages from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha:

In one sense, the other-dependent nature is other-dependent; in another sense, it is imaginary; and in yet another sense, it is perfect. In what sense is the other-dependent nature called "other-dependent”? It is other-dependent in that it originates from the seeds of other-dependent latent tendencies. In what sense is it called "imaginary”? Because it is both the cause of [false] imagination and what is imagined by it. In what sense is it called "perfect”? Because it does not at all exist in the way it is imagined.

and

Thus, in terms of its imaginary aspect, this very other-dependent nature is saṃsāra. In terms of its perfect aspect, it is nirvāṇa.

In this vein, the other-dependent nature is the process or experiential structure in which the world presents itself as a seeming (delusive) reality for beings whose minds have a dualistic perceptual structure (which is the imaginary nature). The perfect nature is the underlying fundamental process or structure of mind's true nature and its own expressions as they are unwarped by said dualistic perceptual structure. In more technical terms, the other-dependent nature is the basic "stuff" or stratum of which all our saṃsāric experiences and appearances consist. It is the mistaken imagination that appears as the unreal entities of subject and object, because these are appearances under the sway of something "other," that is, triggered by the latent tendencies of ignorance. The other-dependent nature appears as the outer world with its various beings and objects; as one's own body; as the sense consciousnesses that perceive these objects and the conceptual consciousness that thinks about them; as the clinging to a personal self and real phenomena; and as the mental events, such as feelings, that accompany all these consciousnesses. Thus, false imagination is what creates the basic split of bare experience into seemingly real perceivers that apprehend seemingly real objects. The duality of subject and object—the imaginary nature—does not even exist on the level of seeming reality, but the mind that creates this split does exist and functions on this level. However, the other-dependent nature in no way exists ultimately, since the Yogācāra texts repeatedly describe it as illusionlike and so on, and also state that it is to be relinquished, while the perfect nature is what is to be revealed (see below).

The imaginary nature covers the entire range of what is superimposed―consciously or unconsciously―by false imagination onto the various appearances of the other-dependent nature. This starts from the most basic gut-level sense of subject-object duality―the very fact that, for example, sense objects naturally seem to appear to be "out there" and the perceiver is "here”; people naturally thinking and instinctively acting in terms of "me" and "others”; and standard notions such as "me and my body," or "me and my mind," all of which represent the imaginary nature. Progressively coarser levels of mistaken overlay include more reified conscious notions of a self and really existent phenomena up through the most rigid belief systems about what we and the world are. In other words, what appear as one's own body and mind form the bases for imputing a personal self. What appear as other beings, outer objects, and the consciousnesses that relate to them provide the bases for imputing really existent phenomena. In detail, the imaginary nature includes the aspects that appear as conceptual objects (such as the mental image of a form); the connections of names and referents (the notion that a name is the corresponding referent and the mistaking of a referent for the corresponding name); all that is apprehended through mental superimposition (such as direction, time, outer, inner, big, small, good, bad, and so on); and all nonentities (such as space). All of these exist only conventionally, as nominal objects for the dualistic consciousnesses of ordinary sentient beings, but are not established as really existent. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XIII.17 says:

Just as there are neither depths nor heights
In a perfect painting, but are seen there,
There is never any duality in any respect
In false imagination, but it is seen there.

The perfect nature is emptiness in the sense that what appears as other-dependent false imagination is primordially never established as the imaginary nature. As the ultimate object and the true nature of the other-dependent nature, this emptiness is the sphere of nonconceptual wisdom, and it is nothing other than phenomenal identitylessness. It is called "perfect," because it never changes into something else, is the supreme among all dharmas, and is the focal object of prajñā during the process of purifying the mind from adventitious stains. Since the dharmas of the noble ones are attained through realizing it, it is called "dharmadhātu." By virtue of its quality of never changing into something else, it is termed "suchness." Just as space, it is without any distinctions, but conventionally, the perfect nature may be presented as twofold—the unchanging perfect nature (suchness) and the unmistaken perfect nature (the nondual nonconceptual wisdom that realizes this suchness). At times, the perfect nature is also equated with the luminous nature of mind free from adventitious stains, or buddha nature. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha characterizes the three natures as follows:

"In this . . . very extensive teaching of the mahāyāna . . ., how should the imaginary nature be understood?" It should be understood through the teachings on the synonyms of nonexistents. "How should the other-dependent nature be understood?" It should be understood to be like an illusion, a mirage, an optical illusion, a reflection, an echo, [the reflection of] the moon in water, and a magical creation. "How should the perfect nature be understood?" It should be understood through the teachings on the four kinds of pure dharmas. As for these four kinds of pure dharmas, (1) natural purity means suchness, emptiness, the true end, signlessness, and the ultimate. Also the dharmadhātu is just this. (2) Unstained purity refers to [the state of] this very [natural purity] not having any obscurations. (3) The purity of the path to attain this [unstained purity] consists of all the dharmas concordant with enlightenment, such as the pāramitās. (4) The pure object in order to generate this [path] is the teaching of the genuine dharma of the mahāyāna. In this way, since this [dharma] is the cause for purity, it is not the imaginary [nature]. Since it is the natural outflow of the pure dharmadhātu, it is not the other-dependent [nature either]. All completely pure dharmas are included in these four kinds [of purity].

As in this passage, many Yogācāra texts emphasize the unreal nature of the other-dependent nature and that it is definitely not the ultimate existent. Nevertheless, the other-dependent nature's lack of reality does not prevent the mere appearance and functioning of various seeming manifestations for the mind. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha continues:

Why is the other-dependent nature taught in such a way as being like an illusion and so on? In order to eliminate the mistaken doubts of others about the other-dependent nature. . . . In order to eliminate the doubts of those others who think, "How can nonexistents become objects?" it is [taught] to be like an illusion. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can mind and mental events arise without [outer] referents?" it is [taught] to be like a mirage. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can likes and dislikes be experienced if there are no referents?" it is [taught] to be like a dream. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can the desired and undesired results of positive and negative actions be accomplished?" it is [taught] to be like a reflection. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can various consciousnesses arise if there are no referents?" it is [taught to be] like an optical illusion. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "How can various conventional expressions come about if there are no referents?" it is [taught] to be like an echo. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can the sphere of the meditative concentration that apprehends true actuality come about?" it is [taught] to be like [a reflection of] the moon in water. In order to eliminate the doubts of those who think, "If there are no referents, how can unerring bodhisattvas be reborn as they wish in order to accomplish their activity for sentient beings?" it is [taught] to be like a magical creation.

These passages also highlight that the template of the three natures is not so much an ontological model, but primarily a soteriological one. This is also expressed in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya on XIX.77–78, which says that the realization of the three natures is the special realization of bodhisattvas. As Nguyen says:

The close association between ontology and soteriology is indeed one of the distinctive features of Buddhism as a whole, and a topic that was given a most thorough analytical treatment in the Yogācāra tradition. . . . In fact, from the perspective of Mahāyāna Buddhism in general and the Yogācāra School in particular, the realization of Reality in itself implies the attainment of enlightenment, that is, nirvana, or in other words, the attainment of buddhahood. This is because in Mahāyāna Buddhology, buddhahood is synonymous with Ultimate or True Reality. Put differently, within the Yogācāra world view, ontological realization is not different from soteriological attainment. Thus the realization of True Reality in this context is more than just an ontological insight into reality; it also carries broader implications and ramifications from the practical perspective of soteriology.

This becomes even clearer when the three natures are also referred to as "lack of nature" and "emptiness." The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says:

When scrutinized with insight,
Neither the dependent, nor the imaginary,
Nor the perfect [natures] exist.
So how could insight imagine any entity?

The way in which Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.50–51 speaks about the lack of nature of all phenomena in general sounds exactly like what is found in prajñāpāramitā or Madhyamaka texts:

Because [phenomena] do not exist as themselves or through an identity of their own,
Do not dwell in a nature of their own,
And do not exist as they are apprehended,
Their lack of nature is asserted.

The lack of nature establishes,
With each one being the basis of the following one,
Nonarising, nonceasing,
Primordial peace, and parinirvāṇa.

More specifically, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra's seventh chapter speaks at length about the lack of nature in terms of characteristics, the lack of nature in terms of arising, and the ultimate lack of nature as representing the imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect natures, respectively. Asaṅga's Saṃdhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣya says that this threefold lack of nature is taught as a remedy for four wrong ideas about the meaning of what is taught through the lack of nature in general. For example, it is a misconception to think that the lack of nature is mere nonexistence, or to believe that what is without nature cannot arise even as a mere appearance on the level of seeming reality.

In its discussions on establishing the mahāyāna sūtras as the words of the Buddha, chapters 3 and 4 of Vasubandhu's Vyākhyāyukti not only defend the prajñāpāramitā sūtras against the charge of nihilism, but point out that these sūtras themselves criticize nihilism as the activity of māras and that their key notion "lack of nature" is not to be understood literally in the sense of nothing existing at all. Rather, it has to be interpreted in the correct way, which is accomplished through the threefold lack of nature as presented in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. In particular, the lack of nature of all phenomena must be clarified in this way in order to relinquish the extremes of superimposition and denial, that is, in order to (1) prevent childish beings from clinging to the existence of the imaginary nature and (2) prevent those who do not understand, when just the main points are being discussed, from clinging to the nonexistence of those phenomena whose nature it is to be inexpressible. When discussing the levels and modes of existence of what are described by the three natures themselves, the Vyākhyāyukti matches them with the framework of the two realities:

It may be said, "The Bhagavat taught in the Pāramārthaśūnyatā[sūtra], 'Both karmic actions and their maturations exist, but an agent is not observable.'D D How is this [statement to be understood]―in terms of the ultimate or the seeming? . . . If it is in terms of the ultimate, how could all phenomena lack a nature? If it is in terms of the seeming, it should not be said that an agent is not observable, since an agent too exists on the level of the seeming." To start, [one needs to know] what this "seeming" and what the ultimate is. By virtue of this, one will know what exists on the level of the seeming and what exists ultimately. Some [śrāvakas] may say, "The seeming consists of names, expressions, designations, and conventions, while the specific characteristics of phenomena are the ultimate." However, in this case, since both karmic actions and their maturations exist as both names and specific characteristics, [whether they pertain to the ultimate or not] depends on one's concept of existence, [that is, on] how one asserts these two [―karma and maturation―as being either names or specifically characterized phenomena].

I hold that a person is something that exists on the level of the seeming, but not as something substantial, because it is [just a] name that is labeled onto the skandhas. Karmic actions and their maturations exist substantially on the level of the seeming, but do not exist ultimately, because they are the objects of mundane cognition. [Paramārtha means] being the object of the ultimate, because the ultimate (parama) is supramundane wisdom and it is the object (artha) of the latter. The specific characteristics of the [above] two [karmic actions and their maturations] are not the sphere of this [wisdom], since its sphere is the inexpressible general characteristic [that is suchness]. Here, you may wonder, "Is it mundane cognition or supramundane [wisdom] that represents valid cognition?" There is only one [ultimately valid cognition]―supramundane [wisdom]. Mundane cognition has divisions―being attained subsequently to supramundane [wisdom], it is not [ultimate] valid cognition. [Needless to say then that any] other [cognitions] are not valid cognition [either]. Thus, this accords with a verse of the Mahāsaṅghikas:

Neither the eye, the ear, nor the nose is valid cognition,
Nor is the tongue, the body, or mentation valid cognition.
If these sense faculties were valid cognition,
Whom would the path of noble ones do any good?

. . . If one speaks about "the seeming" and states that "what accords with afflicted phenomena is explained as flaws" and "what accords with purified phenomena is explained to be excellent" [and yet claims that] these are nothing but mere verbiage, how could one explain anything to be excellent, explain anything as a flaw, or actually accept any seeming phenomena without doubt? In other words, if these too were [utterly] nonexistent, how could [the Buddha] speak of existence on the level of the seeming? Through denying all afflicted and purified phenomena, one could not express anything, since one would not abide in [knowing] what is the case and what is not the case and moreover refute one's own statements.

This points to two of the main misconceptions that explain why the Yogācāras saw a need to interpret the message of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras in terms of the three natures. Obviously, since these sūtras themselves teach one to reject what is afflicted and practice or adopt what is pure, in terms of the path, it makes no sense to simply take emptiness as meaning that nothing whatsoever exists on any level of reality, because then there is nothing to adopt or to reject. Thus, given the emptiness of all phenomena on the ultimate level, the existence of skandhas, karmic actions, a person, adopting, rejecting, and so on can only be, and must be accepted on, the level of seeming reality. However, within that level, one needs to further distinguish clearly between mere imaginary labels (such as the person) and the functional phenomena (such as skandhas and actions) that are taken as the bases for such labeling and perform the functions to be worked with on the path, even though both do not exist ultimately (neither does the path that nevertheless leads to the realization of the ultimate). Thus, verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā state:

Based on the three kinds of lack of nature
Of the three kinds of nature,
It is taught that all phenomena
Are without nature.

The first one lacks a nature
In terms of characteristics; the next one
Lacks existence on its own,
And the following is the lack of nature as such.

Sthiramati's commentary explains:

"The first one" is the imaginary nature. It "lacks a nature in terms of characteristics," because its characteristics are imputed. [For example,] form has the characteristic of form, feeling has the characteristic of experience, and so on. Thus, since [the imaginary nature] has no character of its own (svarūpa), just as a sky-flower, it is the lack of nature of any character of its own. "The next one" refers to the other-dependent nature. It does not exist by itself (na svayaṃbhāva), because it arises through other conditions, just as an illusion. Thus, as shown, there is no arising of it, which is why it is referred to as "the lack of nature in terms of arising." Because the perfect nature is the ultimate of all phenomena, which are other-dependent in nature, it is referred to as their true nature (dharmatā). Therefore, the perfect nature is the ultimate lack of nature, because the nature of the perfect [nature] is to not be any entity (abhāvasvabhāvatvāt).

In brief, just as when mistaking the moving colors and shapes in a movie for a story line with actual persons with all their emotions and so on, the imaginary nature stands for the illusory display of dualistic appearances that actually do not exist in the first place, let alone having any characteristics of their own. Therefore, it is called "the lack of nature in terms of characteristics." Just as the mere movement of said shapes and colors on the screen, the other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances which means that they appear in an illusionlike manner, but are without any nature of their own and do not "really" arise. Thus, the other-dependent nature is called "the lack of nature in terms of arising." The perfect nature is "the ultimate lack of nature," which has two aspects. First, although there is no personal identity, the perfect nature is what functions as the path that remedies the notion of a personal identity. Just as an illusory ship can be used to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means to cross the ocean of saṃsāra to the other shore of nirvāṇa. In terms of dependent origination, this remedial or path aspect is actually contained within the other-dependent nature, but since it is the cause for realizing the ultimate, it is included in the category of "the ultimate lack of nature." The second aspect of the perfect nature is the one by virtue of which enlightenment is attained through actively engaging in it and is undifferentiable from phenomenal identitylessness. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever (just as the colors and shapes in a movie are nothing but the display of photons, which are ultimately unfindable). This aspect is "the ultimate lack of nature" per se. Note, however, that, while the Madhyamaka system greatly tends to speak only about the objective side of this "ultimate lack of nature," the Yogācāra tradition also emphasizes its subjective side. In other words, the lack of nature or emptiness is not just limited to being something like the bare fact of said photons being unfindable, but there is an awareness or experience of this very fact. Needless to say, for Yogācāras too, the true realization of the ultimate lack of nature also entails the emptiness or unfindability of that very experience, but any realization of this has to happen in the mind―it is not just an abstract fact like a mathematical equation at which no one looks. Fundamentally, all phenomena, including one's mind, have always been, are, and will be empty, but this fact alone makes nobody a buddha, unless it is made into an incontrovertible, all-pervasive, and personal experience of boundless freedom and compassion and is as natural an outlook informing all one's actions as it is for ordinary beings to experience themselves and the world as real, dualistic, and suffering.

Regarding emptiness understood in terms of the three natures, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XIV.34 says:

If one knows the emptiness of the nonexistent,
Likewise the emptiness of the existent,
And also natural emptiness,
Then this is expressed as "knowing emptiness."

On the level of seeming reality, the imaginary nature is just nominally existent, while the other-dependent nature is substantially existent in the sense of what conventionally performs functions. The perfect nature does not exist in any of these two ways, but is the ultimate incontrovertible state of mind experiencing its own true nature. Again, by definition, this personally experienced wisdom is in itself completely without any reference points, such as it existing or not existing. For these reasons, the imaginary nature is also called "the emptiness of the nonexistent”; the other-dependent nature, "the emptiness of the existent”; and the perfect nature, "the ultimate or natural emptiness." Thus, as mentioned above, the three natures not only accord with the prajñāpāramitā notions of emptiness and the lack of nature, but moreover serve as progressive stages of the transition from utter delusion to the undeluded wisdom of a buddha with all its qualities. Nguyen says:

As an elaboration of the teaching of the Middle Path, the concept of the three identities may be compared to the Madhyamaka School's concept of Emptiness (śūnyatā). Śūnyatā is a hermeneutic concept used to deconstruct the reification of all the constituent factors and processes that are thought to make up the reality of persons and phenomena. The three identities concept not only accomplishes a deconstruction of these factors, but also reveals a realization of their true nature (tathatā) replete with positive implications from the perspectives of both epistemology and soteriology.

Thus, just as in the case of the notion of cittamātra above, the three natures are to be practically and progressively engaged as the bodhisattva path, with each one to be transcended by the following one. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says:

How should one engage in [appearances as being mere cognizance]? . . . One engages in this just like in the case of a rope appearing as a snake in a dark house. Since a snake does not exist, [to see it] in the rope is mistaken. Those who realize [that the rope] is its referent have turned away from the cognition of [seeing] a snake where there is none and dwell in the cognition of [apprehending] a rope. [However,] when regarded in a subtle way, such is also mistaken, since [a rope] consists of [nothing but] the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and what can be touched. [Thus,] based on the cognition of [seeing color] and so on, the cognition of [apprehending] a rope has to be discarded too. Likewise, based on the cognition of [seeing] the perfect nature, . . . also the cognition of mere cognizance is to be dissolved. . . . Through engaging in mere cognizance, one engages in the other-dependent nature.
How does one engage in the perfect nature? One engages in it by dissolving the notion of mere cognizance too. . . . Therefore, there is not even an appearance of [phenomena] as mere cognizance. When bodhisattvas . . . dwell in the dharmadhātu in an immediate way, what is observed and what observes are equal in these bodhisattvas. In consequence, what springs forth [in them] is equal nonconceptual wisdom. In this way, such bodhisattvas engage in the perfect nature.

The path quality of the three natures is also taught in Madhyāntavibhāga III.9cd–10a:

In full understanding, relinquishing,
And attaining and revealing,
The reality of the path is fully explained.

Mipham Rinpoche comments on this as follows.

The imaginary [nature] is what is to be fully understood through the path, that is, it is to be understood that it does not exist as any entity. Therefore, it is taught [through the term "path" here] by way of designating the object through the name of the subject―the path. The other-dependent [nature] is what is to be relinquished through the path. This means that enlightenment is attained by virtue of false imagination, which entails dualistic appearances, becoming extinguished. Therefore, this corresponds to [line I.4d] in the chapter on the characteristics of afflicted phenomena above:

Its extinction is held to be liberation.

Therefore, to designate [the other-dependent nature] through the name "path" is a designation of what is to be relinquished through the name of the remedy. The perfect [nature] is explained as the path, because it is that which is to be attained and revealed. [In this case,] the cause is designated through the name of the result.

A similar statement is found in the opening lines of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga:

After having understood, something is to be relinquished
And something else is to be revealed.

Also, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya on XI.13 says:

True reality is always free from duality, the basis of mistakenness,
And inexpressible in every respect, having the nature of being free from reference points.
It is held to be what is to be understood, relinquished, and purified, though it is naturally stainless.
Its purity of afflictions is asserted to be like space, gold, or water.

