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This dissertation is a study of the process through which Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, by synthesizing doctrines and texts into consistent models, integrates views of reality within doctrinal and soteriological systems. It consists of an analysis of the most fundamental doctrinal tension found in the Tibetan tradition, namely the apparent inconsistency of doctrines belonging to the negative Mādhyamika and to the more affirmative Yogācāra trends of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As a case study aiming to provide a first systematic examination of that problematic, the dissertation surveys and analyzes Tibetan interpretation of the set of texts referred to as the Five Treatises of Maitreya (byams chos sde lnga), and at the way those interpretations deal with the doctrinal tensions found in that set of text. In addition to providing a recension of major interpretations of the Five Treatises developed between 1100 and 1500, a detailed account is given of the model of interpretation given by gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan, a famous teacher of the Sa skya school of Tibetan Buddhism. When confronted with the features of other interpretations, Śākya mchog ldan's interpretation of the Five Treatises, which proceeds primarily by allowing a plurality of views to be maintained even at the level of definitive meaning, provides us with a new insight in the Tibetan philosophical tradition: the most fundamental dimension of philosophical reconciliation of doctrinal views, especially of the kind found in the Five Treatises, can be described as pertaining to textual hermeneutics. Moreover, Śākya mchog ldan's contribution to that domain of Buddhist thought, by placing hermeneutics at the very centre of his system of Buddhist doctrine and practice, suggests that hermeneutics is a fundamental category of all Buddhist philosophical debates, and that it should be part of any attempt to understand the Tibetan philosophical tradition.
Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.
Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, Sources of Tibetan Tradition, 373)
He begins with a cogent presentation of Mahāmudrā covering its sources, the objective Mahāmudrā, the subjective Mahāmudrā, its synonyms, the actual Mahāmudra experience among sublime beings, the analogous Mahāmudrā understanding among ordinary practitioners, and the Mahāmudrā concept according to the philosophical and tantric schools. Following this, he delves into how some later followers of Sakya and Kagyu tradition do not fathom the understanding of their respective teachings. He also points out how the followers of Kadampa tradition have missed the important original teachings of Atīśa and founding fathers.
In summary, Śākya Chokden underscores the point that there are two ways in which misconceptions are overcome: through an extrovert rational analysis and an introvert yogic contemplation. The Mahāmudrā tradition of Gampopa belongs to the latter category while the former includes the postulations of self-emptiness and other-emptiness.1. The emptiness posited through Mādhyamika reasoning. 2. The union of emptiness and bliss which fills the network of channels after tantric practice of consecration. 3. Experience of bare consciousness free from all mentation. 4. Non-apprehension of the mind either inside or outside, having colour and shape, etc. 5. The ground consciousness which is the cause of all experience.
Śākya Choden states that none of these capture the profound, precise, effective Mahāmudrā technique of Gampopa, which is compared to the Single White Remedy, and explains how they are not the same as Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā. Śākya Chokden also distinguishes the Chinese Chan practice from Gampopa’s Mahāmudrā and goes on to explain their differences. He elaborates on the practice of Mahāmudrā through the four points of single-pointedness (རྩེ་གཅིག་), non-elaboration (སྤྲོས་བྲལ་), one taste (རོ་གཅིག་), and non-meditation (སྒོམ་མེད་).On the topic of this person
Shakya Chokden articulated his position on other-emptiness in works written during the last thirty years of his life. In those works he advocated both Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka systems as equally valid forms of Madhyamaka, regarding the former as a system of other-emptiness and the latter as a system of self-emptiness. Instead of approaching the two systems as irreconcilable, he presented them as equally valid and effective, emphasized their respective strengths, and promoted one or the other depending on context and audience. Partly for these reasons, his own philosophical outlook does not neatly fall into the categories of other-emptiness or self-emptiness, and placing him squarely into the camp of “followers of other-emptiness” (gzhan stong pa)—as some advocates of later sectarian traditions did—does not do justice to him as a thinker. (Source: DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln)
This dissertation is a study of the process through which Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, by synthesizing doctrines and texts into consistent models, integrates views of reality within doctrinal and soteriological systems. It consists of an analysis of the most fundamental doctrinal tension found in the Tibetan tradition, namely the apparent inconsistency of doctrines belonging to the negative Mādhyamika and to the more affirmative Yogācāra trends of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As a case study aiming to provide a first systematic examination of that problematic, the dissertation surveys and analyzes Tibetan interpretation of the set of texts referred to as the Five Treatises of Maitreya (byams chos sde lnga), and at the way those interpretations deal with the doctrinal tensions found in that set of text. In addition to providing a recension of major interpretations of the Five Treatises developed between 1100 and 1500, a detailed account is given of the model of interpretation given by gSer mdog Paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan, a famous teacher of the Sa skya school of Tibetan Buddhism. When confronted with the features of other interpretations, Śākya mchog ldan's interpretation of the Five Treatises, which proceeds primarily by allowing a plurality of views to be maintained even at the level of definitive meaning, provides us with a new insight in the Tibetan philosophical tradition: the most fundamental dimension of philosophical reconciliation of doctrinal views, especially of the kind found in the Five Treatises, can be described as pertaining to textual hermeneutics. Moreover, Śākya mchog ldan's contribution to that domain of Buddhist thought, by placing hermeneutics at the very centre of his system of Buddhist doctrine and practice, suggests that hermeneutics is a fundamental category of all Buddhist philosophical debates, and that it should be part of any attempt to understand the Tibetan philosophical tradition.