The true reality being always free from duality refers to the imaginary nature, because it absolutely never exists as the characteristics of apprehender and apprehended. [True reality serving as] the basis of mistakenness refers to the other-dependent [nature], because it is what imagines this [duality of apprehender and apprehended]. The inexpressible [true reality], having the nature of being free from reference points, is the perfect nature. Here, the first true reality is what is to be fully understood; the second one is what is to be relinquished; and the third one is both what is to be purified from adventitious stains and naturally pure. In its natural purity, like space, gold, or water, it is pure of afflictions. Space and so on are neither naturally impure, nor is their purity not asserted [as being revealed] by virtue of adventitious stains disappearing.

Thus, one of the main reasons for speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to account for the process of mind progressing from its mistaken state to freedom, which―as far as the Buddhist path is concerned―takes place within the dependently originating structure of the other-dependent nature, realizing the nonexistence of the imaginary nature and revealing or becoming immersed in the perfect nature instead. Thus, from the perspective of the path, the imaginary nature is to be known for what it is―utterly nonexistent; the other-dependent nature is to be relinquished in the sense of mind ceasing to create dualistic appearances; and the perfect nature is that which is to be manifested or realized, which is just the true nature of the first two natures, once the other-dependent nature ceases to project the imaginary nature. In other words, in terms of the Buddhist path, the delusive complexities of the ontologically and epistemologically more fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent nature can be reduced to, or collapsed into, the underlying single ontologically and epistemologically stable structure of the perfect nature, which is simply uncovered. This is what is called "fundamental change of state" (see below). As should be clear, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the basic unmistakenness and irreversibility of this change of state.

To conclude this discussion of the three natures and to get a glimpse of the variety of explanations on the three natures, let's look at the four models that are presented in Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā on I.1.D

False imagination exists.

Duality is not present in it.
But emptiness is present in it,

And it is also present in this [emptiness].

[Model 1] . . . Some think, "All phenomena are without nature in every respect, just like the horns of a rabbit." Therefore, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." This is [to be] supplemented by the words, "by a nature of its own." "But in that case, since the sūtras state that all phenomena are empty, does this not contradict the sūtras?" There is no contradiction. For, [line I.1b] says, "Duality is not present in it." False imagination is said to be empty, because it is free from the nature of apprehender and apprehended, but it is not that it lacks a nature in every respect. Therefore, this does not contradict the sūtras. "But if duality does not exist in any respect, just as the horns of a rabbit, and false imagination exists ultimately by virtue of a nature of its own, then the nonexistence of emptiness would follow." It is not like that, because [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." Emptiness is the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended. Thus, emptiness does not become nonexistent. You may think, "But if nonduality is emptiness and it exists in false imagination, why are we not liberated? Also, given that it is present [in false imagination], why is it not apprehended?" In order to remove such doubts, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." Since false imagination is present in emptiness, You, sir, are not liberated. By virtue of possessing stains, unlike clear water, it is not suitable to be realized.

[Model 2] Or, some may regard forms and so on to exist substantially as something other than mind and mental factors. So in order to refute them, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists" means that this very [false imagination] is what exists substantially, but form exists neither as something separate from it, nor substantially. "What is the reason [for that]?" For, [line I.1b] says, "Duality is not present in it." False imagination is neither the apprehender of anything, nor is it apprehended by anything. "So what is it?" It is just sheer being, free from apprehender and apprehended. Since no form and so on is apprehended outside of consciousness, just as in a dream, consciousness arises appearing as form and so on. "But if its cause does not exist, its arising is not tenable." Therefore, the lack of focal object is just as in a dream. You should understand that consciousness appearing as referents also arises in other cases, [such as the waking state,] by virtue of its seeds maturing. Since there is no apprehender without something to be apprehended, it is not tenable for an apprehender to exist if there is nothing to be apprehended. Therefore, form and so on do not exist apart from false imagination. "However, by virtue of there being nothing to be apprehended, there is no pure object (viśuddhyālambana) [either], and thus no liberation." This is not the case. For, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." Here, the word "but" means "because." That is, precisely because emptiness is the pure object―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended―that exists in false imagination, it is not that there is no liberation. "But if it exists in false imagination, given that it is present [there], why is it not apprehended?" It is [only] by virtue of its being obscured through false imagination that it is not suitable to be apprehended like the stainless sky, but not by virtue of its being nonexistent. In order to teach that, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in emptiness."

[Model 3] Or, in order to refute the denial of everything, [line I.1a] says, "False imagination exists." It is neither that all [phenomena] do not exist, nor is it that they have a real nature of their own―they exist as the nature of the modulations of consciousness. Some think, "Form and so on appear in just the way they appear, that is, through a nature of their own and as something separate from false imagination." In order to refute such superimpositions onto what is unreal, [Maitreya] retorts with [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." The intention here is that what is present is mere false imagination. Some apprehend the nonexistence of duality as having the nature of total extinction (chedarūpa), just as the son of a barren woman. Others say, "The freedom from an internal person as the agent (antarvyāpārapuruṣa) is the emptiness of phenomena." Therefore, in order to refute denials of emptiness and in order to teach true identitylessness (bhūtanairātmya), [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." "But if emptiness exists in false imagination, it consequently follows that all living beings would be liberated without any effort." This is not so, for [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." As long as emptiness is not purified, there is no liberation, and its being afflicted needs to be purified through great efforts. Thus, it is not that there is liberation without effort.

[Model 4] Or, in terms of characteristics,D D there is nothing other than the description of what is afflicted and what is purified. Therefore, in order to investigate what is afflicted and what is purified, [line I.1a], "False imagination exists," represents the details [of what is afflicted]. The nature of false imagination is afflicted, because it has the characteristic of mistakenness. "How is this characteristic of mistakenness to be understood?" It is through [line I.1b], "Duality is not present in it." It is to be understood as the very nature of mistakenness, because it appears in the form of the aspects of apprehender and apprehended, which are not present in its own nature. Now, in order to investigate the very nature of what is purified, [line I.1c] says, "But emptiness is present in it." The nature of emptiness is what is purified, because it is the nature of the nonexistence of duality. You should know that also the path and cessation are included in this, because they are characterized by emptiness. The domain of what is purified is to be searched from right within the domain of what is afflicted―it does not exist as something separate from it. In order to teach this, [line I.1c] says "[emptiness is present] in it." You may ask, "If duality does not exist, given the presence of this [emptiness], why is the world mistaken?" Therefore, [line I.1d] says, "And it is also present in this [emptiness]." This refers to the imagination of apprehender and apprehended, just as an illusion is empty of the aspects of elephants and so on, yet the aspects of elephants appear.

From Sthiramati's approach here, it is clear that he does not primarily speak about ontological models of the three natures, but treats them as pedagogical means to counteract particular wrong ideas. Thus, both false imagination and emptiness are described in several different ways. False imagination is said to be "existent by a nature of its own" (model 1); "substantially existent" (model 2); "of the nature of modulations of consciousness" (model 3); and "having the nature of being afflicted" (model 4). Emptiness is described as "the fact of false imagination being free from apprehender and apprehended" (models 1 and 2); "the pure object" (model 2); "true identitylessness" (model 3); and "having the nature of what is purified" and "being the nature of the nonexistence of duality" (model 4). The first two models sound rather realist and substantialist, but that does not necessarily mean that false imagination is held to be ultimately existent, which is in fact not affirmed anywhere. Also, though Sthiramati describes the above four models, it does not mean that he fully subscribes to all of them. In fact, commenting on Madhyāntavibhāga I.5, Sthiramati explicitly states that false imagination is the other-dependent nature, which arises under the power of causes and conditions, but does not exist or come into being on its own. He also quotes two verses, which add that the other-dependent nature is the sphere of correct mundane cognition, while the perfect nature is the sphere of nonconceptual (supramundane) wisdom.

Given the explicit objectives of Sthiramati's commentary to redress strong kinds of clinging to utter nonexistence or absolute existence and so on, from a pedagogical point of view, equally strong statements on relative existence (or relatively having a nature of its own) and emptiness, respectively, are suitable to counteract wrong ideas and guide disciples on the middle path between these two extremes, but this does not necessarily mean that those who make such statements accept everything in them as their own position. Such a middle path is clearly explained in Vasubandhu's and Sthiramati's commentaries on Madhyāntavibhāga I.2, following the statement in the prajñāpāramitā sūtras that all phenomena are neither absolutely empty nor absolutely nonempty. Sthiramati further clarifies that false imagination is conditioned, because it depends on causes and conditions, while emptiness is not. False imagination is present in emptiness in the form of phenomena, and emptiness is present in false imagination in the form of the nature of phenomena. This is further clarified in Sthiramati's comments on I.13, where the being of the nonbeing of duality is described as the characteristic of emptiness, which is neither existent nor nonexistent. Emptiness is not existent because of the nonexistence of duality. Nor is it nonexistent, since the nonexistence of duality exists. In other words, emptiness is not just the sheer absence of apprehender and apprehended, but constitutes the true mode of being of all phenomena. Emptiness is also neither the same as, nor different from, false imagination. If it were different from false imagination, it would not be its nature, and if it were the same, it would not be the sole pure object that is conducive to liberation.

To summarize, in the first two models, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is described more as an abstract property of false imagination (the other-dependent nature), which is said to not be without nature in every respect. Thus, duality (the imaginary nature) and emptiness are just the two poles of false imagination―the way it mistakenly appears and the way it actually is. Vasubandhu and Sthiramati both say that Madhyāntavibhāga I.5 is taught in order to include all three natures in false imagination, if―or as long as―mere false imagination exists. Since the immediately preceding line I.4d explicitly says that liberation is nothing but the extinction of false imagination, this can only mean that the three natures are only included in, and applicable to, false imagination as long as it exists as the display of saṃsāra. Within this saṃsāric framework, the imaginary nature is the mistakenly imagined duality of which false imagination is actually empty; the other-dependent nature is false imagination itself; and the perfect nature is the very absence of duality in false imagination. This seems to indicate that the first two models above revolve around false imagination as primarily describing the deluded saṃsāric mind. By contrast, the latter two models seem to discuss the three natures more from the perspective of the ultimate. Thus, false imagination is not said to have a nature of its own or to exist substantially, but to exist just as modulations of consciousness and as being afflicted. Emptiness is described as being more than just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the very nature of the absence of duality, that is, true identitylessness, which is the pure object conducive to liberation and even includes the path that leads to this liberation (at the same time, it is not to be looked for outside of what appears as afflicted phenomena). Thus, emptiness (or the perfect nature) is only taken as the mere absence of duality in false imagination, when the latter is described in more ontological or saṃsāric terms (models 1 and 2). But in the more epistemological or path-oriented explanations of false imagination, emptiness is described in more encompassing, positive, and ultimate terms (models 3 and 4). In other words, in the former approach, emptiness is basically just a property of false imagination, but in the latter approach, it is the true ultimate nature of false imagination. The latter accords with Madhyāntavibhāga I.20, in which the last one of the sixteen emptinesses―the emptiness that is the nature of nonbeing―is said to be different from the other fifteen, which all refer to the nonexistence of persons and phenomena. Together, these emptinesses serve to remove all superimpositions and denials―if persons and phenomena were not empty and nonexistent, they would truly exist, but if emptiness itself were nonexistent too, persons and phenomena would not be empty and thus again be truly existent. Madhyāntavibhāga I.21 is explained as "the establishing of emptiness," making it clear that this emptiness (and not false imagination) is the final word here―without it, there would be no path and no liberation.

If this [emptiness] were not afflicted,
All beings would be liberated.
If it were not pure,
Efforts would be fruitless.

From the ultimate perspective, verse I.22 says, emptiness is free from all dualistic pinpointing, such as existence, nonexistence, pure, impure, and so on.

It is neither afflicted nor nonafflicted,
Neither pure nor impure.

As for emptiness being neither afflicted nor impure, Sthiramati comments that what is described here is purity per se, and that the dual terminology just serves to emphasize this. He refers to Vasubandhu's quote from the scriptures, which says that it is pure "because of mind's natural luminosity," and says that "mind" here refers to the true nature of the mind (cittadharmatā). As for its being neither nonafflicted nor pure, this indicates that it is only afflicted through adventitious stains, but not afflicted by nature. The scriptural support is, "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions."D D In this way, emptiness is far beyond being just the mere absence of duality in false imagination―it is the ultimate, luminous and pure nature of the mind.

In brief, all these different models can be summarized in two, which Sponberg (1981, pp. 99ff) calls (a) the pivotal and (b) the progressive models. The "pivot" in (a) is the other-dependent nature (just as in models 1 and 2 above), with the imaginary and perfect natures just being its two "extreme" poles of how it mistakenly appears and actually is. Model (b) refers to the three natures as three levels of reality, progressing from dualistic delusion to nondual freedom from delusion, as well as the realizations of these levels as outlined in the four yogic practices above.

Mind's fundamentally different outlook on itself

As for the Sanskrit term āśrayaparivṛtti (change of state), there are a great number of Buddhist scriptures (from the Pāli canon up through the tantras) in which this term is used with reference to a variety of different states or processes (for an overview, see Davidson 1985). For some of these processes, the term "transformation," which is mostly used in translations, may be appropriate, but as far as the dharmadhātu, natural purity, buddha nature, or the luminous nature of the mind are concerned, the whole point of this notion of "change of state" is that there is absolutely no transformation of anything into anything else. Rather, the revelation of mind's primordially pure nature, which from the perspective of the path appears as fruitional enlightenment, only manifests as a change from the perspective of deluded mind—mind seeming to be obscured before and then unobscured later. But this does not refer to any change in nature, just as the sun first being covered by clouds and then being free from clouds would not be called a transformation of the clouds into the sun, or even any transformation of the sun itself. It is solely from the perspective of those who watch the sun that its state seems to have changed (being with and without clouds, respectively). Even children know that the presence or absence of clouds does not affect the sun itself in any way, but just our perception of it. In fact, for the sun itself, there is not even a question of whether it has changed, let alone how. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.22 says:

Though without difference between before and after,
It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.
Being neither pure nor impure,
Suchness is held to be buddhahood.

Sthiramati's commentary on this explains:

"Purity" is said to mean having the nature of being afflicted before, and then the stains having become nonexistent later through having cultivated the path, with "before" referring to the time of an ordinary being, and "later" to the time of full buddhahood. But the dharmakāya of a buddha is held to be of the nature of suchness, emptiness. Emptiness has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous even at the time of ordinary beings. Also later, at the time of full buddhahood, it has the nature of being empty and naturally luminous. Therefore, in its nature of purity, there is no difference.

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XIII.18–19 says:

When murky water becomes clear,
[Its] transparency does not arise from elsewhere,
But is just its becoming free from pollution.
The same goes for the purity of your own mind.

It is held that mind, which is always naturally luminous,
Is [only] blemished by adventitious flaws.
It is stated that there is no other mind apart from
The naturally luminous mind of dharmatā.

The most detailed presentation of the Yogācāra notion of change of state is given in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (covering two-thirds of its contents), which describes the nature of the change of state as follows.

As for apprehending its nature,
It is stainless suchness
In the sense of adventitious stains
Not appearing and
Suchness appearing.

In the following, the text mainly speaks about the foundation of this change of state (lines 159–60), which is nonconceptual wisdom. In terms of the path, bodhisattvas cultivate and engage in this wisdom through (a) relinquishing the four progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about factors to be relinquished, their remedies, suchness, and realization (lines 171–79);D D (b) understanding that, by virtue of being ignorant about suchness, the delusive appearance of actually nonexistent false imagination and duality out of the ālaya-consciousness prevents the appearance of the nature of phenomena, and that the latter appears, once the former two cease to appear (lines 252–63); and (c) cultivating the above-mentioned four yogic practices (lines 180–85 and 264–75). The basic characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom are described as threefold (lines 186–204). Its characteristic of being grounded in the nature of phenomena means that it is nondual and inexpressible. Its characteristic of nonappearance means that duality, designations, sense faculties, objects, cognitions, and the outer world do not appear for it. Its characteristic of appearance means that, during meditative equipoise, all phenomena appear equal to space, while, during subsequent attainment, all conditioned phenomena appear like illusions. Nonconceptual wisdom is further characterized through excluding its being mistaken for five other states, such as its being nothing but the sheer absence of any mental engagement (such as deep sleep); its possessing five excellencies; and its five functions (223–46). Finally, the text presents four disadvantages, if there were no such change of state; four advantages, since it exists; and three examples of the fleeting nature of the adventitious stains and the unchanging basis of the change of state―the nature of phenomena (lines 293–307). The Third Karmapa's commentary on these examples explains:

For example, space is nothing but pure by nature. Therefore, by virtue of certain conditions (such as fog or mist) in the world, one can observe statements such as, "The sky is not pure" and, "It is pure," [when] it is clear and free [from these conditions]. However, it is not suitable to claim such because of a change of the nature of space. Its own nature being pure, empty, and unconditioned, it is indeed not suitable that it either becomes pure by virtue of itself or becomes pure by virtue of something else. Still, mistaken minds that connect mere conventional terms to it cling to space as being pure and impure, [but] this is nothing but an error. Likewise, though it may appear as if the naturally pure nature of phenomena―the perfect [nature]―has become free from the fog and mist of conceptions, it is not asserted that this perfect [nature] has changed―it is absolutely without any arising or ceasing in terms of itself, others, both, or neither. In the same way, the fact of gold remaining in its excellent state is not changed by stains, and the fact of water remaining clear and moist is not changed in its nature, even if it becomes associated with sullying factors, such as silt. Likewise, all that happens to the unmistaken path and the pure dharmas is that they just become associated with stains and sullying factors through the conceptions of ignorance, but it is not asserted that these uncontaminated dharmas [―the path and the pure dharmas entailed by cessation―] change. Therefore, naturally luminous stainlessness is unconditioned and changeless. Thus, though the nature of phenomena is referred to by this term "fundamental change of state," it is also called "permanent."

All of this underlines that there is no change of state in nature or substance, but only a revelation of the way things actually have always been, once the delusion of what is projected onto this is seen through. Also, nonconceptual wisdom as both the underlying basis and the result of this change of state is clearly described in terms of the dynamics of an enlightened mind, and not as sheer emptiness or an inert state. Thus, as far as the notion of "change of state" refers to this process of uncovering mind's fundamental nature, even when it is sometimes described in Buddhist texts as if there were a transformation of one "thing" into another "thing," or of something impure (such as the skandhas or mental afflictions) into something pure (such as the pure skandhas or wisdoms), this is just a conventional or expedient way of teaching. The Eighth Karmapa's commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra says:

Those present-day followers of [Mahā]mudrā whose confusion is even a hundred thousand times bigger than this exclaim, "Through refining the ālaya-consciousness into something pure, it turns into the result of mirrorlike wisdom." This is not justified for the following reasons. Something like this does not appear in any of the traditions of the mahāyāna, and what does not appear [there also] does not appear in the sense of something that is obtained through reasoning. A presentation of the ālaya-consciousness as the cause and mirrorlike wisdom as its result is not something that is obtained through reasoning. Rather, with respect to the mode of being of causes and results in terms of [such] causes and results in the abhidharma that actually fulfill these functionsD D (that is, what produces and what is produced), the ālaya-consciousness and mirrorlike wisdom are not adequate as a cause and a result that fully qualify as such. Also, since the very nature of the ālaya-consciousness is [nothing but] the adventitious stains, it is presented as impure. No matter how it may be refined by something else, it will not turn into something pure. It is not possible within the sphere of knowable objects that something impure turns into something pure, or that something pure turns into something impure.

To highlight the different perspectives of the notion of change of state, Asaṅga's Abhidharmasamucchaya speaks of three kinds of change of state―(1) the change of state of mind upon the attainment of the path of nonlearning; (2) the change of state of the path; and (3) the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies. Sthiramati's commentaryD D explains that (1) refers to the naturally luminous mind that is the nature of phenomena having become free from all adventitious afflictions without exception. This is also called "the change of state of suchness." (2) means that, once clear realization occurs on the mundane path, it has become the supramundane path. The latter is also called "the path of learning" because there still remain tasks to be accomplished. Once all antagonistic factors are eliminated through being free from attachment to the three realms, this is presented as the perfectly complete change of the state that is the nature of this path. (3) means the ālaya-consciousness being free from even the most subtle latent tendencies of all afflictions.

The tenth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha explains the change of state of the five skandhas as follows:

Through how many kinds of masteries is the mastery of the dharmakāya attained? In brief, mastery is attained through five kinds: (1) Through the change of state of the skandha of form, mastery over [pure buddha] realms, kāyas, the excellent major and minor marks, infinite voices, and the invisible mark on the crown of the head [is attained]. (2) Through the change of state of the skandha of feeling, mastery over infinite and vast blissful states without wrongdoing [is attained]. (3) Through the change of state of the skandha of discrimination, mastery over the teachings [is attained] through all groups of words, groups of phrases, and groups of letters. (4) Through the change of state of the skandha of formation, mastery over creation, transformation, gathering retinues, and gathering the immaculate dharmas [is attained]. (5) Through the change of state of the skandha of consciousness, mastery over mirrorlike [wisdom], [the wisdom of] equality, discriminating [wisdom], and all-accomplishing [wisdom] is attained.

In his commentary on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.12–17, SthiramatiD D says that "state" in this context refers to the five skandhas, while "change" means that the dharmadhātu has become pure and has also become nonconceptual wisdom by virtue of the relinquishment of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations contained in these skandhas (for details, see below). In slightly different terms, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.41–47 also describes the various changes of state of the skandhas (primarily that of consciousness). Verse IX.48 concludes that the facets of such changes are in fact innumerable, but that all of them occur within the changeless and ever-pure dharmadhātu.

Thus, infinite masteries are asserted
In infinite changes of state
By virtue of the inconceivable all-accomplishment
Within the stainless foundation of the buddhas.

Thus, all these changes of state entail both a negative (relinquishment) and a positive aspect (attainment, purity), thus usually designating both a process and its result (cause and effect). By keeping in mind that the term "change of state" is used in Yogācāra texts sometimes to refer to the first and sometimes to the second aspect, seeming contradictions in differing ways of describing or applying this term are resolved. In other words, "state" may either refer to the ālaya-consciousness (or all eight consciousnesses, or adventitious stains) as that which changes from the perspective of the path. Or, it may be understood as nonconceptual wisdom, the Tathāgata heart, or the dharmadhātu as the very state within which any of the above "changes" take place, but which remains changeless itself. As for "change," again, even in terms of the eight consciousnesses or adventitious stains, there is no real change, since all of them are always explained to be delusive and illusionlike, and thus actually nonexistent in the first place―the only "change" being the realization of exactly this fact. Thus, there is no change in terms of the object, but in terms of the realizing subject, which again happens only from the perspective of the (seemingly) evolving wisdom of the path, but not in terms of the fundamentally unchanging nature of nonconceptual wisdom. Thus, at any given time on the path, there is never any change in substance or nature (both on the side of what is to be relinquished and the side of what is to be attained)―all that happens is a cognitive change, or a change in one's outlook on oneself and the world.

These two aspects also represent the two reasons why, from the perspective of the path, any change of state is possible at all. First, what seems to "change" (the adventitious stains) can appear so precisely because it is merely an unreal and deceiving mental construct in the first place. Secondly, these fictitious mental projections are only superimposed onto, and occur nowhere else than within, the undeceiving ground of true reality, which is their actual nature, just to be revealed. In other words, though sentient beings' delusional seeming reality in the form of the imaginary and other-dependent natures has no beginning, for individual beings, it can end. On the other hand, ultimate reality―the perfect nature―has neither beginning nor end.

Thus, as said above, from a soteriological point of view, one of the primary purposes of speaking about the three natures and the other-dependent nature in particular is to highlight how mind is deluded about itself and how it can free itself from that self-delusion. The stage for the process of mind freeing itself―the Buddhist path―is the other-dependent nature, which starts by taking a thorough look at its own dramas (the imaginary nature) and thus first sees its own bare structure―the dependently originating acting of the mind (i.e, cittamātra). Next, taking a look at that very display of acting itself results in seeing and becoming immersed in its lucid yet empty true nature (the perfect nature). In other words, the more the complex, yet delusively quivering and fragile structures of the imaginary nature and the other-dependent natures collapse, the more their immovable and stable fundamental ground shines through, which is not simply yet another structure, but mind's natural state free from all reference points. Thus, it cannot be pinpointed as anything, but revealed and experienced as mind's most basic make-up, which is only possible through this very mind not entertaining any grasping at anything, including its own nongrasping. For example, upon seeing an ice sculpture of a dog, one may think of it as "a dog" with all its characteristics (the imaginary nature), but it is clear that it is just a particular configuration of ice (the other-dependent nature), which in turn is actually nothing but a particular state of water (the perfect nature). The "dog" is reducible to ice, which is in turn reducible to water. However, without ice, one cannot create the sculpture of "a dog"―such is not possible with water in its natural fluid state. Likewise, the dualistic sculptures of the imaginary nature are only possible through and within the other-dependent nature, but never in the perfect nature. At the same time, the former two natures can eventually "melt" into the natural and stable state of the perfect nature.

This natural state is nothing other than buddhahood, the dharmakāya, and so on. Yet again, "stable" does not mean static or being established as some kind of intrinsically existing absolute entity, but refers to the irreversibility of this change of state. Buddhahood (subject) and ultimate reality (object) themselves are no exceptions to being dynamic in nature, though it is impossible to fall back into delusion or duality from this particular dynamics. Of course, some people argue that there is no such state of permanent liberation or buddhahood without reversing into delusion, just as gold or water can only be heated up temporarily (or, as in the case of melted ice, can be refrozen again). When heated up, gold will become liquid, but eventually will always solidify again. Likewise, water may become hot and even boiling, but will inevitably cool down. The Buddhist reply is that these examples miss the point, because the nature of gold is precisely to be solid and cool—and not liquid and hot—to begin with, so it just reverts to its natural state (the same goes for water). As Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.24ab and IX.25 say:

Therefore, buddhahood is said to be
Neither existent nor nonexistent.

Just as with the subsiding of heat in iron
And blurred vision in the eyes,
The mind and wisdom of a buddha
Are not said to be existent or nonexistent.

The Bhāṣya comments:

Therefore, buddhahood is not said to be existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of persons and phenomena, and that is its nature. Nor is buddhahood said to be nonexistent, because its characteristic of being suchness exists. . . . The subsiding of heat and blurred vision is not existent, because its characteristic is the nonexistence of heat and blurred vision. Nor is it nonexistent, because it exists through the characteristic of having subsided. Likewise, the subsiding of attachment and ignorance (which resemble heat and blurred vision) in the mind and wisdom of buddhas is not said to be existent, since it consists of their nonexistence. Nor is it nonexistent, since the liberations of mind and prajñā exist through their respective characteristics of being liberated.

In other words, heat and blurred vision do not exist any more, but the iron (characterized by its natural temperature and hardness) and clear eyesight still exist and function accordingly. Likewise, in buddhahood, ordinary states of mind (the eight collections of consciousness) have subsided, while the five wisdoms operate freely. Sthiramati adds that if the state of the visual disorder of blurred vision having subsided were absolutely nonexistent, then also the eye would not exist and could thus not perform the function of seeing clearly (the same goes for cool iron and a body free from illness functioning properly). Thus, the function of clear eyesight arises by virtue of blurred vision not existing. Likewise, in buddhahood, the afflictions and ignorance do not exist, but the liberation of mind (freedom from the afflictions―nirvāṇa) and prajñā (freedom from ignorance―omniscient wisdom) exist. The first liberation refers to being liberated from the afflictions to be relinquished through the paths of seeing and familiarization, which arises from the lack of attachment. The liberation of prajñā means realizing, just as it is, that the liberation of mind actually is liberation, which arises from the lack of ignorance. In addition, the characteristic of the joy of being free from attachment and ignorance is not nonexistent either. In brief, buddhahood is not just some indifferent state of lacking some things and seeing others, but it is the most fundamental freedom and insight that can possibly be experienced, which is naturally immensely joyful.

Thus, realizing buddhahood means nothing but to recognize the true nature of the mind, which can never be altered through its opposites, such as mistakenness and afflictions. Once the latter are seen through and recognized as adventitious illusory phenomena, mind will not revert to them. In other words, unlike water being reheatable over and again, once the nature of the mind is known for what it is, it is impossible to unknow it. As Dharmakīrti says in Pramāṇavārttika II.210cd–211ab:

Having the nature of being free from harm
And being actual reality, it is not reversed

Through its opposites, even with effort,
Since mind adheres to this side that is its [nature].

Mind's awakening

It should be noted at the outset that, fundamentally, both Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas agree that all descriptions of buddhahood (subject) or ultimate reality (object) are by definition incomplete, relative, and ultimately false, since it lies completely beyond the scope of words, thoughts, and dualistic perceptions. As Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.36 says:

The profundity of the buddhas
In terms of their characteristics, state, and activity
Within the stainless dharmadhātu
Is said to be but a colorful painting in the sky.

Thus, Mādhyamikas usually refrain from saying much, if anything, about this topic. On the other hand, the Yogācāra approach is twofold. Just like the Mādhyamikas, the Yogācāras point out, as Vasubandhu and Sthiramati comment here, that the uncontaminated dharmadhātu is completely free from reference points, so that any teachings by the Buddha on the varieties of its profundity resemble painting space with colors. However, the Yogācāras also acknowledge the pedagogical need for painting this colorful picture anyway, to be inspired by it, and also to inspire others, thus using it as an expedient means to facilitate progressing on the path, until what is painted in an illusory manner is nevertheless directly experienced. Accordingly, Sthiramati comments that, of course, it is difficult to paint space with colors, but if some very skilled person actually manages to do so, it is quite amazing. Similarly, the uncontaminated dhātu is the dharma that is to be personally experienced by the wisdom of the noble ones. As it is inexpressible in words, the Tathāgata's putting it in words by way of the threefold profundity in terms of characteristics, state, and activity is indeed a difficult task and something quite amazing to do. Still, it can be accomplished by virtue of the Buddha's skill and the dharmadhātu’s existing in all beings. Thus, the next verse says:

Though not being different in all of them,
Suchness has become pure.
Therefore, it is the Tathāgata,
And all beings possess its Heart.

Sthiramati says that suchness refers to the nature of the two kinds of identitylessness in terms of persons and phenomena, which pervade all entities. The personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in ordinary beings and the personal and phenomenal identitylessness that exists in the noble ones are not different. It is only by virtue of this suchness having become pure that it is called "Tathāgata." Though suchness exists in everything, once the two kinds of identitylessness have become free from the adventitious afflictive and cognitive obstructions, they are pure, which is called "Tathāgata." Thus, because suchness exists in sentient beings, they are all said to have the Tathāgata heart.

In general, buddhahood is described as both excellent relinquishment and realization (wisdom). Thus, in terms of the path, there is not only something to be relinquished (all reference points as per the Mādhyamikas, or the duality of apprehender and apprehended as per the Yogācāras), but also something to be cultivated (the yogic valid perceptions of meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment), which eventually results in the culmination of the nondual nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha. It is precisely because this nonconceptual wisdom (or dharmadhātu, or buddha nature) is the fundamental ground for all activities on the Buddhist path toward its (re-)discovery that the sūtras, tantras, and the Yogācāras describe it not only in purely negative terms.

The classical Yogācāra "sky painting" of buddhahood (which greatly accords with the Buddhabhūmisūtra) is chapter 9 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, which begins with two verses on buddhahood being omniscience:

Through hundreds of immeasurable hardships,
Immeasurable accumulations of virtue,
Immeasurable time,
And the extinction of immeasurable obscurations,

The knowledge of all aspects is attained―
Immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.
Buddhahood is illustrated
By an opened jewel casket.

Sthiramati's commentary says that it is the four wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom) and the dharmadhātu that are called "buddhahood," and buddhahood is in turn referred to as "omniscience." Following Vasubandhu, Sthiramati continues by saying that buddhahood is taught here through three points: (1) Full realization is illustrated by the innumerable hardships undergone by bodhisattvas for the sake of other beings (such as giving away their possessions and even their bodies); their infinite accumulations of virtue (such as the six pāramitās, the ten bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment); the innumerable eons (three or more) of practicing bodhisattva conduct; and the innumerable afflictive and cognitive obscurations that are overcome in this process. (2) The nature of buddhahood is the attainment of excellent relinquishment (being immaculate in terms of being free from all obscurations) and the attainment of excellent wisdom. The latter is called "knowledge of all aspects" by virtue of unmistakenly knowing [all phenomena] to be impermanent, suffering, empty, and identityless, just as they are. It is "omniscience" by virtue of knowing all phenomena, such as skandhas and dhātus, without exception. (3) The example for buddhahood is an opened casket of very powerful and variegated wish-fulfilling jewels―once the covers of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations have been removed, the unique qualities of buddhahood (such as the ten powers and the four fearlessnesses) manifest. Thus, verses IX.4–5 speak about buddhahood being characterized by nonduality and power.

Buddhahood is all dharmas,
But itself is no dharma whatsoever.
It consists of pure dharmas,
But is not portrayed by them.

By virtue of its being the cause of the jewel of the dharma,
It resembles a jewel mine.
By virtue of being the cause of the harvest of virtue,
It is held to resemble a cloud.

Sthiramati comments that buddhahood is nondual in terms of apprehender and apprehended (any subject-object duality has been relinquished) as well as existence and nonexistence. As for the latter, at the time of buddhahood, what does not exist is the imaginary characteristic of imagined apprehender and apprehended, and what does exist is the characteristic of the existence of the perfect nature. What is called "buddhahood" is the dharma that consists of personal identitylessness, phenomenal identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing. There are no phenomena that are not pervaded by these two kinds of identitylessness and the fact of nonarising and nonceasing. The nature of twofold identitylessness, nonarising, and nonceasing of the dharmakāya of the buddhas and the nature of these in all phenomena is in no way different. But in buddhahood, no phenomena that are characterized as being imagined by childish beings (such as apprehender, apprehended, pots, or clothes) exist. Yet buddhahood consists of pure dharmas, because (a) it is accomplished through practicing virtues such as the pāramitās, bhūmis, and the thirty-seven dharmas concordant with enlightenment, and (b) upon being accomplished, it abides as fully embodying these virtues as well as the unique buddha qualities of the ten powers and so on. Nevertheless, buddhahood is not portrayed by these pāramitās and so on, because the pāramitās that are characterized by being imagined and are observable as the three aspects of giver, recipient, and what is given do not exist by a nature of their own. These imaginary pāramitās and so on cannot be said to portray the nature of buddhahood, because buddhahood is not an imaginary phenomenon. As for buddhahood's power, it resembles a jewel mine, because it is the cause, the condition, and the foundation for the innumerable jewels of the dharma (the teachings) as well as its qualities (such as the ten powers). It resembles a cloud, since its vast, wellspoken, and inexhaustible rain of dharma brings forth the harvests of the pāramitās and such in the fields of the mind streams of those to be guided.

Verses IX.7–11 explain how, based on all this, buddhahood is the supreme refuge for all beings, and the following six verses speak about buddhahood being the "fundamental change of state." Verse IX.12 says:

the seeds of the afflictive and cognitive obscurations, ever present since primordial time,
Are destroyed through all kinds of very extensive relinquishments,
Buddhahood is attained as the change of state endowed with the supreme qualities of the pure dharmas,
Which is obtained through the path of utterly pure wisdom that is nonconceptual and very vast in scope.

This describes the removal of the antagonistic factors of buddhahood and the remedies through which it is attained. The relinquishment of the latent tendencies of the two obscurations being "very extensive" refers to the path of supramundane wisdom from the first to the tenth bhūmi. "All kinds" means that the wisdoms on each one of these bhūmis have nine degrees in terms of lesser, medium, and great. "Wherever" refers to someone's mind in which the two obstructions have been purified through applying these remedial wisdoms, which is the meaning of "attaining the change of state." Once the two obstructions are relinquished in this way, this change of state consists of the attainment of the five dharmas (the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu) as well as the unique qualities of a buddha (such as the ten powers), all of which are supreme, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not possess them. The path of supramundane wisdom is twofold―utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom and the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, whose scope consists of all knowable objects. Utterly pure nonconceptual wisdom sees all phenomena to be empty, just as space. The pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment sees all entities of worldly realms in the three times as illusions and mirages.

Verse IX.14 plays on the word "change of state" by adding ten different prefixes to the Sanskrit word vṛtti in āśrayaparivṛtti, most of which highlight the dynamic character of this change of state called "buddhahood." Thus, it is a "pro-change," because it is always engaged in the welfare of others―all sentient beings. It is a "super-change," since it is the best of all phenomena, superior to any mundane phenomena, and even superior to the change of state of supramundane śrāvakas. In the term "non-change-state," "state" refers to the state that is the result of change, which is a state of nonchange in the sense of the inactivity of the three causes of afflictions (that is, the presence of objects, improper mental engagement, and not having relinquished the latencies of both). It is a "counter-change," since it does not engage in afflictions or nonvirtue, and counteracts selfish actions. It is an "ongoing change," since it functions all the time (once this change of state has occurred, its operation will never decline until the end of saṃsāra) and engages in all the remedies for afflicted phenomena. It is a "dual change," because it first engages in demonstrating becoming fully enlightened and finally engages in demonstrating nirvāṇa. It is a "nondual change," because, ultimately, it neither engages in saṃsāra nor in nirvāṇā. For, by virtue of being endowed with prajñā, what is conditioned is relinquished, and by virtue of possessing compassion, what is unconditioned is relinquished. It is an "equal change," because as far as being liberated from all afflictions goes, it is equal in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. It is a "special change," because it is superior to the change of state of the śrāvakas by virtue of the relinquishment of the cognitive obstructions and the qualities of the powers, the fearlessnesses, and so on. It is an "omnipresent change," because the three yānas engage all sentient beings in an omnipresent way. This change of state of the Tathāgata is endowed with all these supreme qualities, which are the uncontaminated dharmas, or the remedies for all afflictions. Therefore, it operates in a very vast manner. Verse IX.15 says:

Just as space is held to be always omnipresent,
Also this [buddhahood] is held to be always omnipresent.
Just as space is omnipresent in what has form,
Also this [buddhahood] is omnipresent in the hosts of beings.

Just as space is omnipresent in all entities in the three times, the uncontaminated dharmadhātu exists and is omnipresent in the mind streams of all sentient beings. This is to be understood here in terms of buddhas experiencing and accepting all beings as not being different from themselves in a perfect manner. Buddhahood has the nature of the dharmadhātu, and once the characteristic of the omnipresence of the dharmadhātu is realized on the first bhūmi, a state of mind of perceiving oneself and all beings as equal is attained. Through further cultivating this throughout the remaining bhūmis, at the time of buddhahood, this all-encompassing experience is perfected. This is what is called "being omnipresent in the hosts of beings."

As for why sentient beings do not realize the dharmadhātu and do not see buddhas, though the dharmadhātu always exists and is omnipresent in them, verse IX.16 says:

Just as a water container, when broken,
Does not show the reflection of the moon,
The image of the Buddha does not show
In bad sentient beings.

Just as the moon is not seen in a vessel that is without water or broken, the mind streams of beings are either like an empty vessel through not being filled with the accumulations of merit and wisdom, or their mind streams are impaired through being full of afflictions and evil deeds. Despite such beings having the nature of a buddha, they do not see it. Of course, the reverse applies for beings whose mind streams are endowed with merit and wisdom.

This is followed by four verses (IX.17–21) with examples of buddha activity being effortless, spontaneous, and uninterrupted. The next sixteen verses (IX.22–37) explain the profundity of the uncontaminated dharmadhātu, which is free from all reference points of being pure, impure, existent, nonexistent, one, or many:

Though without difference between before and after,
It is immaculateness in terms of all obscurations.
Being neither pure nor impure,
Suchness is held to be buddhahood.