Śākya Chokden’s Unique Understanding of Buddha-Nature
Stating that his presentation will be on Śākya Chokden, Khenpo gives a brief introduction to the figure of Śākya Chokden, who was a brilliant scholar with many unique interpretations and explanations of many topics. Although a Sakyapa, he posed questions about some points made by Sakya Paṇḍita in his Distinguishing Three Vows. This spurred an explanation from other Sakya scholars, which led to much greater clarity in understanding this work and the issues it raised.
Regarding buddha-nature, Śākya Chokden held a very unique position in the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist world, asserting that buddha-nature, or tathāgatagarbha, is synonymous with buddha and that it is only fully present in the state of buddhahood. Buddha-nature is equivalent to resultant dharmakāya according to Śākya Chokden, and it exists only after someone reaches the stage of being a sublime being on the Mahāyāna path. Khenpo points out that Śākya Chokden also argued that buddha-nature is a conscious awareness or cognition, not a mere emptiness which is a non-implicative negation.
In connection to buddha-nature, Śākya Chokden also argued that the False Aspectarian school is not part of the Mind Only school but rather a Middle Way school. Śākya Chokden saw Nāgārjuna as highlighting the rangtong view and Maitreya as underscoring the zhentong system, and they are ultimately the same. He took the five writings of Maitreya as texts propounding Middle Way thought. Among twenty-four volumes of his writings, he has four commentaries on the Ornament of Realization in which he discusses buddha-nature in the section on gotra, or spiritual gene.
Śākya Chokden was emphatic in claiming that sentient beings do not possess buddha-nature, as buddha-nature is the sphere of reality which is endowed with inseparable qualities such as ten powers, and such qualities cannot coexist with the impurities of the ordinary beings. He argued that the three reasons presented by Maitreya only proves that sentient beings have the possibility to attain buddha-nature, not that they already have it. He rejects buddha-nature being a non-implicative negation and asserts that the final wheel shows buddha-nature fully, while the first and middle wheels only help overcome the clinging to self.Śākya Mchog Ldan approaches the buddha-essence inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha in two ways. In some texts, such as the Essence of Sūtras and Tantras, he argues that it has to be identified only as purity from adventitious stains, i.e., the removal of all or some negative qualities that prevent one from directly seeing the buddha-essence. In other texts, such as The Sun Unseen Before, he interprets it as the purity from adventitious stains and the natural purity as it is taught in some sūtras of the Third Wheel of Doctrine and their commentaries. That type of natural purity is understood as the state of natural freedom from all obscurations inseparable from positive qualities of a buddha. Thereby, in this second type of texts, Śākya Mchog Ldan arrives at positing two types of the buddha-essence: relative (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti) and ultimate (don dam, paramārtha). Despite different interpretations of the natural purity, the identification of the buddha-essence as the purity from adventitious stains is present in both.
In his interpretation of the buddha-essence, Śākya Mchog Ldan utilizes the categories of the three levels found in the Sublime Continuum: the impure (ma dag, aśuddha), impure-pure (ma dag dag pa, aśuddhaśuddha, i.e. partially pure) and very pure (shin tu rnam dag, suviśuddha) levels that correspond respectively to the categories of sentient beings, bodhisattvas (understood as ārya bodhisattvas in this context), and tathāgatas.