Verse IX.23 designates buddhahood as "the supreme self that is the lack of self":

In pure emptiness, buddhas attain
The supreme self of the lack of self.
Through attaining the pure self,
They have gone to the great self of the self.

To attain the supreme self means to attain the supreme lack of self. The supreme lack of self consists of personal identitylessness and phenomenal identitylessness. Since the buddhas have this twofold lack of a self as their self and nature within the uncontaminated dhātu, they are presented as being the supreme self. As for the word "self" (ātman), on the one hand, it means the imaginary self of the tīrthikas, referring to "self," "sentient being," "life-force," and so on. But on the other hand, it can also refer to the nature of a phenomenon, such as saying that the defining characteristic or nature of fire is to be hot. In these cases, the word "self" is used in the sense of "nature" (svabhāva). Thus, because the buddhas have the nature of the lack of self, it is said that they have attained the supreme self. So, what is the supreme lack of self? It means pure emptiness. Once the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness have become pure of the stains of apprehender and apprehended, emptiness is pure. Having attained this purity is called "having attained the supreme lack of self." "The great self of the self" (ātmamahātmatā) designates the incomparable nature of this supreme self that is the supreme lack of self, which consists of the twofold identitylessness of persons and phenomena. In terms of exactly this being the very nature of buddhas, it is called "the self of the buddhas." Consequently, verse IX.24 points out that buddhahood cannot be pinpointed.

Therefore, buddhahood is said to be
Neither existent nor nonexistent.
So, upon such questions about the Buddha,
The principle of being undecidable is held.

In the uncontaminated dharmadhātu, buddhahood is not existent, because buddhahood is the dharmakāya, and the dharmakāya is emptiness. In emptiness, there are neither any imaginary persons nor phenomena. Since the perfect nature does not exist in the way of imaginary persons and phenomena, which resemble the horns of a rabbit, it is not presented as existent at the time of budddhahood. However, buddhahood is not nonexistent either, because suchness―the perfect nature―exists at this time. The last two lines of this verse refer to, from a buddha's point of view, merely speculative and soteriologically pointless questions, such as the fourteen issues of whether buddhas still exist after their death or not and so on, which the Buddha did not answer in either an affirmative or a negative way.

The following verses of chapter 9 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra speak about the masteries of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas being progressively more distinguished (38–40); the masteries of bodhisattvas and buddhas in terms of the changes of state of the five skandhas (41–48); buddhahood, by virtue of its masteries, being the cause for maturing beings (49–55); and the complete purity of the dharmadhātu (56–59). Verse IX.56 defines the nature of the uncontaminated dharmadhātu:

It has the characteristic of the suchness of all phenomena
Being pure of the two obscurations.
It [also] has the characteristic of the inexhaustible mastery
Over the wisdom of the real and [the wisdom] whose object that is.

The suchness of all conditioned, unconditioned, contaminated, and uncontaminated phenomena refers to emptiness. The suchness that is the emptiness of the buddhabhūmi has the characteristic and nature of being free from the afflictive and cognitive obstructions. This is the change of state of suchness. "The wisdom of the real" refers to the pure mundane wisdom that is attained subsequently to this change of state, while "the real" refers to the nonconceptual wisdom that is the characteristic of the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the other-dependent nature. This nonconceptual wisdom (of meditative equipoise) is known in an unmistaken manner through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment, but not through any other kind of wisdom. This describes the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, which is the support for the impregnations of negative tendencies. The word "that" in the last line refers to the dharmadhātu, which means that nonconceptual wisdom focuses on the dharmadhātu. This describes the change of state of the path. Through the pure mundane wisdom of subsequent attainment focusing on nonconceptual wisdom, inexhaustible mastery is attained, because this pure mundane wisdom realizes the nature of nonconceptual wisdom in an unmistaken manner. Also, nonconceptual wisdom attains inexhaustible mastery over suchness―the dharmadhātu―because nonconceptual wisdom settles one-pointedly on the dharmadhātu. This describes the nature of the dharmadhātu.

As was said before, the realization of ultimate reality equals buddhahood―in fact buddhahood is nothing but ultimate reality, since there is no subject-object duality at that point. So to further highlight the close connection between the planes of ontology, epistemology, and soteriology, the above characteristics of buddhahood in Yogācāra (neither existent nor nonexistent, neither pure nor impure, being changeless suchness, like space, yet consisting of pure dharmas, and so on) may be compared with the characteristics of ultimate reality as presented in Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra VI.1:

Neither existent nor nonexistent, neither such nor other,
Neither arisen nor perished, neither decreasing nor increasing,
Not purified and yet purified again—
These are the characteristics of the ultimate.

Sthiramati comments that the ultimate is twofold―suchness (the pure dharmadhātu) and nondual nonconceptual wisdom. Suchness is called the ultimate, since it is the fruition of having cultivated the path of the noble ones and represents all phenomena. Or, in terms of its being an object, it is the ultimate, because it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom. Here, the above fivefold characteristic of the nonduality of the ultimate primarily refers to suchness (nonconceptual wisdom being explained later in chapter 9 and so on). (1) The ultimate―the perfect nature―is not existent, because it does not exist like the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, the essence of the ultimate―the perfect nature―is not nonexistent either. (2) The perfect nature is not the same as the imaginary nature, because the latter does not exist and appears in a mistaken way, while the former is the true reality and unmistaken. Nor is the perfect nature the same as the other-dependent nature, because the latter is the support for imaginary phenomena, with its nature being dependently originated and afflicted, while the former does not serve as a support for imaginary phenomena―it is not dependently originated and represents purified phenomenon. The perfect nature is also not different from the imaginary and the other-dependent natures, because what is referred to as "the perfect nature" is the fact of the other-dependent nature being free from the imaginary nature, but there is no extra perfect nature apart from that. (3) The perfect nature is not arisen, since it is not produced by karma and afflictions. It does not perish, since unarisen phenomena do not cease―it has the nature of being unconditioned. (4) The perfect nature is without decrease and increase, just as space. Even when clouds in space decrease, there is no decrease in space. Even when previously nonexistent clouds appear in it, space does not arise newly. Likewise, though saṃsāric afflictions decrease during the time of cultivating the path of the noble ones, there is no decrease in emptiness, and even though purified phenomena―the factors concordant with enlightenment―increase, there is no increase in emptiness. (5) The ultimate is emptiness. Just as space, gold, water, and a crystal are naturally pure, it is pure in that it is of the nature of emptiness. Just as the natural purity of space cannot be purified by washing it with water or the like, in the nature of emptiness, there are no stains to be purified. Therefore, it is said to be "not purified." Though there are no stains to be removed in this nature, it is not that the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in emptiness in an adventitious manner are not to be removed―indeed they must be removed and purified, a process like removing adventitious clouds from space, or adventitious earth and stones from gold. This is called "the ultimate becoming pure." In brief, the ultimate refers to the emptiness that is personal identitylessness and the emptiness that is phenomenal identitylessness.

Mind's three enlightened bodies and four wisdom eyes

The nature and the functions of buddhahood as the realization of ultimate reality are described as the four wisdoms, which represent the cognitive processes within the all-encompassing dharmadhātu that result in the two rūpakāyas performing enlightened activity within the dharmakāya. This description once again clearly highlights the fact that buddhahood is not an inactive or inert state. These processes are presented in the classical Yogācāra format of a change of state in terms of the eight consciousnesses on the one side and the four wisdoms and the three kāyas on the other side. As explained before, this does not mean any actual transformation of the former into the latter, such as miraculously transforming something really bad into something excellent. Still, conventionally speaking, it is taught that, upon being purified (or realized to be adventitious), the ālaya-consciousness manifests as mirrorlike wisdom, the afflicted mind as the wisdom of equality, the mental consciousness as discriminating wisdom, and the five sense consciousnesses as all-accomplishing wisdom. Most fundamentally, once the emptiness in these consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu is completely pure. In other words, these changes of state take place within the fundamental space of the dharmadhātu, while always being inseparable from it. The Nighaṇṭa (a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary of key Buddhist terms) describes the dharmadhātu and the four wisdoms as follows:

Dharmadhātuviśuddha means the completely pure dharmadhātu. It serves as the cause and expanse for the arising and originating of the dharmas of the noble ones (such as the powers and fearlessnesses). Therefore, within the dharmadhātu (that is, suchness), the adventitious afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations (which are like clouds) are translucent and purified. Since it is similar to the pure expanse of the sky, it is called "the completely pure expanse of dharmas."

Ādarśajñāna means mirrorlike wisdom. Since it focuses on the completely pure dharmadhātu, it is free from all conceptions of apprehender and apprehended. This refers to the change of state of the ālaya-consciousness, through which the reflections of all phenomena appear [as clearly in it] as anything whatsoever [can] appear in a polished mirror. Thus, it is called "mirrorlike wisdom."

Samatājñāna means the wisdom of equality. When the utterly pure familiarization with the actuality of true reality is clearly realized for the first time on the first bhūmi, no distinction is made between oneself and others and they are realized to be an equality. Through purification on the following higher bhūmis, on the buddhabhūmi, this [eventually] becomes the nonabiding nirvāṇa. At this time, the afflicted mind has undergone a transition and changed state as wisdom. This is called "[the wisdom of] equality."

Pratyavekṣājñāna means discriminating wisdom. Through the change of state of the mental consciousness, [this wisdom] serves as the basis for all dhāraṇīs, samādhis, dhyānas, and meditative absorptions. It represents the operating of the wisdom that is unobstructed with regard to all knowable objects, pours down the great rain of dharma, cuts through all kinds of doubt, and serves as the cause for [buddhas] displaying their kāyas in the colors of precious substances (such as blue beryll). This is called "discriminating wisdom."

Krityānuṣṭhānajñāna means all-accomplishing wisdom. Through the change of state of the consciousnesses of the five sense faculties (such as the eye), [this wisdom] serves as the basis for promoting the welfare of many sentient beings in all worldly realms through various infinite means. This is called "all-discriminating wisdom."

To be sure, the set of the four wisdoms plus the pure dharmadhātu and the set of the three kāyas are absolutely equivalent―both describe the same thing, that is, complete buddhahood with all its qualities. Thus, when these two sets are matched, mirrorlike wisdom represents the dharmakāya, the wisdom of equality and discriminating wisdom make up the sambhogakāya, and all-accomplishing wisdom is the nirmāṇakāya.

As the quotes in the translations below show, these formats are already found in the Buddhabhūmisūtra, the Trikāyanāmasūtra, and the Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra. However, the classical source on correlating the eight consciousnesses with the four wisdoms and the dharmadhātu in the Yogācāra tradition is the introduction in Sthiramati's commentary on verses IX.12–17 on the fundamental change of state in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.

Here, "state" refers to the five skandhas from the skandha of form up through the skandha of consciousness. After the afflictive and cognitive obscurations that exist in these skandhas have been relinquished, the dharmadhātu has become pure and has become nonconceptual wisdom. This is called "change of state into something else." In this regard, when the four skandhas of form, feeling, discrimination, and formation as well as [everything] in the skandha of consciousness from the eye consciousness up through the afflicted mind have become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. When the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes nonconceptual wisdom.
Or, when the emptiness that exists in form, feeling, discrimination, formation, and the eight consciousnesses has become pure, the dharmadhātu becomes pure. From among the eight consciousnesses, when the ālaya-consciousness has become pure, it becomes mirrorlike wisdom. When the afflicted mind has become pure, it becomes the wisdom of equality. When the mental consciousness has become pure, it becomes discriminating wisdom. When the five [sense] consciousnesses, from the eye [consciousness] up through the body [consciousness] have become pure, they become all-accomplishing wisdom. The attainment of these five―the four wisdoms and the pure dharmadhātu―are called "the five changes of state into something else."

As for the three kāyas, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.59–60 highlights their not being static states, but different functions of the pure dharmadhātu.

The purity of the dharmadhātu
Of the buddhas is explained
As its function varying in terms of
Nature, enjoying the dharma, and emanating.

The svābhāvika[kāya], the sāmbhogikakāya,
And the other one, the nairmāṇikakāya,
Are the divisions of the kāya of the buddhas.
The first one is the foundation of the [other] two.

Sthiramati comments that "nature" (svābhāvika) refers to the dharmakāya,D D meaning that the nature of buddhahood as such is the pure dharmadhātu. When the stains of apprehender and apprehended that exist in the ālaya-consciousness have been relinquished, and thus the dharmadhātu has become mirrorlike wisdom, this is called "dharmakāya." The sāmbhogikakāya refers to the afflicted mind having changed state, and thus having become the wisdom of equality, as well as the mental consciousness having changed state, and thus having become discriminating wisdom. It is called "enjoyment body," because it provides the great enjoyment of the dharma for bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmis. The nairmāṇikakāya represents the change of state of the five sense consciousnesses and all-accomplishing wisdom. It demonstrates the twelve deeds of a buddha and brings sentient beings to maturity. Thus, the Tathāgatas are not limited to a single kāya, but there is a division into three, with the dharmakāya being the foundation or support of the other two.

The different functions of the three kāyas and four wisdoms are described in detail in Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.61–76.D D Further treatises that deal with the eight consciousnesses, the three kāyas, the four wisdoms, and their changes of state include the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (chapter 10) and its commentaries. Also the explanations on the three kāyas in Śīlabhadra's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna and Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (which is largely based on the former) greatly rely on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya on IX.60–66 and chapter 10 of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. These texts also relate the four wisdoms to the three kāyas and explicitly say that the three kāyas are nothing but a division in terms of the functional aspects of buddhahood, which in itself is the single and indivisible purity of the dharmadhātu (of course, the same goes for the four wisdoms too). These functional aspects appear for different beings―the svābhāvikakāya or dharmakāya (which is equivalent to the pure dharmadhātu) is only realized by buddhas; the sambhogakāya is perceived by bodhisattvas; and the nirmāṇakāya is seen even by impure beings. Both texts furthermore relate the dharmakāya and mirrorlike wisdom to the nonconceptual wisdom in meditative equipoise, and the two rūpakāyas and the remaining three wisdoms to the wisdom that is active during subsequent attainment. In particular, Śīlabhadra explains that all elements of the dualistic structure of the phenomenal world in terms of apprehender and apprehended (all consciousnesses and their objects) appear like reflections in mirrorlike wisdom and are discerned accordingly through the other three wisdoms, for which this mirrorlike wisdom serves as a foundation. Thus, it is primarily through mirrorlike wisdom that all aspects of phenomena appear for a buddha's mind, although without any dualistic discriminations. Rather, they are perceived "in their aspect of self-awareness," which is also referred to as buddha wisdom having the quality of total recall. Buddha is said to be omniscient by virtue of mirrorlike wisdom, which is ever present and ever clear. The discussions of these topics in Nāgamitra's Kāyatrayāvatāramukha and its commentary by Jñānacandra also relate the three kāyas to the three natures. Buddhaśrījñāna's (eighth/ninth century) Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā discusses the last chapter of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra in terms of the change of state of the eight consciousnesses as the five wisdoms (adding dharmadhātu wisdom) and the four kāyas.

As mentioned before, the four wisdoms are not four different entities or static qualities of one entity, but just stand for the processes that represent the main functional activities of the single nonconceptual wisdom of a buddha, which cooperate with and supplement each other. Mirrorlike wisdom is like an all-encompassing TV screen that simply reflects what is there, thus providing the "raw data" to be processed and used. Discriminating wisdom means to intently look at this screen and clearly see all its distinct data without getting confused or mixing them up.D D The wisdom of equality refers to being empathic, but lacking any kind of judgment, about the data seen on the screen, as well as making no difference between seer and seen. All-accomplishing wisdom represents the resultant impulse to altruistically act upon what is seen. Thus, nonconceptual buddha wisdom reflects all sentient beings and phenomena within a buddha's field of activity without any bias and personal concern (mirrorlike wisdom). At the same time, this nonconceptual wisdom perceives and discerns all these beings and phenomena in every minute detail, just as they are, with perfectly clear discernment and without any personal projections or superimpositions (discriminating wisdom). Nonconceptual wisdom is also completely nondual, which not only refers to its perceptual structure (no subject-object duality), but also to its "affective" structure―it neither takes saṃsāra as something bad to be avoided, nor nirvāṇa as something good to dwell in; lacks any attachment and aversion to anybody or anything; and instead sees the buddha nature of all beings, which is not different in essence from a buddha's very own state, thus naturally being loving and compassionate toward all those who do not see this (the wisdom of equality). By virtue of all these features, nonconceptual wisdom is the most efficient mental mode of operation possible, which underlies everything that, from the perspective of those to be benefited, appears as a buddha's helpful activity in an effortless, unpremeditated, and uninterrupted way (all-accomplishing wisdom).

As for the five wisdoms "in action" in realized beings during all situations, the Third Karmapa says that, when embraced by the correct yoga, sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are all yogic valid perception, which is connate wisdom's own nature. Through all aspects of knowing and what is to be known being embraced by the perfect view, in terms of its functions, this connate wisdom then manifests as the five wisdoms. These are the wisdom that discriminates all causes and results; the wisdom of being empty of a nature of its own (mirrorlike wisdom); the display of wisdom's power by virtue of having gained mastery over it (all-accomplishing wisdom); the wisdom of seeing the equality of all this; and the principle of not moving away from suchness, which pervades all of this (dharmadhātu wisdom).D D Pawo Tsugla Trengwa, one of the main students of the Eighth Karmapa and a teacher of the Ninth, describes the complementary functions of these wisdoms as follows:

[Buddhahood means] to know without exception how all the aspects of each phenomenon are, because it is endowed with discriminating wisdom. In this process, it is not endowed with a seeing [that entails] any subject or object to be seen, any higher or inferior, any same or different, and so on, because it is endowed with the wisdom of equality. This knowledge does not entail any efforts [either], because it is endowed with mirrorlike wisdom. Also, all of these are indescribable as being one or different and so on, and are neither a seeing nor a nonseeing, because they never move away from the dharmadhātu.

The ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra concludes with a verse on buddhas being neither one nor many (IX.77), four verses on applying the means to attain buddhahood (IX.78–81), four verses on the unity of the activities of all buddhas (IX.82–85), and one verse on generating enthusiasm for buddhahood (IX.86). Sthiramati says that the means to attain buddhahood are the first five pāramitās. The pāramitā of prajñā is what renders these five pure, and it is taught in IX.78–81 (in themselves, these verses exhibit the typical style of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras).

Precisely what does not exist
Is the supreme existent.
Nonobservation in every respect
Is held to be the supreme observing.

On the first bhūmi, bodhisattvas realize that the imaginary nature―apprehender and apprehended―does not exist. The very fact of its nonexistence is designated as "the supreme existent," because the perfect nature―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended―exists. On this bhūmi, bodhisattvas neither observe nor see the imaginary nature, nor any conceptions of "me" and "mine," nor any conceptions of phenomena. This is called "the supreme observing," because they see the perfect nature―the freedom from apprehender and apprehended.

The supreme meditation is held
To be not seeing any meditation.
The supreme attainment is held
To be not seeing any attainment.

During the second up through the tenth bhūmis, bodhisattvas relinquish all conceptions of apprehender, apprehended, "me," and "mine." The very meditation in which neither a meditator nor something to be meditated on are seen is called "the supreme meditation," because bodhisattvas familiarize themselves with the characteristic that there is nothing to be observed. At the time of buddhahood, not seeing the sambhogakāya, the nirmāṇakāya, or the qualities such as the powers and fearlessnesses is called "the supreme attainment," because the supreme attainment consists of the dharmakāya―the supreme of all dharmas. Thus, familiarizing themselves with the characteristic of there being nothing to be observed is the means to become a buddha, while those who entertain any kind of focus or reference point will not become enlightened.

For arrogant bodhisattvas who consider
Their own grandeur, length [of practice],
Characteristics, and vigor,
Enlightenment is said to be far away

Some bodhisattvas may consider their own grandeur, since they see that enlightenment possesses magnificent qualities (such as the ten powers) and that it is difficult to attain. They may consider that attaining enlightenment takes a long time, since they must practice for three or more countless eons. They may see characteristics, since they see some objects to meditate on. They may think that enlightenment is to be attained through effort and feel superior, because they make such efforts, while others do not. When they are proud in this way and focused on real entities, enlightenment is distant for them.

Nonconceptualizing bodhisattvas
Who see all that has been mentioned
To be mere imagination
Are said to attain enlightenment.

On the contrary, those bodhisattvas who see all that has been explained above (one's own grandeur and so on) as being nothing but mere imagination and mere mind, and who do not even conceive of this mere mind have attained the poised readiness for the dharma of nonarising, with their nonconceptual wisdom thus being effortless and spontaneously present. Therefore, attaining this is called "attaining enlightenment."

For more details on buddhahood as the change of state of the eight consciousnesses to the four wisdoms as well as the descriptions, divisions, and relations of the kāyas (whether presented as two, three, four, or more), see the translations below and appendix 6.

Notes

• 1 The image here alludes to this river being considered as very holy by Hindus—even its mere sight is said to wash away all one’s negative deeds. (It rises on the summit of Mount Amarakaṇṭaka in Madhya Pradesh in central India, and after a westerly course of about eight hundred miles ends in the Gulf of Cambay below the city of Bharuch.)
• 2 Tib. rang byung rdo rje.
• 3 Tib. 'jam mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas.
• 4 Tib. karma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal.
• 5 Tib. dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba.
• 6 Tib. mi bskyod rdo rje.
• 7 Nguyen 1990, 317 and 336.
• 8 Hall 1986, 18–19.
• 9 The only Yogācāras who could be―and often are―read as asserting such a consciousness are Paramārtha and Dharmapāla. However, without going into the details here, Paramārtha explains that what he calls "stainless consciousness" (amalavijñāna) is nothing other than the stainless nondual dharmadhātu, or mind's ultimate nature of luminosity, which is the same as buddha nature. He also says that "mere cognizance" (vijñaptimātra) means that both objects and consciousness do not exist (see below). As evidenced by Dharmapāla's commentaries on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka and Śataśāstra, his position is rather complex and subtle. He indeed says that the other-dependent nature really exists (in the sense of not being totally nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit), but he adds that it is not itself the ultimate. Furthermore, he says, "One should be convinced of the voidness of all dharmas"; "The principle of voidness is free from all characters of dharmas, such as existence, [nonexistence,] etc." (Tillemans 1990, 93); and "Thus all dharmas are likened to illusions: in them not the slightest substance whatsoever can be found. . . . Thus, dharmas are produced by causes and conditions; their natures are all void, like an illusion" (ibid., 171). Indeed, though Dharmapāla uses Yogācāra templates, many passages of his commentary could as well have been written by a Mādhyamika. In general, he emphasizes the framework of the two realities, with existence and nonexistence pertaining only to seeming reality, while ultimate reality lies beyond these as well as any other kinds of duality.
• 10 King 1994, 663.
• 11 Lusthaus 2002, 178.
• 12 King 1994, 662.
• 13 Note that, in pre-Christian Greek etymology, soter means "healer"―which matches well with the frequent description of the Buddha as the great physician for mental afflictions.
• 14 "The invincible" (an epithet of Maitreya).
• 15 Tāranātha 1980, 203.
• 16 King 1994, 670.
• 17 Tshad ma'i bstan bcos kyi shing rta'i srol rnams ji ltar 'byung ba'i tshul gtam du bya ba nyin mor byed pa'i snang bas dpyod ldan mtha' dag dga' bar byed pa (Śākya mchog ldan 1988a, vol. dza, p. 95).
• 18 Sngags la ’jug pa’i mun pa sel bar byed pa’i chos kyi sgron me gzhung tshan bcu bdun pa (ibid., vol. pa, p. 230).
• 19 Nguyen 1990, 320..
• 20 In the following, I will not deal with all the many questions of whether the authors listed here were actual historical persons, whether they actually authored these texts, and when exactly they lived. Also, the texts listed include only the typical Yogācāra works by these authors, though many of them also wrote on other Buddhist topics or composed commentaries on several sūtras (such as the prajñāpāramitā sūtras). The main point here is to roughly identify the basic scriptural corpus of Yogācāra treatises, no matter by whom they were composed or when.
• 21 Though this text is primarily a summary of the prajñāpāramitā sūtras, as has been pointed out repeatedly by modern scholars, it does so by mapping a number of classical Yogācāra templates onto these sūtras (see my forthcoming translation of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and several of its Tibetan commentaries).
• 22 Note that the structure (though not always the contents) of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra corresponds to the Bodhisattvabhūmi in the Yogācārabhūmi and that its ninth chapter on buddhahood is largely based on the Buddhabhūmisūtra (verses IX.56–59 and 82–85 are directly from this sūtra). Both Sthiramati's and Asvabhāva's commentaries on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra extensively quote and refer to the Buddhabhūmisūtra (also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of buddhahood in appendix 1 relies primarily on these two texts).
• 23 Certain Western and Japanese scholars attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the Yogācāra tradition and any scriptures on buddha nature, such as the Uttaratantra, even speaking of different schools. Indeed, the Uttaratantra is exclusively devoted to, and gives the most detailed presentation of, buddha nature, while not mentioning typical Yogācāra notions such as the three natures or the eight consciousnesses. On the other hand, there is only one verse in the other four works attributed to Maitreya (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.37) that mentions tathāgatagarbha, and it is absent in most of the works of Asaṅga (except for the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā), Vasubandhu, and other major Yogācāras (for the consistent comments of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on tathāgatagarbha as suchness or identitylessness being the same in all phenomena/beings, see below). However, the equivalent notions such as mind's natural luminosity being obscured only by adventitious stains are rather common themes in Yogācāra texts (for the related topic of agotraka―"those who lack the disposition"―see below). As Keenan (1982, 15) remarks, "This does not mean that tathāgatagarbha is to be reckoned as a defined academic school in contrast to Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. As Takasaki has pointed out, such an evaluation was a peculiarity of Chinese Buddhism and is not found in either India or Tibet. This is further borne out by the complete lack of polemic against tathāgatagarbha teachings in Yogācāra works. . . . The foregoing textual data seem to suggest that the initial pre-Asaṅgan Yogācāra thinkers represent a theoretical development from within the same circles that produced the tathāgatagarbha teachings. They appear to have taken their initial insights from the notion of the pure mind, as in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra" (see its verses IX.37 and XIII.18–19 below).
• 24 Besides this text, the only other two known Indian "commentaries" on the Uttaratantra are Vairocanarakṣita's (eleventh century) very brief Mahāyānottaratantraṭippaṇī (eight folios) and Sajjana's (eleventh/twelfth century) Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa (a summary in thirty-seven verses).
• 25 The Tengyur also contains an anonymous commentary on the first chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, called Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā (attributed by some to Vasubandhu).
• 26 As for the meaning of the Sanskrit compound tathāgatagarbha, its first part (tathā) can be taken as either the adverb "thus" or the noun "thusness/suchness" (as a term for ultimate reality; several texts gloss tathāgatagarbha as "suchness"). The second part can be read either as gata ("gone"), or āgata ("come, arrived”; the Tibetan gshegs pa can also mean both). However, in the term tathāgata, both meanings more or less come down to the same. Thus, the main difference lies in whether one understands a Tathāgata as (a) a "Thus-Gone/Thus-Come One" or (b) "One Gone/Come to Thusness," with the former emphasizing the aspect of the path and the latter the result. The final part of the compound—garbha— literally and originally means embryo, germ, womb, the interior or middle of anything, any interior chamber or sanctuary of a temple, calyx (as of a lotus), having in the interior, containing, or being filled with. At some point, the term also assumed the meaning of "core," "heart," and "pith" (which is also the meaning of its usual Tibetan translation snying po). Technically speaking, the compound tathāgatagarbha can be understood as either a bahuvrīhi or a tatpuruṣa compound, meaning "containing a Tathāgata (as core)" or "the core of a Tathāgata," respectively. The first is the most natural reading and is also supported by numerous passages in the scriptures. As for the term sugata, it means "one who has fared well," "one who goes well," or "one who lives in bliss." The compound sugatagarbha is to be understood in an analogous way as above.
• 27 The Tengyur attributes the Hastavālanāmaprakaraṇa and its Vṛtti to Āryadeva, while the Chinese canon has Dignāga as its author. Given the use of typical Yogācāra terms and notions in these texts, the latter seems more likely.
• 28 D4054 (attributed to Jinaputra in the Tengyur). The attribution to Sthiramati stems from the Chinese tradition and is supported by many Western scholars.
• 29 In due order, Taishō 1584, 1593, 1599, 1595, 1589, and 1587.
• 30 Taishō 1666.
• 31 Taishō 1610. The Chinese canon attributes the text to Vasubandhu (which is highly unlikely) and gives Paramārtha as the translator.
• 32 Taishō 1587.
• 33 Further sources of the amalavijñāna are his Shih pa k'ung lun (Taishō 1616) and San wu-hsing lun (Taishō 1617).
• 34 Other Indians involved in transmitting and translating mahāyāna and Yogācāra materials in China include Guṇavarman (367–431), Dharmarakṣa (385–433), Dharmagupta, and Prabhākaramitra (both sixth/seventh century).
• 35 The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa is only extant in Chinese (Taishō 1530). It is attributed to Bandhuprabha and others, and translated by Hsüan-tsang. As Keenan 1980 and 2002 points out, about half of the text is identical to Śīlabhadra's commentary and the other half is almost exclusively added from Hsüan-tsang's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Thus, the text was obviously compiled in the seventh century, either by Hsüan-tsang himself, or, much more unlikely, by Bandhuprabha in India, drawing from no-longer-extant Sanskrit materials used in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Interestingly, the text contains a passage about mind being self-illuminating that refutes precisely the arguments that Bodhicaryāvatāra IX.18–19ab adduces against self-illuminating mind. It also explains all four buddha wisdoms (such as mirrorlike wisdom) to be self-awareness and gives a detailed presentation of the relationships between the four aspects of consciousness that manifest as the apprehended, the apprehender, the self-awareness of the apprehending of the apprehended, and the self-awareness of the very act of being self-aware (see Keenan 2002, 86–89).
• 36 See The Life of Hsüan-tsang (Taishō 2053.244a–246b), translated by Li Yung-hsi, 149–65. Peking: The Chinese Buddhist Association, 1959.
• 37 Both Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, II.133 and Tāranātha 1980, 207 attribute a Kāyatrayāvatāra to Candragomī.
• 38 The attribution of the Durbodhālokā commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra to him is even disputed within the Tibetan tradition.
• 39 As for the developments of Yogācāra after Vasubandhu, there are several ways to distinguish various schools or lineages. In The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1947), 83–84, Junjirō Takakusu identifies three main streams―(1) the line of Dignāga, Agotra, and Dharmapāla at Nālandā; (2) the line of Guṇamati and Sthiramati at Valabhi; and (3) the line of Nanda, whose tenets were later followed by Paramārtha. Not much is known of further Yogācāras such as Guṇaśrī, Nanda, Śrīsena, Candrapāla (he is referred to as an early commentator on the Madhyāntavibhāga), Śuddhacandra, Citrabhānu, and Bandhuśrī (except for Guṇaśrī, the others and some of their positions are mentioned throughout the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi). There are also a number of later commentators on Dharmakīrti's texts, primarily on his Pramāṇavārttika, whose primary focus is, of course, on valid cognition, but who also sometimes discuss the more specific Yogācāra topics in this context (these commentators include Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Yāmāri, Ravigupta, and Jina). In general, except for most of the works by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, the majority of the above texts (in both the Tibetan and Chinese canons) still remain to be studied in detail.
• 40 Limaye 1992, 69 and D4034, fol. 75b.1ff.
• 41 Webster's Third New International Dictionary says that "concept" comes from Latin conceptus (collection, gathering, fetus) and is "something conceived in the mind : THOUGHT, IDEA, NOTION: as a philos : a general or abstract idea : a universal notion: (1) : the resultant of a generalizing mental operation : a generic mental image abstracted from percepts; also : a directly intuited object of thought (2) : a theoretical construct . . ." About "conceive," Webster's says, "to take into one's mind . . . to form in the mind . . . evolve mentally . . . IMAGINE, VISUALIZE . . ." Thus, somewhat differing from "concept," when "conceive" is understood in these latter senses in a very general way, it comes closer to the above meanings of kalpana and its related terms.
• 42 In the following translations, depending on the context, I use either "conception" or "imagination" for the above terms.
• 43 When I speak of "classical Yogācāra terms," this refers to these terms being predominantly used by Yogācāra masters, but does not mean that they invented them, since almost all of them are to be found in the sūtras (a notable exception is Vasubandhu's notion of "modulations" of consciousness [pariṇāma]). Even the term "false imagination," which is primarily known from the texts by Maitreya, is already found in early mahāyāna sūtras such as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra and the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra.
• 44 Pandeya 1999, 9.13.
• 45 Ibid., 11.30–12.3 (D4032, fol. 135b.1–3).
• 46 Tib. rong ston shes bya kun gzigs.
• 47 Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa'i rnam bshad tshig don rab tu gsal ba, edited by David P. Jackson and S. Onoda, 1988, fol. 40b.3–5.
• 48 Skt. asatkalpa, Tib. yod min rtog pa. This term is equivalent to "false imagination."
• 49 When used in terms of ultimate reality, dharmadhātu―or just dhātu―is understood in two main ways, which are reflected by two different Tibetan words that translate the latter term. In its most general way, dhātu in dharmadhātu refers to the ultimate nature of all phenomena—being equivalent to emptiness—which is usually translated into Tibetan as dbyings ("open expanse," "space," or "vastness"). If dhātu signifies specifically the nature of the mind of sentient beings in the sense of buddha nature as the most basic element of their entire being, it is typically rendered as khams (lit. "element"). To be sure, these two meanings and their Tibetan renderings are not necessarily regarded or employed in a mutually exclusive way. Still, generally speaking, they represent the understanding of (dharma)dhātu in Madhyamaka texts and the texts on buddha nature, respectively. In Yogācāra texts, the term is used and understood in both ways, depending on the context, but it is always clear that the direct realization of the dharmadhātu by nonconceptual wisdom does not just refer to a nonimplicative negation or blank voidness, but to mind's ultimate nature.
• 50 For more details on the characteristics of nonconceptual wisdom, see also the translation of OED below.
• 51 For "the supreme self that is the lack of self" realized by the buddhas, see Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.23 below.
• 52 Sanskrit in Anacker 1986, 416. For mere cognizance being by definition without a referent, see also verse 27 of the Triṃśikā below.
• 53 Hall 1986, 13–18.
• 54 D4051, fol. 221a.4–221b.2.
• 55 These four steps are also found in Laṅkāvatārasūtra X.256–57, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XIV.23–28, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (lines 182–185, 264–275), Madhyāntavibhāga I.6–7ab, as well as in Triṃśikākārikā 28–30 and Trisvabhāvanirdeśa 36–37ab. Śāntarakṣita's autocommentary on his Madhyamakālaṃkāra (D3885, fol. 79a–b) as well as Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and first Bhāvanākrama (D3915, fol. 33a–b) also quote Laṅkāvatārasūtra X.256–257 and refer to these four stages, commenting on the last one from a Madhyamaka perspective (see Brunnhölzl 2004, 300–302). See also AC (p. 246) and NYC on NY lines 60–61.
• 56 Limaye 1992, 73.
• 57 III.13 (P5549, fol. 29b.2).
• 58 III.12 (ibid., fol. 29a.3–7; the phrases in “[ ]” are from the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva).
• 59 Pandeya 1999, 23.11ff. (P5534, fols. 35b–36b).
• 60 Lines 264–275. The same is also expressed in lines 182–185, which treat "the four yogic practices."
• 61 This refers to the mastery over a wealth of qualities that result from the change of state of the five skandhas, particularly from the eight consciousnesses becoming the four wisdoms (see below).
• 62 Sthiramati (Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 43) comments that this is equivalent to supramundane nonconceptual wisdom without subject and object (anālambyālambakaṃ). With the propensities of the clinging to apprehender and apprehended being eliminated, mind as such is resting in its own true nature (svacittadharmatāyāṃ ca cittam eva sthitaṃ bhavati).
• 63 Ibid., 15ff.
• 64 This term refers to mental factors, such as feeling and discrimination.
• 65 Quoted and translated in Lusthaus 2002, 465 (Taisho 1585.6c; chap.2:4B).
• 66 As translated in Paul 1984, 159–60.
• 67 Ibid., 163–64 and 167. The Yogācārabhūmi, one of the major Yogācāra texts (and definitely the longest one), only mentions the term cittamātra twice (P5536–8, zi, fols. 70b.2 and 80b.2f), but both times explicitly not as a denial of outer objects (for details, see Schmithausen 1973a, 165–66 and addendum after p. 186). However, given the consistent abhidharmic foundation of this text, this is not as surprising as one may think at first.
• 68 Paul 1984, 166.
• 69 I.9ab.
• 70 Verses 1–2, 5bd, 6ab, and 8ac.
• 71 Note that, unlike the works by Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and so on, the five Maitreya works do not mention the terms ālaya-consciousness and afflicted mind.
• 72 Manas has a wide semantic range, primarily being one of the many Sanskrit words for "mind" in general, also meaning "conceptual mind," "thought," and "imagination" (it can also refer to "intellect," "intelligence," "perception," "spirit," "opinion," "intention," "inclination," and more). There is a definite lack of proper equivalents for most of the rich Sanskrit and Tibetan terminologies used for mind and its many facets, but there is also a need for distinctive terms when going into the subtleties of mapping out mind in Buddhist texts, especially in the context of the eight consciousnesses. This is why manas is rendered throughout by the English technical term "mentation" (coming from the Latin mens ["mind," "thinking"] and mentare [to "think"], which are cognate with Skt. manas). The Oxford English Dictionary defines “mentation” as "mental action or a mental state," with the former suggesting mind being in some kind of operational mode, which is also one of the primary meanings of the Sanskrit and Tibetan terms (its other meanings referring specifically to the sixth consciousness or the afflicted mind).
• 73 To wit, when just the term ālaya appears, depending on the context, it can either refer to the ālaya-consciousness or, especially in the tantras, to the fundamental ground of all being, equivalent to the luminous nature of mind or the Tathāgata heart.
• 74 Literally, kliṣṭamanas means "defiled mind," but here I rather follow the Tibetan (lit. "plagued or plaguing mind"), since it is not just a question of mind being defiled like a dusty but insentient mirror. Rather, as the above process shows, mind experiences mental and physical suffering through such defilement.
• 75 In general, the eight consciousnesses (primary minds) and their accompanying mental factors are said to be always congruent in five respects. They are congruent in terms of (1) the support, in that they depend on the same sense faculty; (2) the focal object, in that they observe the same object; (3) the aspect, in that they have the same apprehended aspect triggered by the object; (4) time, in that they occur at the same time; and (5) substance, in that at any given time, each primary mind is only accompanied by one single kind within each of its accompanying mental factors (for example, one cannot have a pleasant and unpleasant feeling at the same moment).
• 76 I.6 (D4048, fols. 3b.5–4a.1). Mentation being associated with the above four afflictions is also mentioned in Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā (verse 6) and his Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa (D4059, fol. 15b.5).
• 77 In general, there are two neutral actions―those that obscure liberation and those that do not (such as walking or sitting).
• 78 D4066, fols. 231b.5 and 232b.2.
• 79 D4067, fol. 25a.2–4. The beginning of chapter 5 of Hsüan-tsang's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 289–90) explains that the six collections of consciousnesses all rely on mentation as their immediate condition. However, it is only the sixth one that receives the name of "mentation consciousness" (manovijñāna), because it is named after its specific support―the seventh consciousness or mentation―just as the five sense consciousnesses, despite also relying on mentation, are named after their specific supports, such as the eye sense faculty. Or, the mental consciousness is so called, because it depends only on mentation, whereas the other five depend in addition on their respective material sense factulties. The six consciousnesses are therefore named in this way because of their supports and in relation to one another―"eye consciousness" up through "mentation consciousness." This is unlike the case of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which are named in accordance with their natures―mentation (manas) by virtue of the activity of egoistic thinking/conceit (manyanā), and mind (citta) due to "accumulating/variety" (citra).
• 80 Note though that the explicit term "immediate mind" seems to be a later Tibetan term―it does not appear in any of the texts by Maitreya, Asaṅga, or Vasubandhu (or any other Yogācāra texts I have consulted). For more details on this specific topic, see the introduction to the Third Karmapa's view below; he further divides "mentation" into the afflicted mind, the immediate mind, and "pure or stainless mentation."
• 81 D4066, fol. 239a.7–239b.3.
• 82 This meditative absorption represents the cessation of all primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum (the first six consciousnesses) as well as one of the two consciousnesses with a stable continuum (the afflicted mind with its mental factors, but not the ālaya-consciousness). This absorption is used as the culminating meditative absorption in the process of "ninefold progressive abiding" (which includes various alternating ways of training in entering and rising from the four samādhis of the form realm and the four formless absorptions).
• 83 D4049, fol. 53a.7–b.1.
• 84 Guṇaprabha's Pañcaskandhavivaraṇa (D4067, fol. 27a.1–2) explains that, during the meditative absorption of cessation and the path of the noble ones, the afflicted mind ceases insofar as its latent tendencies do not manifest. However, once one rises from these states, it rearises from its seeds.
• 85 Note that, as Paul (1984, 139) remarks, "this consciousness is never enumerated specifically as a ninth consciousness, though this is the implication from the assertion that the amala-vijñāna is separate from all defilement and emerges only after the cessation of the ālaya."