Śākya Mchog Ldan argues that one becomes a possessor of the buddha-essence free from adventitious stains only on the impure-pure level. In other words, when bodhisattvas enter the Mahāyāna Path of Seeing (mthong lam, darśanamārga) simultaneously with the attainment of the first boddhisattva [sic] ground (byang chub sems pa’i sa, bodhisattavabhūmi) of Utmost Joy (rab tu dga’ ba, pramuditā), they become āryas, i.e. ‘exalted’ or ‘superior’, bodhisattvas, directly realize the ultimate truth (don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya), and thereby for the first time generate an antidote to obscurations of knowables (shes bya’i sgrib pa, jñeyāvaraṇa). They start gradually removing them, and thereby actually see at least a partial purification of stains ‘covering’ the buddha-essence, and its inseparability from at least some positive qualities. Such is not possible for anyone below that level, even for the non-Mahāyāna arhats (i.e., śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas). Thus, only Mahāyāna āryas have the buddha-essence characterized by the purity from adventitious stains; ārya bodhisattvas have only a part of it, while buddhas have it completely.
Among the distinctive aspects of Shakya Chokden s oeuvre are his several contributions to the history of Buddhist thought. Historical writing in Tibet (chapter 11) was interested above all in important political or religious events, and the lives of the major actors. Doctrinal or intellectual history was generally ignored, no doubt in part be- cause the outlook fostered in the monastic colleges was one of perennialism: the truths revealed in the Buddha s teaching were eternal, and thus exempt from the process of historical change. Knowledgeable scholars were, of course, aware that commentarial and interpretive traditions did have a history of sorts, but this awareness tended to be expressed in their own commentarial notes, not in dedicated doctrinal histories. In Shakya Chokden's writings, however, we find sustained historical essays on Indian and Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology, and of the Madhyamaka philosophy inspired by Nāgārjuna. The selections given here are drawn from his work on the latter, and may serve as an introductory guide to the philosophical writings included in the remainder of this chapter.
Shakya Chokden's discussion turns on the distinction made by Tibetan thinkers between two types of argument, termed in the present translation "autonomous reason” and "consequence.” The first refers to the method of using positive proof to demonstrate the truth or falsehood of a given proposition. The second, by contrast, only seeks to undermine the propositions advanced by a (real or presumed) opponent by drawing out their untenable consequences, and so is similar to reductio ad absurdum, or “indirect Proof,” in Western systems of logic. This distinction was often considered by Tibetans to he the basis for designating two distinct schools of Madhyamaka philosophy, Svātantrika (Autonomous Reasoning) and Prāsańgika (Consequentialist). MTK (Komarovski, Sources of Tibetan Tradition, 373)
i. The Wish-fulfilling Meru: A Discourse Explaining the Origination of Madhyamaka (dBu-ma'i byung-tshul rnam-par bshad-pa'i gtam yid-bzhin lhun-po),
ii. Drop of Nectar of Definitive Meaning: Entering the Gate to the Essential Points of the Two Truth[s] (bDen-pa gnyis-kyi gnas-la 'jug-pa nges-don bdud-rtsi thigs-pa), and
iii. Great Ship of Discrimination that Sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning: A Treatise Differentiating the Tenets of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka (sBu-ma thal-rang gi grub-mtha'i rnam-par dbye-ba'i bstan-bcos nges-don gyi rgya-mtshor 'jug-pa'i rnam-dpyod kyi gru-chen).