• 86 Taishō 1584, 1616 (esp. pp. 863b20f and 864a28), 1617 (esp. p. 872a1f). Apparently, there are no Indian, but only Chinese scriptural sources for this ninth consciousness, so the Tibetan tradition seems to have obtained its information on it from the latter, including the Chinese commentary on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (translated into Tibetan as P5517) by the Korean master Wonch'uk (aka Yüan-ts'e; 613–96). According to Hsüan-tsang's Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 109–11), the notion of amalavijñāna was originally a teaching of the Vibhajyavādins (more precisely, the Mahāsāṃghika-Ekavyāvahārika-Lokottaravādin-Kaukkuṭikas), who speak about the natural purity of the mind being merely obscured by adventitious stains. Paul (1984, 240–41) points out the following: "The Tunhuang manuscript, She ta-sheng lun chang {a text on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha}, attributes the following to the WHL {a Mahāyānasaṃgraha-related threefold anthology attributed to Paramārtha}: ‘The characterless and unproduced state is the amala[-vijñāna], the ultimately pure consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1013c20–21). ‘The nature of discrimination (parikalpita-svabhāva) is forever nonexistent. The nature of dependence (paratantra-svabhāva) also does not exist. As for these two, they have no existence and this is identical to the amala-vijñāna. Thus, it is ultimately the only pure consciousness. Furthermore, it is a foreign tradition that states in the Shih-ch'i ti-lun, “Chapter on the Bodhisattva,” {another text by Paramārtha} that the amala-vijñāna is explained as the ninth consciousness’ (T.2807.85.1016c19-22)."
• 87 As for the last term, most translations that come purely from the Tibetan yongs grub (instead of the Sanskrit pariniṣpanna) say "thoroughly established nature" or the like. This is usually based on too literal an understanding of the Tibetan (while disregarding its underlying Sanskrit, which simply means "perfect" or "perfected") and on certain Tibetan doxographical hierarchies, which consider this term as an exclusive feature of so-called "Mere Mentalism" with its alleged assertion of some ultimately existing or "thoroughly established" consciousness. However, neither the Sanskrit term nor its understanding by all major Yogācāra masters justify any such wrongly reifying rendering. Also, it seems somewhat misleading to say "perfected nature," since there is nothing to be changed, let alone perfected, in this nature, its whole point being rather to signify primordial perfection and completeness.
• 88 A detailed study of all these different models would cover a large volume on its own (for an overview, see Boquist 1993).
• 89 II.17 (P5549, fol. 18b.5–8).
• 90 II.28 (ibid., fol. 22a.6–7).
• 91 II.26 (P5549, fol. 21a.5–21b.4). Note that Vasubandhu (P5551, fol. 180b.4–5) comments on the pure object (4) that, if it were the imaginary nature, it would have arisen from the cause of afflicted phenomena; and if it were the other-dependent nature, it would be something that is unreal.
• 92 See also below for Sthiramati's comments on verses 23–24 of Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā and his equating the other-dependent nature with the ālaya-consciousness, which is eventually eliminated in its fundamental change of state.
• 93 II.27 (ibid., fols. 21b.5–22a.4).
• 94 Nguyen 1990, 84–85.
• 95 II. 132 (verse 198; D107, fol. 172a.5–6).
• 96 P5481, fols. 8b.7–9a.3.
• 97 For example, P5562, fols. 116b.7–117b.7 and 122a.7–123a.1.
• 98 Ibid., fol. 123b.2–6 (from D106, fol. 34a.7–34b.3).
• 99 This quote is also found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan ed., p. 468.20–21).
• 100 This is the second from among three ways to understand paramārtha (for details, see below). In Yogācāra, usually, "mundane" and "supramundane" cognition or wisdom are understood as the perceptive modes during a bodhisattva's subsequent attainment and meditative equipoise, respectively.
• 101 This is Samādhirājasūtra IX.23.
• 102 P5562, fols. 127b.6–128a.5. That the general characteristic of all phenomena is suchness is explained by both Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva in their commentaries on Mahāyānasaṃgraha II.26 (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7 and D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1; for details, see below).
• 103 Sanskrit edition by Lévi, p. 41.
• 104 Ibid., 110–11.
• 105 III. 8–9, fols. 28a.5–29a.7.
• 106 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990c, 705–6.
• 107 Limaye 1992, 172.
• 108 Following the words of I.1, Sthiramati does not explicitly state the names of the three natures here, but only speaks about false imagination, duality, and emptiness. However, as his commentary on I.5 (which introduces the three natures by name) makes clear, in due order, these correspond to the other-dependent, imaginary, and perfect natures.
• 109 The topic of the first chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga is the characteristics of afflicted and purified phenomena, or false imagination and emptiness.
• 110 Pandeya ed., pp. 9.25–11.30.
• 111 Neither Vasubandhu's nor Sthiramati's commentaries state anywhere that false imagination exists ultimately. They do say several times that both false imagination and emptiness exist, but it is very obvious that this does not refer to the same level of existence.
• 112 Ibid., 19.
• 113 Ibid., 13.16–21.
• 114 Ibid., 36–38.
• 115 Ibid., 46.
• 116 Such statements are not only found in the mahāyāna scriptures, but also in the Pāli canon (from which Vasubandhu most probably quotes), such as Aṅguttara Nikāya I.10, "O monks, the mind is luminosity, and yet it is afflicted by adventitious afflictions." Also the Saṃyutta Nikāya (III.151.22–23; 31–32; and 152.8–9) states, "O monks, sentient beings are afflicted because of the afflictions of the mind. Because of the purity of the mind, sentient beings are purified." The Tibetan tradition considers the two lines, "because of mind's natural luminosity" and "because of being afflicted by adventitious afflictions" not as parts of Vasubandhu's commentary, but as two additional lines in Madhyāntavibhāga I.22.
• 117 The above four models also show that quite different interpretations of the three natures obviously existed already at the time of Sthiramati, and that at least some of them may have been interpreted in more or less reifying ways by certain people.
• 118 P5531, fol. 138b.2–4.
• 119 XIII.18–19.
• 120 Mathes 1996, lines 128–132.
• 121 These four are found in the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī (D142), which says that bodhisattvas have to gradually relinquish all four of these conceptions in order to enter the sphere of nonconceptuality. Rangjung Dorje seemed to consider the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī as important, since he composed a (now lost) synopsis of it and also refers to these four conceptions in his OED and DSC (for details, see there as well as NTC and NYC).
• 122 OED, pp. 610–11. For more details, see the translation of the excerpts from OED below.
• 123 That means being actual effective causes and results, and not just nominal ones.
• 124 JNS, vol. 1, p. 210.
• 125 D4049, fol. 100a.7–100b.1.
• 126 D4054, fol. 231a.6–231b.2. See also Sthiramati's comments on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.56 below.
• 127 X.5 (D4048, fol. 38a.4–8).
• 128 D4034, fol. 113b.1–2.
• 129 Note that the Yogācāra literature in fact sometimes employs two terms―āśrayapāravṛtti (lit. "change of state into something else") versus āṣrayaparivṛtti―as referring to the former and the latter aspects above, respectively. However, the use of these two terms in the texts is not consistent in this way. Ultimately, both come down to the same, basically indicating two sides of the same process.
• 130 Limaye 1992, 116–17.
• 131 Throughout, the reason for using "familiarization" instead of the―at least in popular western Buddhist literature―more familiar word "meditation" is that, in Buddhism, both the Sanskrit bhāvanā and the Tibetan sgom pa mostly mean "familiarizing with," mentally "cultivating," or "enhancing" something, either some certainty gained through prior reflection or a direct insight into true reality. Thus, this process can be either conceptual or nonconceptual. However, it should be noted that the original meaning of "meditation" is just "reflection" (Lat. meditatio, meditare), which is clearly conceptual, while the original meaning of the term "contemplation" (Lat. contemplatio, contemplare) is "viewing" or "looking" at something in a settled state of mind (possibly being either conceptual or nonconceptual). Also, as for compassion and other virtuous mental states, the point is not really to meditate on them as some more or less abstract object or in a conceptual way, but to cultivate and familiarize with them as integral constituents of one's mind. Of course, this is even more obvious in the case of mind's ultimate true nature (of which it is invariably said that it cannot be meditated on anyway, but one can definitely familiarize oneself with it). Likewise, the texts often speak about cultivating or familiarizing with a path, śamatha, or vipaśyanā, and it obviously makes no sense to say "meditating on a path," and even less to say "meditating on śamatha or vipaśyanā." As for the Sanskrit term bhāvanā, it generally refers to an act of producing, manifesting, or promoting. Specifically, it means imagining, forming in the mind, occupying one's imagination with or directing one's thoughts to something. In this sense, the word can also refer to reflection, meditation, or contemplation (thus, depending on the context and to follow common consensus, I sometimes use "meditation" too). The term can also mean the application of perfumes and the like, or saturating or steeping any powder with fluid. Thus, similar to the process of a scent fully pervading a cloth or the like and actually becoming inseparable from it, "cultivation" or "familarization" in this sense may be seen as "perfuming" the mind stream with liberating insights.
• 132 D4034, fol. 120b.1–121a.1
• 133 For more details on "change of state," see the translation of OED below.
• 134 Limaye ed. p. 121; D4034, fol. 124a.2–5.
• 135 D4034, fol. 124a.5–124b.2. Vasubandhu's very brief comment on this agrees, saying that, since suchness is the same in all beings and a Tathāgata has the nature of pure suchness, all beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart (Limaye 1992, 122). This conforms to his Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (P5551, fol. 180a.6–7) on "natural purity" in Mahāyānasaṃgraha II.26 above, which says that, inasmuch as this natural purity exists as suchness, it exists in all sentient beings as their general characteristic. Therefore, it is said that all phenomena (!) are endowed with the Tathāgata heart. Asvabhāva's Ṭīkā is silent on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.37, but his Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana (D4051, fols. 230b.7–231a.1) on II.26 follows Vasubandhu, saying that natural purity is the actual true nature of ordinary beings, which means that suchness never changes into anything else, and therefore is the general characteristic of all phenomena. Thus, it is said that all sentient beings possess the Tathāgata heart. Later (D4051, fol. 246b.4), Asvabhāva's text comments on bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi attaining an equal mind with regard to all beings (III.11) by saying that they see all beings as equality in the sense of their identitylessness, which is why the scriptures say that all beings have the Tathāgata heart. Also, Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (Keenan 2002, 48 and 103) says that the teachings on buddha nature refer to the pure dharmadhātu being present in the mind streams of all sentient beings. However, these teachings only refer to those beings who (among the five kinds of disposition) possess the buddha disposition. They were given only as skillful means, referring only to a small part of sentient beings, and in order to guide those of indeterminate disposition to swiftly enter the mahāyāna. Note that most of this is remarkably identical with certain Madhyamaka explanations (particularly the one found in the Tibetan Gelugpa school) of what buddha nature is. Coming from several Yogācāras, this evidences that at least some followers of this tradition did not explain tathāgatagarbha as the Uttaratantra and its commentaries do, but simply as "natural purity" in the sense of suchness being the same in all beings. One reason may be that the above commentators, in line with the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's many verses on buddhahood, dharmadhātu, and suchness being free from reference points (such as IX.36 above; for more, see below), did not want to provide any ground for reification on the level of ultimate reality. Another reason may lie in certain Yogācāras explaining that being "one who lacks the disposition" (agotraka) means to absolutely never attain nirvāṇa (see below). However, as evidenced in some of the passages quoted earlier, the same masters also refer to mind's luminous nature being obscured only by adventitious stains, and emptiness being both empty and naturally luminous at the time of sentient beings as well as at the time of the noble ones. Also, later in his commentary (D4034, fol. 196a.5–196b.1), Sthiramati states that it is untenable to say that only one among all the innumerable sentient beings who are endowed with the disposition to become a buddha will become a buddha, while the others will not. In fact, everybody who has gathered the two accumulations of merit and wisdom will become a buddha. Interestingly, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.37 is also quoted in Asaṅga's Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (J 71.16–17) in the context of saying that the suchness of the Tathāgatas is the tathāgatagarbha of sentient beings, which is typically and explicitly equated with the natural purity and luminosity of mind being obscured only by adventitious stains.
• 136 Some people say that the freedom from apprehender and apprehended is less encompassing and profound than twofold identitylessness. However, the freedom from apprehender and apprehended corresponds exactly to twofold identitylessness, since all possible objects and subjects in terms of both persons and phenomena are included in the former as well. Moreover, the relinquishment of obscurations in terms of apprehender and apprehended is also extensively discussed in both the prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Technically speaking, in the latter's detailed descriptions of many different levels of progressively more subtle mistaken conceptions about apprehender and apprehended to be relinquished on the paths of preparation, seeing, and familiarization, respectively, these levels comprise all cognitive obscurations, but implicitly include the afflictive obscurations too.
• 137 If not noted otherwise, the following comments on the select verses from the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra are all excerpts from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 106a.6–144b.7), which usually follows, but often greatly elaborates on, Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya.
• 138 These consist of seven sets of practices: (1) the four applications of mindfulness (Skt. catuḥ smṛtyupasthāna, Tib. dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bzhi), (2) the four correct exertions (Skt. catvāri samyakprahāṇāni, Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), (3) the four limbs of miraculous powers (Skt. catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ, Tib. rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), (4) the five faculties (Skt. pañcendriyāṇi, Tib. dbang po lnga), (5) the five powers (Skt. pañcabalāni, Tib. stobs lnga), (6) the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasaṃbodhyaṅgāni, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun), and (7) the eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. āryāṣṭāṅgamārga, Tib. 'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad). In the mahāyāna, sets (1)–(3) make up the lesser, medium, and greater levels of the path of accumulation; (4)–(5) respectively correspond to the first two (heat and peak) and the second two (poised readiness and supreme dharma) of the four levels of the path of preparation; (6) is equivalent to the path of seeing; and (7) represents the path of familiarization.
• 139 These two kinds of knowing represent the two buddha wisdoms of knowing suchness and variety. Elsewhere (D4034, tsi, fol. 231a.7–231b.2), Sthiramati comments that "omniscience" refers to knowing the imaginary nature, that is, knowing that all phenomena that are imagined as apprehender and apprehended are like horns of a rabbit and lack characteristics. "Knowing all referents without exception" means to know the entire seeming reality―knowable objects such as skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, contaminated phenomena, and uncontaminated phenomena.
• 140 The Bhāṣya says that the pāramitās and so on are not perfect (apariniṣpanna) in the sense of there being any intrinsic being of them.
• 141 Besides "change," vṛtti in itself has many meanings (such as "operation," "activity," "function," "mode of life or conduct," "nature," "state," "practice," and "mood") which are modulated here by the ten prefixes pra-, ud-, a-, ni-, ā-, dvaya-, advaya-, samā-, viśiṣṭā-, and sarvagā-.
• 142 Note that Uttaratantra I.27a gives the fact that "buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings" as one of the three reasons why all sentient beings are said to have the Tathāgata heart. For a detailed discussion of these three reasons in Uttaratantra I.27–28, see Brunnhölzl 2007b, n. 280.
• 143 Note that this is similar to "the pāramitā of ultimate self" in Uttaratantra I.37cd. Also, the use of "self" in the double sense of what is to be relinquished and the ultimate nature of phenomena resembles the use of "nature" (svabhāva) in Madhyamaka, which says that phenomena lack any nature and that precisely this is the nature of phenomena.
• 144 This corresponds to the above-mentioned threefold change of state as in the Abhidharmasamucchaya.
• 145 Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya does not comment on the last two lines of this verse, while Asvabhāva's Ṭīkā (D4029, fol. 72b.5–73a.1) agrees in identifying "the wisdom of the real" (vastujñāna) as the wisdom of subsequent attainment, and "that" in the last line as the dharmadhātu. However, it says that "the real" (vastu) refers to the ālaya-consciousness―the other-dependent nature. Still, this describes the change of state of the impregnations of negative tendencies―when the other-dependent nature has changed state, it becomes the sphere of the wisdom that is attained subsequently to nonconceptual wisdom, but not the sphere of other wisdoms. Nonconceptual wisdom attains mastery over suchness, because it rests in meditative equipoise at will, while the wisdom that is attained subsequently to this meditative equipoise attains mastery over the other-dependent nature in the sense of being unmistaken about it. Sthiramati's comments are literally confirmed by Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on this verse (Dngul chu thogs med 1979, 174–75), which concludes, "Thus, the nature of phenomena is realized through meditative equipoise, and meditative equipoise is realized through subsequent attainment. Since this is uninterrupted, it is the characteristic of inexhaustible mastery." Note that in Asaṅga 2004, 93–94, the translators Jamspal et al. present a greatly abbreviated, but partly mistaken form of Sthiramati's above explanation (misidentifying "the real" as the ālaya-consciousness). Against Sthiramati and Asvabhāva, Jamspal et al. also prefer to follow the Gelugpa scholar dBal Mang, who takes "the wisdom of the real" as referring to the wisdom of meditative equipoise, thus, as Jamspal et al. put it, "tacitly correcting Sthiramati's (or the translator's) equation of vastujñāna with mundane, aftermath intuition."
• 146 D4034, fols. 74a.3–75b.1.
• 147 That even the Madhyamaka understanding of the ultimate is not limited to its being solely an object is shown by Bhāvaviveka's Tarkajvālā (D3856, fol. 59a.7–59b.2). He explains that, in paramārtha, artha ("object," "purpose," or "actuality") refers to what is to be understood, realized, or examined. Parama means "supreme." Thus, (1) since paramārtha is an object and ultimate (or supreme), it is the ultimate object. (2) Or, it may be read as "the object of the ultimate." Since it is the object of ultimate nonconceptual wisdom, it is the object of the ultimate. (3) Or, it can be understood as "that which is in accordance with the ultimate object." Since the ultimate object exists in the prajñā that is in approximate accordance with the realization of this ultimate object, it is what is in accordance with the ultimate object. In other words, in (1), both parama and artha refer only to the object as opposed to the subject that realizes it, (2) means that parama refers to the subject (wisdom) and artha to the object (emptiness), and (3) indicates a reasoning consciousness that cognizes ultimate reality not directly but inferentially.
• 148 The Yogācāra system does not present the dharmadhātu as a fifth wisdom (dharmadhātu wisdom), which has its origin in the Buddhist tantras. Later however, especially in Tibet, listing five wisdoms became the predominant general presentation (see also Pawo Rinpoché's discussion of the Buddhabhūmisūtra in appendix 1). When the dharmadhātu wisdom is added, it is usually matched with the svābhāvikakāya. Some explanations (for example, TOK vol. 3, p. 607) also say that dharmadhātu wisdom is the change of state of the empty aspect of the ālaya-consciousness, while mirrorlike wisdom is the change of state of its lucid aspect.
• 149 P5833, fol. 6a–b.
• 150 D4034, fol. 113b.1–5.
• 151 As mentioned before, verses IX.56–59 are literally found in the Buddhabhūmisūtra.
• 152 Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya agrees, adding that the dharmakāya's characteristic is the fundamental change of state. The dharmakāya is often referred to as "svābhāvika-dharmatākāya" or "dharmatākaya," with dharmakāya being explained as an abbreviation of these two terms. For example, see Mahāyānasaṃgrāhabhāṣya on X.1, Buddhabhūmyupadeśa (Taishō 1530, 325c5–7), Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna (D3997, fol. 272b.5), Jñānacandra's Kāyatrayavṛtti (D3891, fol. 8b.2), and Ārya Vimuktisena's Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8).
• 153 Note that the Sanskrit grammatical forms svābhāvikakāya, sāmbhogikakāya, and nairmāṇikakāya (as opposed to svabhāvakāya, sambhogakāya, and nirmāṇakāya) are quite standard (being not only used in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its commentaries, but also throughout the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, the Uttaratantra, their commentaries, and other texts). These forms indicate these kāyas are related to the dharmakāya as its features and not as three separate entities on their own. Thus, in terms of its nature, the dharmakāya is referred to as svābhāvikakāya (this is why these two are usually said to be equivalent); in terms of its bringing the enjoyment of the mahāyāna dharma to bodhisattvas, it is the sāmbhogikakāya; and in terms of its manifesting in all kinds of forms for all kinds of beings, it is the nairmāṇikakāya.
• 154 Most of these verses as well as the related IX.41–48 are quoted and explained in the translations below.
• 155 Note that Haribhadra's commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra say the same.
• 156 Nishio 1982, esp. 59, 84–92, 125–26.
• 157 Literally, Skt. pratyavekṣā is "looking back" and also means "paying attention," "looking after," or "care."
• 158 On this, compare DSC on Dharmadhātustava verses 38–45 on Mahāmudrā meditation related to sense perceptions and the mental consciousness (see Brunnhölzl 2007b, 245–51).
• 159 AC, fol. 163b.
• 160 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba n.d., 764.
• 161 For further details on the Yogācāra system in general as well as the notions of naturally luminous mind and the Tathāgata heart, see the bibliography in general as well as Brunnhölzl 2004, 457–95 and 2007b, 57–109.
• 162 Tib. dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan.
• 163 Tāranātha even wrote two commentaries on the Heart Sūtra from the perspective of shentong. Tāranātha n.d., vol. 17, pp. 571–759 and 759–83.
• 164 Śākya mchog ldan 1988b, 13–15.
• 165 Tib. ldog pa gzhan sel gyi cha. An "elimination-of-other" is a conceptual phenomenon arrived at through excluding everything it is not.
• 166 The same is said by Karma Trinlépa below.
• 167 Śākya mchog ldan 1988c, 40ff.
• 168 Lit. "proponents of the lack of a nature." This is another term for the Mādhyamikas.
• 169 This accords with Śākya Chogden's repeated statements that the view of rangtong is the best one for cutting through all reference points, while the view of shentong is more helpful for describing and facilitating meditative experience and realization.
• 170 Śākya mchog ldan 1975, 225–27.
• 171 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990b, 3–6.
• 172 Skt. gotra is sometimes still translated as "family" or "lineage" (two of the word's ordinary literal meanings), when it refers to buddha nature. Of course, by virtue of having buddha nature, all beings could be said to belong to the family or lineage of the buddhas, but one cannot help but wonder what it should mean that buddha nature itself is a "family" or "lineage."
• 173 In Tibet, there have been long-standing and complex debates about the questions of whether the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra―as well as the Madhyāntavibhāga and Dharmadharmatāvibhāga―belongs to what Tibetans call "Mere Mentalism" (thus being inferior to Madhyamaka); whether it and the Yogācāra School teach that some beings have no disposition to attain enlightenment at all (and what exactly "disposition" means in this context); and whether they assert three yānas ultimately, and so forth. The Gelugpa School in particular answers these questions in the affirmative and many modern scholars do so too. There is no room here to address these issues in details (such as the complex treatment of gotra in different Yogācāra texts), but as can be seen from the above, there are Tibetan teachers (as well as some modern scholars) who disagree with the Gelugpa answers. In particular, as for the term "disposition" (gotra), it should first be noted that, differing from this term's primary meaning in the Uttaratantra, in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, it is not synonymous with buddha nature. Like the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the text speaks about five categories of gotra (those of bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, those with uncertain gotra, and those without gotra). The Laṅkāvatārasūtra identifies the last category with those who just follow their great desire (icchantika) and reject the dharma, thus having eliminated all their roots of virtue and not attaining parinirvāṇa. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra follows this very common definition of gotra in general, which is "roots of virtue" (see also Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, ed. Yamaguchi, 188). The Bhāṣyā on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra III.4 explains that gotra is that from which qualities arise and increase. Also the distinction between the naturally abiding (prakṛtistha) and the accomplished (samudānīta) or unfolding dispositions in this verse differs from how these terms are understood in the Uttaratantra, with the former defined as what has the nature of being a support for further virtue (prakṛti can also mean "cause") and the latter as what is thus supported. On Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra III.9 and III.11, the Bhāṣya comments that accumulating roots of virtue is indispensable for acquiring a disposition, but once the bodhisattva disposition is acquired, it serves as the source of an infinite number of further roots of virtue. Thus, gotra in this sense refers to conditioned and multiple phenomena, whereas gotra in the sense of buddha nature is clearly unconditioned and single. The former sense is also evident from Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 41b.6–43a.2), which says that beings have infinite gotras, all of which refer to some (conventional) nature of theirs, such as being an angry or passionate person, or liking sweet versus other tastes. Just as the possession of the gotra of desire functions as the cause for giving rise to desire, but not for hatred, the three different gotras of the three yānas are indispensable for there being three yānas. As for Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra III.11, the Bhāṣya explains that to be without disposition means to possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa―either for a certain time (the first four kinds of beings in the verse) or forever (the last one). According to Sthiramati's commentary (D4034, fols. 48a.4–49b.1) this refers to those with the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood) for a certain time and those who have the property of not attaining any kind of nirvāṇa for a certain time. He says that the first four pertain to those who do possess the bodhisattva disposition, but, by virtue of certain conditions, will temporarily (for many eons) not attain parinirvāṇa (that is, buddhahood). Among these, "those who are solely devoted to wrongdoing" are engaged in the five negative actions without interval. "Those who have completely destroyed the immaculate dharmas" are those who, under the influence of wrong spiritual teachers, have fallen into the wrong view of nihilism, thus denying karma, the three jewels, and so on. "Those who lack the virtue conducive to liberation" have not gathered the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, but only the virtues for higher rebirths as gods and humans within saṃsāra. "Those who have inferior immaculate dharmas" have only gathered a fraction of the merit and wisdom necessary to attain parinirvāṇa. Thus, as long as these four do not fully remove their negative actions and wrong views, and accumulate the complete accumulations of merit and virtue necessary to attain parinirvāṇa, they will not attain this state. As for those who will not attain any nirvāṇā, "lacking the cause" refers to lacking the virtuous roots and the disposition for any of the nirvāṇas of the three yānas, because without such a disposition, they do not attain any of these three nirvāṇas. They do lack the property of attaining nirvāṇa, just as the natures of stones and trees do not turn into something that has the nature of consciousness, such as minds and mental factors. Thus, in the first four cases, Sthiramati says, "lack of disposition" has only a pejorative sense, while "lacking the cause" means utter nonexistence, because they absolutely do not attain nirvāṇa. However, considering the text's (and the commentators') understanding of "disposition" (virtuous roots), its explicit stance that all beings possess tathāgatagarbha (IX.37), and its statement that mind is natural luminosity, which is merely obscured by adventitious stains (XIII.18–19), being without gotra (agotraka; the text does not use icchantika) forever is not equivalent to saying that some beings have no buddha nature or absolutely can never attain enlightenment. Rather, there are some beings who simply never acquire a "disposition" for any of the yānas in the sense of never acquiring any—or at least a significant—amount of virtue that qualifies as such a disposition. In other words, all beings have the potential for buddhahood, but some just never actualize this potential even remotely, which is exactly why saṃsāra in general is said to be endless. This is basically also what Asaṅga's Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā on I.40–41 (J 36–37; P5526, fols. 96b.8–97b.6) explains, using the term gotra in both the above way and also for buddha nature. Without tathāgatagarbha, the text says, beings would neither be weary of suffering nor wish and strive for being free of it (nirvāṇa). These are the two functions that the pure buddha disposition exhibits, which dwells even in beings who are fixated on their wrong ways. However, to be aware of the shortcomings of saṃsāric suffering and the advantages of nirvāṇic happiness is not without any cause or condition, but due to the existence of the gotra of persons with virtuous dharmas. If this kind of gotra were without any cause or condition and not brought about through terminating wrongdoing, it would also have to exist in those who just follow their great desire, having the gotra of not passing into parinirvāṇa (icchantikānām apy aparinirvāṇagotrānām; clearly, here, gotra does not refer to buddha nature, but to virtuous roots as above). The gotra being pure of adventitious stains does not happen as long as one does not aspire for the dharma of one of the three yānas through connecting with the four conditions of relying on a genuine spiritual friend and so on (that is, dwelling in a conducive place, accumulating merit, and making aspiration prayers). The Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra says that the light rays of sunlike buddha wisdom touch even those who are fixated on wrongdoing, thus benefiting them and enhancing the arising of future causes for happiness through virtuous dharmas. In other sūtras, we find the statement that those who just follow their great desire possess the property of not attaining parinirvāṇa forever. But this refers to having aversion toward the mahāyāna dharma as being the cause for not attaining parinirvāṇa. Therefore, this statement was made for the sake of turning such people away from their aversion, with the intention of referring to another time (that is, their actually attaining nirvāṇa at some point in the future). By virtue of the existence of the naturally pure gotra, it is impossible for there to be any beings who can never become pure, which is said with the intention that, by virtue of essentially not being different from the Bhagavat, it is possible for all sentient beings to become pure. Sthiramati's Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā (ed.Yamaguchi, 55.19–56.6) on I.19a ("the emptiness of the primordial nature" among the sixteen emptinesses) juxtaposes the positions on there being three versus a single gotra, but takes all of them to be primordial: "As for [I.19a] 'In order to purify the gotra,' its emptiness is the emptiness of the primordial nature. The reason for this is that, [according to the Bhāṣya,] 'gotra is the primordial nature.' How so? 'Because of having a nature of its own,' which means to have a nature of its own from beginningless time that is not adventitious. Just as some [phenomena] in beginningless saṃsāra are sentient and some are insentient, here too, some [sets of] the six āyatanas represent the buddhagotra and some the śrāvakagotra and so on. The gotra is not accidental, because it has been continuing since beginningless time [up through the present], just as the distinction between what is sentient and insentient. Others say that, since all sentient beings are endowed with the tathāgatagotra, gotra should be understood here in this way" (depending on how the Sanskrit here is reconstructed, "in this way" could also be read as "as suchness," which would conform to the above-mentioned comments by Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.37). As for the issue of there being only a single yāna, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.53–54 gives seven reasons for why the Buddha spoke about there being only one yāna. The commentaries by Vasubandhu (Limaye 1992, 199–200), Sthiramati (D4034, fols. 196a.5–199b.2), and Asvabhāva (D4029, fols. 93b.6–95a.2) elaborate on these reasons as (1) the dharmadhātu not being different in śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas; (2) all those who progress through the yānas up through a buddha equally lacking a self; (3) the state of being liberated from the afflictions being the same in all of them; (4) śrāvakas with uncertain disposition being led into and liberated through the mahāyāna; (5) a buddha's mind of equality toward all beings and the attainment by certain śrāvakas who remember that they have been bodhisattvas before being partially similar; (6) the Buddha having emanated as śrāvakas and attained parinirvāṇa through the śrāvakayāna; and (7) there being nothing more supreme to go to than the buddhahood to be reached through the mahāyāna. With buddhahood having only a single yāna, the respective statements in various sūtras that there is a single yāna should be understood through these seven intentions (abhiprāya). However, it is not the case that the three yānas do not exist. The reason why the buddhas teach a single yāna is to attract śrāvakas with uncertain disposition to the mahāyāna and to prevent bodhisattvas with uncertain disposition from falling away from this yāna. Sthiramati says explicitly that those sūtras that speak of a single yāna and three yānas are of expedient and definitive meaning, respectively. Mahāyānasaṃgraha X.32 quotes the very same two verses from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra as the answer to the question, "If this dharmakāya of the buddhas, which is endowed with such excellent qualities, is not in common with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, with what intention was a single yāna taught?" The commentaries by Vasubandhu (D4050, fol. 187a.1–187b.6) and Asvabhāva (D4051, fol. 292b.6–293b.3) repeat that the teachings on the single yāna entail the above seven intentions (however, Asvabhāva also says that there is a single yāna because, ultimately, the yānas of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are the mahāyāna). Many Tibetan and most Western scholars follow this, holding that the Yogācāras in general, as in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, assert the ultimate existence of three yānas. In large part, this is due to the common hermeneutical approach of taking the Sanskrit abhiprāya (Tib. dgongs pa) by default to mean "intention," and this by default meaning that anything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning. However, it is very hard to defend the position that the Yogācāras in general assert three yānas, let alone ultimately, and said hermeneutical approach entails a number of problems too. First of all, there is no text by Maitreya or Asaṅga that says that there are three vehicles ultimately, or that the teachings that there is a single yāna are of expedient meaning or entail some intention. On the contrary, at least as far as the presentations in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and the Uttaratantra go, they are both clearly from the perspective of a single yāna. Among the works of Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Asvabhāva, the stance that the single yāna was taught with certain intentions is only found in their above-mentioned commentaries on the same two verses in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Among these commentaries, it is only the one by Sthiramati which says that these teachings are of expedient meaning. However, in several other places in the same commentaries and other texts by these masters, there are passages that suggest only a single yāna, which eventually is entered by all śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha arhats as well. I am not going to provide a new commentary here on verses IX.53–54 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, but on their own, they could very well be read as giving the reasons for why there in fact is only a single yāna (see also Yamabe 1997, 200–203). In particular, the first reason in XI.53 is literally the same as in Abhisamayālaṃkāra I.40ab and verse 21 of Nāgārjuna's Niraupamyastava, which, however, is taken by these texts as the reason for why there in fact is, respectively, only a single gotra or yāna ultimately. In addition, these latter two verses are usually quoted by the very same scholars above as two of the classical scriptural supports for there being only a single gotra and yāna. Also, one cannot but wonder how this reason (1) of the dharmadhātu’s being the same in śrāvakas and all others is supposed to establish the ultimate existence of three yānas, or how it could serve as a proof for the expediency of the single yāna (if anything, it only proves the opposite). In fact, it would then absurdly follow that these ultimately existing three yānas have three ultimately different fruitions, which could consequently only come from three ultimately different kinds of dharmadhātu. In the same vein, reasons (2)–(3) also speak about a single yāna by virtue of certain features from an ultimate point of view (lack of a self and irreversible liberation from afflictions) being the same for the three yānas, and (7) speaks about a single yāna by virtue of there being no higher destination than the one arrived at through the mahāyāna, so how can there be three different yānas ultimately? In fact, looking at Vasubandhu's above-concluding remarks in his commentary on IX.53, one could easily read them as stating that there is only a single yāna from the perspective of buddhahood, but, relatively speaking, from the perspective of those in the śrāvakayāna and the pratyekabuddhayāna, it is not that their yānas do not exist at all. Padma Karpo's commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa rje btsun byams pa'i gzhal lung, fol. 107a.4–107b.3) says that Asaṅga and his followers, for the sake of guiding different beings, taught, for those whose dispositions are individually certain, that the yānas are real as different ones and, for those whose dispositions are not certain, that there is a single yāna. Statements such as those in Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI.54 and teachings about the single yāna taught in the Daśabhūmikasūtra, the Ratnameghasūtras, and so on being of expedient meaning are given only in order to dispel the fear of certain people, while Asaṅga's Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā establishes a single yāna. As for the sometimes chameleonlike notion of "intention" (Skt. abhiprāya/saṃdhi, Tib. dgongs pa), in general, as Ngülchu Togmé's commentary on Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XII.16–18 (Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal 1979, fol. 133b.5–6) points out, "expedient meaning" on the one hand and the two categories of "intention" and "indirect intention" (Tib. ldem dgongs) on the other hand are not coextensive, since Mahāyānasaṃgraha II.31 states that all teachings of the Buddha (and not just the portions of expedient meaning) have to be understood in terms of the four intentions and also says that the indirect intention of a remedy teaches all the remedies that consist of the eighty-four thousand teachings of the Buddha. Also, as is often pointed out, if everything with an intention is necessarily of expedient meaning, then all Buddhist teachings would be of expedient meaning, because they were all given with certain intentions, including the ones with regard to emptiness. To conclude, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (II, vv. 131–32 and 204–5; D107, fols. 127b.2–3 and 173b.7–174a.1) says that even the teachings on a single yāna are just for those of weak insight, but are not the definitive meaning. Rather, in ultimate reality, any presentations of any yānas are obsolete.