The Wish-fulfilling Meru attempts in presenting in a lucid and concise way the Madhyamaka view including the Tantrik-madhyamaka, and its spread in India and Tibet. Drop of Definitive Meaning, through its brief yet succinct explanation guides us in entering the spheres of definitive meaning by means of understanding the two truth[s]—the conventional truth and the ultimate truth. Great Ship of Discrimination that sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning extensively explains the divergence of Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, their philosophical views, and their interpretation of various concepts. In all, this anthology gives a general presentation of Madhyamaka schools and their views according to the great Sakyapa master. (Source: back cover)Tāranātha begins his somewhat delicate task of comparing the two masters Dol po pa and Śākya mchog ldan in a conciliating manner, by explaining that both supposedly see what is profound reality and hence should not have different thoughts about it. It is only in order to accommodate the different needs of their disciples that they enunciate variant views. Even though the essential gźan stoṅ view and meditation practices of both masters are the same, there are a lot of minor differences regarding tenets (grub mtha') that arise when formulating the view on the level of apparent truth.'"`UNIQ--ref-000067AE-QINU`"'
The first four of the twenty-one points address differences in the exegesis of the Madhyamaka and Maitreya texts which are considered to be commentaries on the Buddha's intention underlying the second and third turnings of the "Wheel of the Dharma" (dharmacakra).'"`UNIQ--ref-000067AF-QINU`"' Points 5-8 embody Śākya mchog ldan's and Dol po pa's different understanding of non-dual wisdom. In points 9-16, their views on the trisvabhāva theory are distinguished. In a related topic, Tāranātha also elaborates the different understandings of self-awareness (point 11), entities and non-entities, and conditioned and unconditioned phenonema (all in point 13). Next, our attention is drawn to different ways of relating the four noble truths with the apparent and ultimate (point 17). The last four points deal with the two masters' views on the Buddha-nature. (Mathes, "Tāranātha's 'Twenty-One Differences with Regard to the Profound Meaning'," 294–95)
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The second part will demonstrate the immense value of the preservation of these texts by giving an example of Śākya mchog ldan's writings, in the form of an English translation of his Rgyud bla ma'i rnam bshad sngon med nyi ma,[1] a commentary on The Rgyud Blama- also known as The Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra- in which he outlines his hermeneutical schema for understanding the Buddha nature.
The third part will list the titles contained in Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works reproduced and published in Bhutan in 1975 according to the copies kept at The National Library, Thimphu, including provisional references of published studies in English that have dealt with them.
Notes
- In Śākya mchog ldan's Collected Works, 'dzam gling sangs rgyas bstan pa'i rgyan mchog yongs rdzogs gnas lngar mkhyen pa'i pandita chen po gser mdog pan chen shākya mchog ldan gyi gsung 'bum legs bshad gser gyi bdud rtsi, vol. 13, Thimphu 1975.
Philosophical positions of this person
All beings possess a "nominal" buddha-nature as is taught in the second-wheel teachings, while only bodhisattvas on the first bhumi and up (i.e. Noble Bodhisattvas) possess the "actual" buddha-nature as it was taught in the third-wheel teachings. (see note from Brunnhölzl below)
- "Though everyone including ordinary beings possesses wisdom in a nonmanifest manner, only bodhisattvas on the first bhūmi onward manifest this wisdom as the direct realization of ultimate reality. This means that only such bodhisattvas possess the actual tathāgata heart in that they see at least certain degrees of purification of the stains that cover the tathāgata heart as well as its inseparability from certain degrees of buddha qualities. Ordinary beings thus do not possess this actual tathāgata heart at all, while buddhas possess it in its completeness. In other words, the close connection between seeing the tathāgata heart free from adventitious stains and possessing it, as well as between becoming free from adventitious stains and “attaining” the qualities of a buddha, is a prominent feature of Śākya Chogden’s interpretation of tathāgatagarbha." Brunnhölzl, K., When the Clouds Part, p. 78.
- See also Wangchuk, Tsering, The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows, p. 114.
He distinguishes between different types of buddha-nature taught in the second and third wheels, though the third is the more definitive and represents the "actual" tathāgatagarbha.
- "In sum, Śākya Chogden distinguishes three kinds of tathāgata hearts: (1) the nominal tathāgata heart that is the mere natural purity (as taught in the second dharma wheel and its Madhyamaka commentaries), (2) the actual tathāgata heart that is the purity of adventitious stains and represents the relative tathāgata heart (as taught in the third dharma wheel and the Nonaspectarian system of Maitreya and Asaṅga, as well as in the teachings of expedient meaning in the second dharma wheel as these are interpreted by the third dharma wheel), and (3) the actual tathāgata heart that is the natural purity that is inseparable from all buddha qualities and represents the ultimate tathāgata heart (as taught in the system of Maitreya and Asaṅga and in the third dharma wheel)." Brunnhölzl, K., When the Clouds Part, p. 78.
- See also Wangchuk, Tsering, The Uttaratantra in the Land of Snows, p. 115.
Affiliations & relations
- Sakya · religious affiliation
- Sangpu Neutok · primary professional affiliation
- rong ston shes bya kun rig · teacher
- don yod dpal ba · teacher
- Ngor mkhan chen, 1st · teacher
- spyang lung chos sdings gzhon nu blo gros · teacher