On account of the differences between childish beings,
Those of weak insight, and the noble ones,
I speak of three yānas,
One yāna, and no yāna.
This is the door to the ultimate―
Freedom from the duality of cognizance.
Within the state of nonappearance, how could there be
A presentation of three yānas?
. . .
As long as sentient beings are to be engaged,
There is no limit for yānas.
But once mind as such fundamentally changes state,
There are no yānas and no one to progress.
There is no presentation of yānas,
But in order to guide childish beings,
I explained different yānas,
Being taught as a single yāna.

For further details, see the bibliography, especially Ruegg 1969, 73–86, 97–100, and 185–88; Kunst 1977; Hakamaya 1980; Prasad 1991,1–45; Lopez 1992, 16–70; Yamabe 1997; and D'Amato 2003.

• 174 D107, fol. 292a.
• 175 These are (1) causal features (nimitta), (2) names (nāma), (3) conception/imagination (vikalpa/parikalpa), (4) suchness (tathatā), and (5) perfect wisdom (samyagjñāna). For more details, see the translation of OED.
• 176 These are the five chapter headings of the Madhyāntavibhāga.
• 177 These are the five chapter headings of the Uttaratantra.
• 178 Pp. 490.2–491.2; 492.1–3; and 494.1–495.2.
• 179 Tib. sangs rgyas mnyan pa bkra shis dpal 'byor. The Sangyé Nyenpas are regarded as incarnations of the Indian paṇḍita Smṛtijñānakīrti (eleventh century), who stayed in Tibet for many years as a teacher and translator, being instrumental in initiating the later spread of the dharma there. According to Krang dbyi sun 1985, 3249 and 3255, the First Sangyé Nyenpa was born in 1457 and his next incarnation appeared in 1520. This fits with the biography of the Eighth Karmapa in Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (vol. 2, 20.7), which says that Dashi Baljor passed away in 1519. However, the latter's biography in Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1200–1206 gives his year of birth as 1445 and says that he passed away at sixty-five. In the table of contents of Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, the editors Gyaltsan and Legshay say, "The work in hand gives the dates for this teacher as 1445–1509. These seem not to be in accordance with his relationship with the 7th and 8th Zhwanag Karma-pa." TBRC gives 1145/1457–1510/1525.
• 180 Literally, the Tibetan says sems tsam ("Mere Mentalism"), which is ever so often used in Tibetan texts to refer to the Yogācāra school in general or a specific part of it. What is meant in this context is clearly the classical Yogācāra system as presented by Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, and not "Mere Mentalism" in its somewhat pejorative sense as what is refuted, and subordinated to, Madhyamaka in the default Tibetan doxographical hierarchies.
• 181 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, 40.
• 182 Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 2005b, fol. 6b.5–7a.1.
• 183 What follows is partly based on and confirms the preliminary remarks on Rangjung Dorje's view and his DSC in Brunnhölzl 2007b (see also for a number of different presentations of what shentong is).
• 184 1308 and 1332 were other Monkey Years, but the first one seems too early, while during the latter one, Rangjung Dorje was on his long journey to, and stay at, the Chinese court and not in Upper Dechen.
• 185 In the Blue Annals ('Gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal. 1996, 492), Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 210.7, and Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 100, the entry of the year 1326 is followed by a number of events, the last one being the composition of DSC. The next explicit dates are 1328 in the first two texts and 1329 in the latter.
• 186 There is some unclarity here, since both the commentaries by Jamgön Kongtrul and the Fifteenth Karmapa gloss this as the Pig Year of the sixth sixty-year cycle of the Tibetan calendar, which would make it 1335, since this is the only Pig Year within that cycle during Rangjung Dorje's lifetime. However, as this date is contradicted by NY’s being explicitly referred to in AC, 1323 is the only Pig Year before AC's indubitable composition in 1325 and after ZMND's in 1322, which fits well with the overall chronology. Of course, there are still earlier Pig Years in Rangjung Dorje's life (1311 and 1299), but it seems highly unlikely that he composed NY eleven or even twenty-three years (at age fifteen) before ZMND. Also, while NY says itself that it was composed at Upper Dechen in Tsurpu (Central Tibet), all sources agree that, upon his return from the Chinese court, Rangjung Dorje went through Minyag and other areas of Kham in eastern Tibet in 1335, teaching the dharma extensively. Tshal pa kun dga' rdo rje 1981, 103; Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003 (vol. 2, 941); and Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972 (fol. 111a) all say that he returned to Tsurpu only during the ninth month of that Pig Year (November/December) and then stayed at Chimpu in Samyé during that winter for six months.
• 187 Except for the two texts on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra and OED, all of these other texts are unfortunately lost. However, there is a commentary preserved on the Uttaratantra (Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, pp. 126–262) by Tülmo Dashi Öser (Tib. dul mo bkra shis 'od zer; born 1474), a close disciple of the Seventh Karmapa and teacher of the Eighth. This text is basically Rangjung Dorje's own summary of the text with a few added clarifications and also exhibits many of the typical traits of his view as presented below.
• 188 See bibliography.
• 189 The last line in OED's colophon is not only remarkable because of this, but because the term "freedom from extremes" also stands for the view of "the earlier Mādhyamikas" in Tibet (meaning what was understood as the correct Madhyamaka view before Tsongkhapa). This view was proclaimed by masters such as Patsab Lotsāwa and his four main disciples; the Sakya masters Rendawa, Gorampa Sönam Senge, and Dagtsang Lotsāwa; the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé; Pawo Rinpoche, and others. Said approach uses Madhyamaka analysis that results in an unqualified negation of all four positions of the typical Madhyamaka tetralemma without asserting anything instead, in order to completely overcome all conceptualizations and reference points. In this way, it is certainly an accurate characterization of the Indian Madhyamaka approach. However, "the later Mādhyamikas"—the Gelugpa school—criticized this view by saying that "lack of real existence" is the correct Madhyamaka view and thus not to be negated. At the same time, there were attempts to discredit "the Madhyamaka of freedom from extremes" through associating it with the notorious stereotype of the Chinese Hvashang Mahāyāna.
• 190 At times, NTC and NYC also pick up this approach. The contemporary eminent Kagyü scholar and meditation master Thrangu Rinpoche says on NT and NY that they combine scholasticism and reasoning within the shentong approach with the Mahāmudrā tradition of directly familiarizing with the nature of the mind. Thus, in terms of the more theoretical instructions, they present the definitive meaning, and in terms of practice, they correspond to the Mahāmudrā approach to meditation.
• 191 The Eighth Situpa's commentary (Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 24–31) on this verse says that the ground for everything in saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is the purity of mind, that is, the Tathāgata heart. This is the basis of purification but not what is to be purified, since in its own essence, there is nothing whatsover to be purified. Also, mind's nature is the unity of being lucid and empty, since there is no being lucid apart from being empty and no being empty apart from being lucid. Those who explain lucidity and emptiness as two separate things and their union as these two things becoming associated stand outside the teachings of the Tathāgata. In terms of Mahāmudrā, this commentary justifies the Kagyü approach of pointing out instructions with or without tantric empowerment and clarifies that it is in full accord with Madhyamaka. Adventitious stains are identified as the dualistic phenomena of apprehender and apprehended produced by the adventitious mistakenness of mind about itself. The dharmakāya is the manifestation of the fundamental nature of the basis of purification in which all such adventitious dualistic phenomena are relinquished.
• 192 In the translated sections of AC, a few tantras are quoted too, but Rangjung Dorje's predominant reliance on Indian sūtrayāna treatises is remarkable for a text that is a commentary on the tantras, further underlining his stance that the fundamental view of the mahāyāna is the same in the sūtras and the tantras.
• 193 Rang byung rdo rje 2006c.
• 194 DSC, fol. 50b.
• 195 Even in Jamgön Kongtrul's NTC and NYC, the terms "Mere Mentalists" and "Mere Mentalism" do not appear at all (while he constantly uses these terms in his other works), but he too uses "Yogācāra."
• 196 Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, p. 128.
• 197 See Brunnhölzl 2007b, 159–93.
• 198 Tib.chos grags rgya mtsho.
• 199 ZDKT, pp. 396–97.
• 200 Ka rma 'phrin las pa 1975, vol. cha, pp. 90–92.
• 201 The sixty-four qualities are the thirty-two qualities of freedom of the dharmakāya (the ten powers, four fearlessnesses, and eighteen unique qualities of a buddha) and the thirty-two qualities of maturation of the rūpakāyas (the major marks). ZDKT (pp. 46.1–47.3) explains the above further: “Others say, ‘If this Heart had the sixty-four qualities from the very beginning, the qualities of perfect buddhahood would exist in the mind streams of sentient beings, and in that case, does the buddha wisdom in the mind stream of a hell being experience the sufferings of hell?’ Such is indeed said, but it is precisely for this reason that we speak about [wisdom or luminous mind] by making the distinction that it is stained during the phase of sentient beings and stainless in the state of a buddha. In other words, perfect buddhahood and its powers and so on do not exist in the mind streams of sentient beings. This is definitely how it is, but it will be understood through saying again and again, 'Stained buddhahood and its powers and so on exist [in their mind streams].’”
• 202 These are Kalkin Puṇḍarīka's commentary on the Kālacakratantra, called Vimalaprabhā (Tib. 'grel chen dri med 'od); Vajragarbha's commentary on the Hevajratantra, called Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā (Tib. rdo rje'i snying 'grel); and Vajrapāṇi's commentary on the Cakrasaṃvaratantra, called Lakṣābhidānāduddhṛtalaghutantrapiṇḍārthavivaraṇa (Tib. phyag rdor stod 'grel). Note that Mipham Rinpoche's Lion's Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness starts by listing the sources of the shentong view as the sūtras of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, which teach the definitive meaning; Maitreya's Uttaratantra; the profound teachings by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; the commentaries on the definitive meaning by Nāgārjuna, such as his collection of praises; the tantras, such as the Kālacakratantra; and the commentaries on their intention, such as the trilogy of bodhisattva commentaries.
• 203 These four lines list the key terms at the beginning of the first chapter of ZMND and AC (see the translations below).
• 204 The Tibetan has stong byed, but following the standard pair of "the basis of being empty" (stong gzhi) and "what it is empty/to be emptied of" (stong bya), this should be the latter.
• 205 Tib. gar dbang chos kyi dbang phyug.
• 206 Tib. rtogs brjod lta sgom spyod 'bras kyi glu (lines 132–35).
• 207 Tib. bdud 'dul rdo rje.
• 208 Tib. go nyams lta ba'i glu (lines 73–90). For complete translations of these two songs and more details, see Brunnhölzl 2007a.
• 209 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. I, pp. 196–97.
• 210 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 516–19.
• 211 Dpa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, 1109.
• 212 JNS, vol. 1, pp. 221 and 223.
• 213 Ibid., p. 210.
• 214 Ibid., pp. 33–34.
• 215 Kong sprul blo gros mtha' yas 1982, vol. III, p. 24.
• 216 JNS (vol. 2, pp. 297) identifies those who only realize the lack of nature of the apprehended as the Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, while the False Aspectarians are said to realize the lack of nature of both apprehender and apprehended. Thus, though there is no explicit division here into Real and False Aspectarians and the latter's doxographical place is not spelled out, the latter thus seem not to be included under the label Mere Mentalists. Also, though Mikyö Dorje does not explicitly call Maitreya and Asaṅga “Mādhyamikas” (or label them "False Aspectarians") here, he seems to suggest below that they (at least de facto) are. JNS explicitly refers to them as Mādhyamikas several times.
• 217 "The sevenfold collection" refers to Dharmakīrti's texts on valid cognition (such as the Pramāṇavārttika) and "the sūtra" refers to Dignāga's Pramāṇasamucchaya.
• 218 These are the Madhyāntavibhāga, the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, and the Uttaratantra.
• 219 This is quite a remarkable early analysis of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's approach, since it already outlines the model called "ascending/sliding scales of analysis," with which the contemporary Western scholars Dreyfus and McClintock describe Dharmakīrti's system. I do not at all mean to diminish their merits in conducting excellent and detailed analyses of said approach (in fact, I greatly admire it), but—as the above passage shows—the principle obviously has been recognized before.
• 220 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 4, pp. 406–8.
• 221 JNS, pp. 22–26.
• 222 Ruegg 2000, 80–81.
• 223 This refers to the tantras.
• 224 As quoted in TOK vol. 2, p. 553.
• 225 Audio recording of an oral commentary on the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga in Samye Ling, Scotland (April 1990).
• 226 See my forthcoming translation of the major portions of this text.
• 227 Dbu ma sogs gzhung spyi'i dka' gnad (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1990a, vol. 22, p. 450.3) and Dam chos dogs sel (in 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1992, 521).
• 228 JNS, 218 says that what is called "uncontaminated consciousness" is the unconditioned naturally abiding disposition (the very nature of the mind associated with stains), which is definitely the cause for perfect buddhahood and primordially exists in all beings.
• 229 In Buddhism, by definition, only conditioned phenomena can be causes since unconditioned phenomena are permanent and cannot perform any active function. Cessation refers to the absence of a previously existent conditioned phenomenon, but in itself, an absence cannot be a cause for anything (the most famous counterexamples to this pan-Buddhist position are Tsongkhapa and his followers, who hold that cessation is a functional entity that serves as the operational agent that links karmic causes and effects).
• 230 ZDC ( p. 29) adds that the immediate mind, once it becomes associated with the immaculate dharmas of the path, is also the cause for a buddha's qualities of freedom. The afflicted mind does not represent valid cognition since it is the root of all saṃsāric mistakenness and of producing all mental states of noncognition, wrong cognition, and doubt.
• 231 Hsüan-tsang's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (La Vallée Poussin 1928–1948, 442) speaks about uncontaminated and contaminated mentation as referring to the minds of bodhisattvas when being engaged in, and rising from, meditative equipoise, respectively, with pure mentation being related to the wisdom of equality.
• 232 As explained above, the sixth consciousness is said to have two functions―the conceptual mind and mental perception, which perceives outer objects just like the five sense consciousnesses.
• 233 ZDKT calls this "the internally oriented aspect" of the mental consciousness as opposed to its externally oriented aspects―mental perception and thoughts.
• 234 No early biography of either Rangjung Dorje or Dölpopa records any such meeting. Three considerably later sources by Mangtö Ludrub Gyatso (1523–1596), Tāranātha, and the Eighth Situpa (Chos kyi 'byung gnas and 'Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab 1972, 208.1–2) report a single meeting of the two, saying that the former made a prophesy about the latter coming to realize a particularly sublime view unlike his present one (for details, see Stearns 1999, 47–48). However, there is no mention of Dölpopa being a student of Rangjung Dorje.
• 235 I am not attempting to make any judgments as to whose view is better or "higher"―both being undoubtedly highly erudite scholars and realized meditation masters.
• 236 All these terms come from several sūtras on buddha nature, and some are also found in the Uttaratantra. Dölpopa also often qualifies his descriptions, such as by saying that, when making distinctions between what is permanent and impermanent in the context of giving explanations, buddha nature, nondual wisdom, and so on are permanent, enduring etc., whereas all seeming phenomena are impermanent. However, within profound meditative equipoise, all reference points need to be let go of. As for the above terms, given his overall explanations on buddha nature, it seems that Rangjung Dorje wishes to avoid expressions that bear strong absolutist connotations.
• 237 Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 128, 430, and 454.
• 238 Though Rangjung Dorje never mentions the specific term "ālaya-wisdom," one could read certain passages in his texts as implying the above distinction, such as OED (pp. 501.4–502.2) describing "ālaya" as a general label for the three natures, while referring to the imaginary and other-dependent natures as "ālaya-consciousness." The eight consciousnesses are the obscurations, while the four wisdoms are the stainlessness of these consciousnesses, thus being the perfect nature, with dharmadhātu wisdom being the matrix of all of these (see also AC, pp. 26ff.). Note, however, that some later Kagyü commentators on Rangjung Dorje's texts use this terminology (such as Tagramba and Jamgön Kongtrul).
• 239 Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 97, lines 15–17.
• 240 Just as an aside, the fact that JNS refutes this position (which is no doubt still maintained by many Kagyüpas today and is regarded as the epitome of the shentong view) twice and also negates the claim that the ālaya-consciousness transforms into mirrorlike wisdom (as mentioned above) is quite remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposedly written to uphold the shentong view.
• 241 JNS, vol. 1, p. 223 (interestingly and unlike with other opponents, the Eighth Karmapa uses honorific terms when he quotes Dölpopa). What Dölpopa is reported here as saying is a paraphrase of a passage in his Mountain Dharma (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, 121), which concludes, "If [existence] were to establish being [something], since excrement exists in humans, are humans then excrement or what?" Note that Hopkins (2006, 188), probably due to his Tibetan original reading bshad pa instead of bshang ba, has "explanations" instead of “excrement,” which, of course, makes the argument much less poignant.
• 242 See, for example, DSC, fols. 14a, 16b, 25b–26a; NT lines 89–90 and 94; A Song on the Ālaya.
• 243 See his Fourth Council (Tib. bka' bsdus bzhi pa) in Collected Works, vol. 1. Paro, Bhutan: 1984, 404–5.
• 244 For further details, see Schaeffer 1995, 25–36; Stearns 1995 and 1999; Hopkins 2002, 273–315 and 2006, 8–39; Mathes 1998 and 2004; and Burchardi 2007.
• 245 Tib. khrims khang lo tsā ba, aka bsod nams rgya mtsho.
• 246 Tib. bya bral rin chen bzang po.
• 247 Tib. dvags po rab 'byams pa chos rgyal bstan pa.
• 248 Tib. ngo khro rab 'byams pa dbang phyug dpal (also known as ngo khro rab 'byams bshes gnyen rnam rgyal).
• 249 Tib. dkon mchog yan lag.
• 250 Tib. mkha' khyab rdo rje.
• 251 The most extensive commentaries among these are those by Tagbo Rabjampa (353 folios) and Ngotro Rabjampa (337 folios). For a complete list of these commentaries on ZMND (including their size and short biographies of their authors), see Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ka, pp. 22–39.
• 252 Tib. chos kyi ‘byung gnas (also known as bstan pa'i nyin byed).
• 253 TOK, vol. 1, p. 461; vol. 2, p. 544.
• 254 Chos kyi 'byung gnas n.d., 20–22 (trans. Sherab Dorje 1995, 48–49).
• 255 Ibid., 24–26, and 30–31 (trans. 52–54 and 59–60).
• 256 Ibid., 32–39 (trans. 62–70).
• 257 Against common usage in Western translations, as indicated by Peter Roberts, Cyrus Streans, Elizabeth Callahan, and others, the above (and not nādī, vāyu, and tilaka) are the Sanskrit equivalents for the Tibetan rtsa rlung thig le in the Buddhist tantras and their Indian commentaries. This is also confirmed by the Sanskrit dictionary by Monier-Williams and the Tibetan-Sanskrit dictionary by J. S. Negi.
• 258 Ibid., 92 (trans. 127–28).
• 259 Thrangu Rinpoche 1990, 2–7.
• 260 Thrangu Rinpoche 2002, 20–51.

Abbreviations

AC - Rangjung Dorje's autocommentary on his Profound Inner Reality AS - Asiatische Studien D - Derge Tibetan Tripiṭaka DSC - Rangjung Dorje's commentary on the Dharmadhātustava J - Johnston's Sanskrit edition of the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā JAOS - Journal of the American Oriental Society JIABS - Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies JIBS - Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgakku Kenkyū) JIP - Journal of Indian Philosophy JNS - Mikyö Dorje's commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra LTWA - Library of Tibetan Works and Archives MM - Rangjung Dorje’s Aspiration Prayer of Mahāmudrā NT - Rangjung Dorje's Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathāgata Heart NTC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on NT NTKD - Kakyab Dorje's commentary on NT NTKY - Göncho Yenla's annotations to NT NY - Rangjung Dorje's Treatise on the Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom NYC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on NY NYKD - Kakyab Dorje's commentary on NY OED - Rangjung Dorje's Ornament That Explains the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga P - Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka PEW - Philosophy East and West T - A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. Tohoku Imperial University, 1934 Taishō - Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (The Chinese Buddhist Canon). Ed. J. Takakusu, K. Watanabe. Tokyo: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Kanko kai, 1970 TBRC - The Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (www.tbrc.org) TOK - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's Treasury of Knowledge WZKS - Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens ZDC - Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé's commentary on ZMND ZDKT - Karma Trinlépa's commentary on ZMND ZMND - Rangjung Dorje's Profound Inner Reality

ZZB - Trimkang Lotsāwa's commentary on The Profound Inner Reality

1. Rang byung rdo rje (Karmapa, 3rd). Rang byung rdo rje'i mgur rnam. Bidung, Tashigang, Bhutan: Kunchhap, 1983.
   1. 1990a. Rnam par shes pa dang ye shes 'byed pa'i bstan bcos. In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po, 49–54. Also as Rumtek blockprint, n.d.
   2. 1990b. De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po bstan pa'i bstan bcos. In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po, 55–62. Also as Rumtek blockprint, n.d.
   3. 2006a. Collected Works (Dpal rgyal dbang ka rma pa sku phreng gsum pa rang byung rdo rje'i gsung 'bum). 11 vols. Lhasa: Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang.
   4. 2006b. Chos dang chos nyid rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa'i rgyan. In Collected Works, vol. cha: 488–613.
   5. 2006c. De bzhin gshegs pa'i snying po bstan pa'i sa bcad. In Collected Works, vol. ja: 277–81.
   6. 2006d. Sems kyi khrul tshul brjod pa. In Collected Works, vol. ca: 101–6.
   7. 2006e. Rtogs pa brjod pa'i tshig bcad. In Collected Works, vol. ca: 89–92.
   8. 2006f. Gnas lugs gsal byed ye shes sgron me. In Collected Works, vol. A: 21–44.
   9. n.d.[a] Zab mo nang gi don gsal bar byed pa'i 'grel pa. Rumtek (Sikkim), India.
   10. n.d.[b] Zab mo nang gi don zhes bya ba'i gzhung. Rumtek (Sikkim), India.